税务会计与财务会计一致下影响公司会计政策选择的因素外文翻译

1、原文:外文文献翻译Factors influencing a firms accounting policy deciSons whenaccounting and financial accounting coincidel1.ln troducti onA firms accounting policy decisions are made on the basis of the onsequencesof the alter native p olicies。 Accord ing to Holthause n and Leftwich, afirms reporting p olicy

2、 choice has econo mic con seque nceswhe n cha nges in the rulesused to calculate acco un ti ng nu mbers alter the distributi on of a firms cash ows, orthe wealth of p arties who use those nu mbers for con tract ing or decisi on mak ing. In additi on to their use in the con tract ing agreeme nts betw

3、ee n the various p arties of afirm reported acco un ti ng fi the level of panys tax liability . This is the case ,pro vided that the same acco unting treatme nt is used for finan cial reporting and tax purp oses alike. Tax planning can result in an in crease in the firms tax sav ing andcon seque ntl

4、y it can have a p ositive effect on a firms cash ows .As a con seque nce,assu ming rati on ality and efficie nt cap ital markets, an acco un ti ng p olicy thatmi ni mizes taxable n come should be p referred ;However, give n that the reduct ion of afirms tax liability is usually panied by a corres po

5、nding decrease in itsre ported e, tax planning, un der certa in circumstances, can have seriousimplications for various parties invoIved with a firm. The unfav orable picture of thefirms finan cial po siti on that may emerge as a result of a decrease in the level ofreported figures, can have serious

6、 consequenceswith regard to firms ability to meetits con tractual and regulatory obligati ons, while shareholders and man agers person awealth may be affected as well. These implications have been designated asthe non-tax costs-or financial reporting costs-of a tax reduci ng p olicy. Each party ofa

7、firm is supp osed to trade-off the tax ben efits of an acco unting choice, aga inst thee nsuing non-tax costs. The e of this trade-off is supp osedto inuence afirms acco un ti ng p olicy decisi ons.The aim of this study is to pro vide an un dersta nding of the factors that inuen cethe acco un ti ng-

8、p olicy decisi ons of firms op erati ng in an acco un ti ng en vir onment in which tax rules are used for finan cial reporting purpo ses. For this purpo se, oun ti ng en vir onment of Greece has bee n chosen. In Greece, tax accounting andfinancial accounting coincide and it is expected that tax cons

9、iderations will inuencemanagementsaccounting policy decisions. This study investigates whether non-taxc on siderati ons can inuence firms acco un ti ng-p olicy decisi ons and prompts them todeviate from a tax-reducing policy. The structural characteristics of the broadereconomic and bus in ess en vi

10、r onment of Greece affect the sig nifica nee of the non-taxcosts relat ing to a p articular acco unting p olicy decisi on. The similarities of the oun ti ng and bus in ess en vir onment with that of other European and non-Eur opeancoun tries mea ns that the findings of this study may be of some help

11、 in un dersta ndin gthe acco un ti ng p olicies of firms op erati ng in other coun tries.I.Factors givi ng rise to sig nifica nt non-tax costsThe sig nifica nee of tax ben efits and non-tax costs are con diti onal upon certa in characteristicsof a firm. A firms ownership structure has been hypothesi

12、zed to beassociated with the magnitude of the non-tax costs that can be gen erated fromtax-mi ni mizi ng strategy. The man ageme nt of firms characterized by a diffusedownership and a separation between management and ownership mightfacesignificant non-tax costs. The extensive use of accounting-base

13、dcontractsin thesefirms can in duce man agers to assig n a great deal of imp orta nee to the leel of e. Furthermore, man agers p erce ptio ns regard ing the impact that acco un ti ngfigures have on their evaluati on by the exter nal users of acco unts may make the mp articularly concerned about the

14、level of rep orted p rofits. On theother hand, for thosefirms in which ownership is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small scheme is reduced, while man agers muni cate any in formatio n directlyto shareholders without hav ing to use p ublished finan cial stateme nts (Klasse n, 1997).Thus, n

15、on-tax costs may be of lesser imp orta nee and firms are exp ected to pu rsue amore aggressive tax-reduci ng p olicy. The findings of empirical research seem tosupport the argument that parison to the widely-held firms, the closely-held ones are less concerned about the non-tax con seque nces of the

16、ir acco un ti ng choices,a nd they are more in cli ned to imp leme nt a tax-reduci ng strategy (Smith, 1976;Dhaliwal et al., 1982;nu mber ofshareholders who actively con trol the firms management, the necessity for using abcHunt, 1986; Penno and Sim on, 1986; Niehaus, 1989; Scholesa nd Wolfs on, 199

17、2; Wolfs on,1993;Cloyd et al., 1996; Klasse n, 1997).In Greece, as in many Euro pean coun tries (e.g. Fran ce, Italy), theow nershi p-structure of the majority of the firms is characterized by a high level ofconcen trati on (Nobes and P arker, 2000). I n most casesthe owners are activelyinvoIved in

18、panies administration, occupying important posts within ani zatio nal structure of their firms (OECD, 1995; Makridakis et al., 1997;Sykia nakis, 2004).Firms owners can directly and effectively monitor and motivatetheir subordinate managers and they do not n eed to emp loy incen tive schemes.Further,

19、 man agers in such firms muni cate in formatio n regard ing their performa nee directly to their sup erior own er-ma nagers without hav ing to rely uponfinan cial stateme nts. Un der these circumsta nces, it is argued that theow nershi p-structure of most Greek firms con tributes to the ado ptio n o

20、f an aggressivetax-reduc ing strategy, since their own ersh ip status does not app ear to gen eratesig nifica nt non-tax costs.The use of acco unting figures in a firms negotiations with the providers of creditcapital, andthe in clusi on of acco unting nu mbers-based terms in the debt agreeme nts,su

21、ggesthat a p articular acco un ti ng choice can gen erate imp orta nt non-tax costs(Wo Ifson ,1993). Lower rep orted profitfigures may adversely in flue nee theba nkscredit decisions, and thus raise the cost of capital for thefirm (Deak in ,1979).Furthermore, the violatio n of the terms of loa n agr

22、eeme nts pl aces a firm in tech ni cal default, a situatio n that can have p articularly adverse con seque nces for afirm(G op alakrish nan and P arkash, 1995). I n order to reduce the likelihood that theseeve ntswill occur, firms are more likely to ado pt an e-i ncreas ing acco un ti ngp olicy. How

23、ever, such a decisi on is most likely to be associated with imp orta nt taxcosts, since the result ing in crease in the rep orted e is likely to follow anin crease in taxable e (Maydew, 1997). The finan cial leverage of a firm is usedas a proxy for the firm aeed for debt capital, and its proximity t

24、o violating debtcovenants (Christie,1990). The more leveraged firms are exp ected to face higher non-tax costs, and thus they are more likely to select the e increasing choice.Findings of empirical research suggest that the more leveraged firms do trade-off taxbe nefits aga inst non-tax costs.Banks

25、are the main providers of funds for panies. The dominant roleof bank credit in the financing of bus in ess enterp rises is a disti net characteristic notonly of the Greek bus in ess environment, but also of many other Europeancountries(e.g. France, Germany). Banks have developed a close relationship

26、 panies, while in certain cases they own part of the firm sharecap ital. Thus,ba nks in many in sta nces may directly obtai n any releva nt financialin formatio n, without hav ing to rely upon p ublicly disclosed data. It has bee n argued that the factthatfinan cial acco un ti ng in many European co

27、un tries has bee n domin ated by taxregulati ons and hasn ever devel oped into a genuin ely independent branch ounting can be p artially attributed to the factthat whe n:.eve n panies in con ti nen tal coun tries are domin ated by ban ks,gover nments or families, then eed for p ublished in formati o

28、n is less clear .Furthermore, in Greece the large state-c on trolled banks are not supp osed toalways base theircredit decisi ons on en tirely objective and rati onal finan cial criteria(OECD,1995; Pap as, 1993;Makridakis et al., 1997). Con seque ntly, the imp orta nee ofp ublic acco unting in forma

29、ti on may furtherdimini sh. Moreover, a con seque nceof theclose relati onship betwee n banks panies is such that aviolati on of a debtcove nant may not have serious con seque ncesfor a firm. Withi n this con text,atax-reduci ng strategy is not likely to give rise to imp orta nt non-tax costs.Yet, s

30、ome significant non-tax costs can still arise. Even if economic criteria donot alwaysplay a crucial role in banks credit decisi ons, panies will berequired to meet some official criteriabased on acco un ti ng nu mbers whe n making aloa n app licatio n. If the applying firm has a strong linkwith a p

31、articular bank, on eca nnot rule out the p ossibility that the banks officials will to“adjusti ng acoo unting figures in order to allow the firm ply with the releva nt terms.Thus, atendency of a firm to in flue nee acco unting figures through the choice of anapprop riate acco untingp olicy may be re

32、in forced. Furthermore, it cannot be assumedthatall firms enjoy the p rivilege ofhav ing a close relatio nship with a bank. As aeon seque nee, finan cial acco unting con siderati ons canstill in flue nee a firm oun tiqpolicy decisi ons. Within a framework of efficie ntly functioningcapitalmarkets, s

33、hareholders of public (listed) firms would prefer higher cash flows, sincethatwould result in higher share p rices. Con seque ntly, higher tax-sav ings would bep referred. This couldhave bee n the case for Greek p ublic firms, since the majority ofthem are own er-c on trolled firms andstockholdi ngs

34、 con stitute a substa ntial proportionof the personal wealth of the own er-ma nagers. Yet,the p erceived in flue nee ounting figures may have on the firm share p rice can enhance theimp orta nceassig ned to finan cial reporting figures. A firms management might believe thatrefigures have a con sider

35、able impact on its share p rice. This impact maybegreater tha n that result ingfrom a possible change in the level of firm ax-liability.In this case, it is possible that a firm sman ageme nt will aim to report higher figures ino rder to in flue nee its share p rice, des pite a corres ponding in crea

36、se in tax costs. Thus ,p ublic firms are more likely, comp ared to the p rivate (non-listed) on es, to p refer e in creas ing op ti on. The fact that the own er-ma nagers are prep ared to forego taxbe nefits in order to achieve higher rep orted earnin gs, does not imply that they do n otaimtowards t

37、he maximization of a firm value, and as a consequenee of their wealth.Theown ers-ma nagers believe that firms value is a function of the firm s acco un ti ngp rofits. Asal. put it:If man agers believe that stock p rices react more stro ngly to rep orted e tha nto cash flow, thep ublic cap ital marke

38、t in troduces a poten tial non-tax cost that servesto discourage them from tax and creditors are willi ng to supplyfunds on terms that are affected by rep orted acco un ti ng nu mbers, man agers an dexisti ng shareholders may unanim ously wish to report high e, eve n at theex pense of paying additio

39、nal tax. That is, firm value may be maximized by reportinghigher e rather than reduc ing tax p ayme nts Cloyd et al.con formity, eve n if con formity in creases the firm sex pected future cash flows. . . . , if new inve：Accord ing to the Greek finan cial p ress, acco unting figures have a dominantin

40、 flue nee on the firm s stock value. Furthermore, it has been asserted that it is mon for listed firms to get invoIved in e man ageme nt through theselective app licati on of acco unting p olicies. With in this con text, it can be exp ectedthat a tax-reduc ing p olicy due to its decreas ing in flue

41、nee on the level of rep orted profits, can gen erate for the Greek p ublic firms some non-tax costs, which mayp reve nt them from pursuing such a p olicy.2.MethodologyThe above discussion indicates that managemen 羽erceptions regarding the impactof acco un ti ng figures on the users of acco unts migh

42、t gen erate imp orta nt non-tax costsfor a firm pursuing a tax-reduc ing p olicy. A po stal survey was con ducted in order togather in formati onrelati ng to man ageme nt s p erce pti ons about the in flue nee oun ti ng figures upon the users of acco unts.The res pondents were asked to in dicatethe

43、exte nt to which they believe that acco unting in formati on in flue nces:.the lending decisi ons of the pro viders of debt cap ital; and.the firm s share price.Furthermore, this study inv estigates the exte nt to which certa in p rofit-relatedobjectives werepu rsued. The follow ing e-related object

44、ives have bee niden tified:.the mini mizatio n of the firms tax burden;.the reporting of p rofits that will in flue nee the firms share price;.the reporting of p rofits that will in flue nee the bankscredit decisi ons; and.the reporting of p rofits that will en able the firm to avoid breachi ng the

45、debtcove nantsSource: Christos Tzovas. Factors in flue ncing a firm acco un ti ng p olicy decisi on swhe n taxacco unting and finan cial acco unting coin cideJ.Ma nagerial Audit in gJo urn al, 2006:372-386.译文:税务会计与财务会计一致下，影响公司会计政策选择的因素一个公司的会计政策的选择是以替代政策的选择为基础。霍尔索森和莱夫特威克认为当一个公司报告政策的选择具有经济后果时，那么当事人一方使

46、用会计数字就可以进行财富的决策，当这些数字的规则变化了，就会改变该公司的现金流的分布。此外，他们使用各个公司之间的合同协议，来报告一家公司的税收水平是否可靠。如果其税收水平是可靠的，那么相同的会计处理就可以用来反映在财务报告上并达到税收的目的。税收筹划可以使该公司达到少缴税的目的，因此，其对一家公司的现金流入具有积极的影响。假设市场是合理以及高效的那么,会计政策就可以达到税收最小化，收入与利润最大化的结果。然而,考虑到一家企业税收负担的减少通常伴随着其报告收入的减少，在特定环境下，税收筹划就可能对公司的一些相关方面产生重要的影响。该公司的一个不利方面就显现出来了 ，就是可能会带来该公司报告数据

47、水平的下降，可能影响该公司有关的能力，股东和经理的个人财富也可能会受到影响。这些影响已被指定为“非税”的成本或财务报告的成本，从而妨碍了税收政策实施的有效性。每一个企业应该对随之而来的贸易非税收成本估量一个会计选择的税收优惠。这种权衡的结果 应该能影响一个公司的会计政策的选择。这项研究的目的是提供一个可理解的因素，这个因素可以影响一家公司在特定会计环境下对会计政策的选择。为此，希腊的会计环境已被选定。在希腊，税务会计与财务会计具有一致性,能影响管理层的会计政策选择的确定。 研究就是要探讨是否非税收方面的考虑会影响公司的会计政策选择的决定，并提示他们是否偏离了税收政策。在希腊更广泛的经济及营商环

48、境的结构特点影响了非税收成本涉及到的特定会计政策选择。希腊会计和其他欧洲及非欧洲国家的营商环境的相似性意味着，这项研究结果可能对于在一定程度上了解其他国家经营企业的会计政策有帮助。在希腊,在许多欧洲国家（如法国,意大利）,大部分的公司所有权结构的特点是高水平的高度集中（诺贝斯和帕克，2000年）。在大多数情况下，业主积极参与其公司的管理，其在企业的组织结构中占有重要的岗位（经合组织,1995年；Makridakis等,1997;Sykianakis,2004）。公司的所有者可以直接和有效监督和激励下属的经营 ，他们并不需要使用刺激性计划。此外，这些公司的经理就可以传递信息，而不必依赖财务报表直

49、接向上级所有者传递信息。 在这种情况下,它认为大多数希腊企业的所有制结构有助于采纳一个积极的税收减少的会计政策，因为他们所有权状况似乎并没有产生明显的非税收成本。一家公司会计数据的使用与信贷资金提供者，以及对以会计数剧为基础的债务协议的条款列入都有关联。一个公司的谈判表明，使用一个特定的会计选择会产生重要的非税成本（欧胜,1993）。低报的利润数字可能产生不利影响,从而提高公司的资本（迪肯,1979）的成本。此外，贷款协议的条款违反了地方的默认情况下，会产生一个坚定的（戈帕拉克里希南与帕卡什,1995年）特别不利的后果。为了减少这些事件的发生的可能性，公司更可能采用收入增加的会计政策。然而，这

50、样的决定是最有可能与重要的税收成本相联系，因为报告收入的增加很可能会导致后续的应纳税所得额（Maydew,1997年）的增加。一个企业的财务杠杆运用，作为该公司的债务资本的需求代理，其邻近违反债务契约（佳士 ,1990年）。越是运用杠杆的企业将越面临更高的非税收成本，因此他们更可能选择的使收入增加得选择。实证研究结果发现，更多的杠杆企业从非税收成本的权衡中取得税收优惠。银行是希腊公司资金的主要提供者。银行信贷在企业融资业务的主导作用是它的一个显着特点。银行已经与许多公司密切的关系，在特定情况下，他们自己就是公司的股本的一部分。因此,在许多情况下，银行可直接获得任何相关的财务资料，而不必依靠公开披露的数据。有人认为,事实上,很多欧洲的会计，尤其是财务会计一直占据着国家的税收法规和有没有发展成一个真正独立的分支机构可部分归因于一个事实国家甚至大陆的上市公司是由银行，政府或家庭为主，对发布信息的需要是不太清楚。此外,在希腊的大型国有控股银行不应该时刻以完全客观、其合理的财政和信贷决策组织为标准（O