2888.B 浅谈家族企业文化的建设 外文参考文献译文及原文doc

1、本科毕业设计（论文）外文参考文献译文及原文 学 院 经济管理学院 专 业 工商管理 年级班别 学 号 学生姓名 指导教师 2007年 6月 15 日目 录外文文献译文1外文文献原文7 尽管董事会缺少独立董事，小股东也缺少投票权，家族企业对全体股东来说仍然是较好的选择只要家族企业的创始人担任首席执行官或者董事会主席。当创始人的后代接手后，公司的价值就开始下跌了。以上是沃顿商学院教授拉夫阿密特（raphael (raffi) amit）和哈佛商学院教授贝伦维拉伦格（belen villalonga）的一篇论文中的部分结论。这篇题为家族对公司的所有、控制和管理如何影响公司价值的论文认为，当创始人担任

2、家族企业的ceo ，或者当创始人雇佣他人担任ceo ，而自己担任董事会主席时，家族企业要比非家族企业业绩更佳。一旦创始人的后代担任家族企业的ceo，就算创始人仍然担任董事会主席，企业的市场价值就会下跌。 阿密特和维拉伦格分析了1994至2000年间财富500强企业的代理数据。出于研究目的需要，他们将家族企业定义为：创始人或因血缘或婚姻关系而成为家庭成员的人担任高层执行官、董事的公司或者是由一名或全体家族成员共同持有至少5%公司股份的公司。一些非常成功的美国公司就是家族企业，如沃尓玛、家得宝、亨氏、鲁伯梅、布莱克戴克。这些公司有一点是相同的都有一个有远见、有管理技巧，能凝聚员工的创始人。然而当创

3、始人的愿景被其后代冲淡时，公司业绩就滑坡了，福特汽车和摩托罗拉便是如此。威廉福特二世是亨利福特的第四代子孙，三年前他担起了复兴福特汽车的使命，开始执掌福特汽车。这家汽车巨头最近报告说，9月份的销售额比去年同期下降了7%，其中部分原因是日本汽车制造商带来的激烈竞争。无线电话制造商摩托罗拉的首席执行官克里斯托弗加文（christopher galvin）的曾祖父是摩托罗拉的创始人。面对强大的竞争对手诺基亚和三星，他在1月份正式将大权移交给前sun公司的总裁爱德华赞德（edward zander）。从数字上来看，阿密特和维拉伦格研究样本中家族企业比非家族企业年轻（家族企业平均历史62.68岁；非家族

4、企业平均历史72.19岁），销售额增长率更高（19.6%对13.8%），资产回报率也更高（11.6%对10.9%）。阿密特指出，家族企业的一些负面因素有：股东投票权的显著差异、交叉持股、集团投票（见注解）。这些制度的设计目的都是为了保证公司掌握在家族手中。 虽然有这些家族控制的问题存在，但是只要创始人仍然参与公司管理，家族企业仍然能为股东带来更多的利益。对小股东来说，一家理想的家族企业应该是由创始人担任ceo或董事会主席，并且没有任何像a、b级的超级投票股或非流通股的控制强化机制的公司。 创始人是关键阿密特和维拉伦格的研究目标是家族企业是否为股东带来更多的利益。他们发现，家族企业胜过非家族企业

5、似乎有两个原因。许多非家族企业都有一个普遍存在的问题管理层与股东之间就回报、管理层的薪资、公司治理等问题发生的冲突。“任何股权分散的公司都存在着所有者与管理者之间的冲突，”阿密特说，“而在家族企业里，管理者就是所有者，因此不存在这种冲突。”确实，家族企业有大股东和小股东关系紧张这一问题。然而，股东仍然是划算的。因为管理者和所有者之间的冲突所消耗的成本要高于大、小股东争吵的成本。这些争论也许有助于营运结果，也许有害于营运结果，但家族企业能有效运转的真正原因在于其创始人。“我们没有对创始人的作用进行特别研究，但他们的作用确实存在，”阿密特说，“创始人给整个员工队伍注入了一种敬业奉献的精神。这让家族

6、企业不断进步。非家族企业没有这些。”这就是为什么当家族企业处境不妙的时候，就会让创始人回来把准航向。1997年，苹果电脑合伙创始人史蒂夫钱伯斯（steve jobs）回到公司出任临时ceo ，后又任永久ceo。他用imac、ipod等新产品扭转了大局。10月1日，仁科赶走了ceo克雷格康维（craig conway），迎回了创始人戴维杜夫（david duff）。查尔斯施瓦（charles schwab）公司宣布该季度盈利下跌10%后，其创始人兼主席于7月重回公司出任ceo。阿密特和维拉伦格的发现说明了创始人的作用。这项研究显示，由创始人兼ceo掌舵的公司市场价值对资产的平均比率，又称“托宾q

7、值”，最高。创始人任ceo兼主席的公司的平均“托宾q值”达3.12。创始人任主席，雇佣外人担任ceo的公司的“托宾q值”有将近2.81。然而，当创始人的后代参与管理事务时，创始人与公司绩效之间的因果联系似乎被打破了。当后代接替创始人担任主席时，“托宾q值”整整跌了一个点，从2.81跌到1.81。当ceo 也由创始人后代担任时，市场价值对资产之比继续下跌。教训：家族企业需要创始人的参与才能成功。“我们的研究结果证明，创始人能给公司带来宝贵的技能，”阿密特和维拉伦格写道，“然而，当我们对主席和ceo的职位进行研究后，我们发现，在创始人同时兼任主席和ceo二职与创始人任主席，另外雇佣一个ceo这两种

8、情况下，创始人的技能对公司来说几乎是同样宝贵的。对于这一现象，一种可能的解释是创始人带给公司的技能具有这样的性质：他们也许是能给人以灵感的领袖、伟大的梦想家或者是极具天赋的科学家。但他们也许不是，也不需要是，优秀的经理人。”公司族谱尽管上文已经给出了“家族企业”的定义，到底是什么构成了家族企业却并不总是很清楚。有些公司类似惠普（hp）。惠普公司由比尔惠立特（bill hewlett）和戴维普卡德（david packard）共同创立。这两大家族现在控制着惠普大量股份。普卡德家族的股份是惠立特家族的两倍。阿密特和维拉伦格认为，普卡德家族在惠普掌握着控制权。谷类食品公司克罗格（kellogg）由w

9、.g.克罗格（w.g. kellogg）基金会控制。时装零售商诺德斯托（nordstrom）也是一家家族企业。 但其他公司就没那么明显了。时代华纳于1996年被特纳广播公司收购后成为一家家族企业。特纳广播公司的创始人泰德特纳成为合并后新实体最大的股东。欧齐苏贝格（ochs-sulzberger）和葛兰汉（graham）两大家族通过破产收购分别接收了纽约时报和华盛顿邮报。阿密特综合分析了全体家族成员及代表对企业的所有权以及基金会持有的企业股份。一旦家族对企业的所有权成立，公司即分属以下各大类： 有控制机制、ceo为家族成员的家族企业。在这样的企业，家族通过超级投票股等机制控制公司。超级投票股不能

10、公开交易，家族成员所持有的每一股都拥有多于普通股几倍的投票权。 有控制机制、ceo为非家族成员的家族企业。这样的家族企业有一套机制保证家族的投票权，同时雇佣家族外的人士来管理公司。例如，20世纪90年代，福特雇佣杰克纳斯（jacques nasser）任ceo，而在此之后，又把大权交回给福特后代。 ceo为家族成员、没有控制增强机制的家族企业。在以上所有类型的家族企业，创始人是否参与公司管理似乎是公司成功与否的最大决定因素。良好的公司治理尽管家族企业往往缺少独立董事，并且给家族内部成员更多的投票权，家族企业在公司治理上仍然比非家族企业胜出一筹。对阿密特来说，这是更让人感到惊讶的发现之一。家族企

11、业的平均公司治理指数为9.05，而非家族企业为10.02（公司治理指数越低越好）。“家族企业往往比较简洁，”阿密特说。他接着说，家族企业给高层管理人员的“金降落伞”（见注解）较少。发生收购时，也无需向高层管理人员支付大量遣散费。 不过，这并不等于说家族企业就不存在公司治理上的问题，阿密特补充道。家族企业更有可能通过发行投票权不同的股票等措施来保证对公司的控制权。在名列财富500强的家族企业中，各大家族拥有全部股份的16%，但有50%的家族企业使用控制增强机制。与之形成对比的是，仅有13%的非家族企业使用控制增强机制。这些机制使家族股东可以拥有比他们的所有权股更多的投票权。阿密特和维拉伦格指出，

12、家族企业还通过其他方式保证对公司的控制权。他们把非家族成员股东的比例保持在一个比较低的水平。此外，同非家族企业相比，家族企业中独立董事所占的比重要低得多，阿密特说。但是，他补充道，就算把所有潜在的公司治理问题都考虑在内，家族企业仍然胜出一筹。 以今天的公司治理观点来看，成为一家缺少独立董事、投票权掌控在一个家族手中的公司的股东似乎不是一个好主意。但关键在于家族企业是有价值的，尤其是在创始人担任主席兼ceo，为员工创造了一种积极的企业文化的情况下！“总之，我们的研究结果说明，要知道家族企业与非家族企业相比价值是多还是少？什么时候多？什么时候少？你必须分清构成“家族企业”这一定义的三个基本元素所有

13、权、控制、管理，”阿密特和维拉伦格写道，“虽然家族对企业控制过多会带来负担，但家族拥有企业这一点有诸多优势，对于小股东来说，在一家由创始人任ceo的家族企业能比在一家非家族企业得到更多回报。”注：集团投票：股东并非根据个人喜好，以个人名义进行投票，而是联合起来投票，以体现小集团的意愿。金降落伞：反兼并的策略之一，指公司的最高管理阶层在被聘用或续约时与公司签下合约，约中规定：若公司被兼并而致使该高级经理失业，控制公司的兼并者将支付该经理庞大金额的遣散费用、红利及股票选择权。这便是高级经理的“金降落伞”。家族企业的文化建设是一个渐渐的完善过程。只有针对家族企业的文化建设方面的存在的现实问题适时地进

14、行改革和创新，才能使家族式企业有一个更好的发展，才能不断提升家族企业的价值。如何衡量家族企业的价值呢? 我们可以用企业每年的净利润（为了分析简单，这里撇开了其他非物质要素对企业价值的影响）和企业寿命这两个维度来衡量。随企业规模的扩大，作为企业所有者的企业主，应该具备理性能力，积极地在适当的时候推进家族企业的文化建设，把这种被动的学习变成积极主动的适应。纵坐标表示企业的净利润,即企业每年的收入总额扣除掉各类成本及正常开支的余额。横坐标表示企业的寿命。则企业的价值就是各年的企业净利润总和。由于通货膨胀率等各因素的影响，不同年份即使获得一样的净利润，但它们对企业的影响是不一样的。为了消除这个影响，需

15、要给每一年所获得的净利润赋权，然后再相加。因此，企业的价值可以用数学公式表示为y= ，i代表企业创建后的年份，n代表企业的寿命，x代表企业的年净利润， w代表年净利润的权重。适时积极推进家族企业的文化建设可以作用于关系企业价值的这两个维度，通过增加企业的每年净利润和延长企业寿命来提升企业价值。当前，我国的许多家族企业都已经具备了一定的规模，家族企业正在进行品牌和文化建设，这种建设并不是学者教导的结果，而是企业自身演进的自然产物。家族企业文化建设不仅要靠企业主和管理者的推动和全体企业员工的参与，也需要政府。政府只有成为可靠的财产权利的保护者和诚信原则的维护者等，为家族企业的文化建设创造良好的外部

16、环境。纵上所述，企业特定的组织形态是一定条件下企业内外环境的产物，家族企业产生和成长是市场选择下的一种适应性组织形态。企业文化是关系家族企业成败兴衰的关键，家族企业文化建设是家族企业演化到一定阶段后的必然要求。家族企业文化建设应该从家族企业存在的各种具体问题出发,在企业主重视、全员参与下，适时积极推进家族企业的文化建设。新的企业文化形成是一个渐渐的过程, 只有通过反复的宣传和强化，将员工的感性认识上升到理性认识，将少数人的观念逐渐变为大多数员工的共识，才能真正发挥企业文化的导向、凝聚、激励和约束功能，企业的价值才能得到大大的提升，家族企业才能实现可持续发展。当前，我国私营企业的治理形式普遍存在

17、家族化现象。从制度经济学和演化经济学的视角对当前家族企业的文化建设问题进行分析和评价，解决家族企业在文化建设过程中存在的各种现实问题，以促进家族企业价值的提升。despite the lack of independent directors on their boards and voting power for minority shareholders, family-run companies are still the better bet for all stakeholders as long as the founder of the firm is involved as c

18、hief executive officer or chairman. if the descendent of a founder runs the company, value is lost. those are some of the conclusions of a paper by wharton professor raphael (raffi) amit and harvard business school professor belen villalonga. the paper - how do family ownership, control and manageme

19、nt affect firm value? - suggests that family ownership of corporations performs better than non-family firms when the founder serves as the ceo of a family firm or as its chairman with a hired ceo. when a descendent serves as the ceo of a family-run company - even if the founder remains chairman - t

20、he firms market value declines. amit and villalonga analyzed proxy data on all fortune 500 firms from 1994 to 2000. for the purposes of the study, a family firm was defined as a company where the founder or member of the family by either blood or marriage was an officer, a director or the owner of a

21、t least 5% of the firms equity either individually or in a group. some of the most successful u.s. companies, including wal-mart, home depot, heinz, rubbermaid and black & decker, are family-run. the hallmark of each of these companies is a founder who had vision and the managerial skills to rally e

22、mployees around a business.but performance slips when the founders vision is diluted by descendents, as shown by such firms as ford motor and motorola. william ford jr., a fourth generation descendent of henry ford, now runs the giant auto manufacturer, which recently reported that september sales f

23、ell 7% from a year ago - in part a reflection of stiff competition from japanese rivals. william ford jr. had been brought in three years ago to revive the company. wireless phone maker motorola, facing tough competition from nokia and samsung, saw ceo christopher galvin, whose great-grandfather fou

24、nded the company, officially hand over the reins to former sun microsystems executive edward zander in january. by the numbers, family firms in amit and villalongas sample are younger (62.68 mean years vs. 72.19 for non-family firms), deliver better sales growth (19.6% for family firms vs. 13.8%) an

25、d have higher return on assets (11.6% vs. 10.9%). amit points to some of the negatives of family businesses - notably different levels of voting rights among shareholders, cross-holdings and voting blocks, all of which are designed to keep company control in family hands. but even with those control

26、 issues, family-run companies still do better for shareholders if the founder remains involved. the ideal family company for minority shareholders is one where the founder is ceo or chairman of a firm that does not have any control-enhancing mechanisms such as class a and class b super voting and no

27、ntradable shares. why founders matterthe goal of amit and villalongas project was to ask whether they perform better for shareholders. that said, family firms seem to outperform their non-family counterparts for two reasons. many non-family companies suffer from the standard conflict between managem

28、ent and shareholders over such issues as returns, management pay and governance. this conflict between owner and manager is standard in widely-held firms says amit. in a family-run company, the manager and owner are the same and so the conflict doesnt exist.family firms do carry the baggage of tensi

29、ons between majority and minority shareholders; however, stockholders are still better off because there is a higher cost to the shareholder-owner conflict compared to squabbles between minority and majority shareholders. although those conflicts may help or harm results, the real reason family comp

30、anies seem to work is their link to founders. we dont go into the effects of founders specifically, but there is an effect, says amit. founders instill commitment into the entire employee base. that makes the company better. non-family companies dont have that.such reasoning is why struggling compan

31、ies often bring back their founders to right the ship. apple computer co-founder steve jobs returned to the company in 1997 as interim and later permanent ceo, and turned the company around with new products such as the imac and ipod. peoplesoft ousted ceo craig conway oct. 1 and brought back founde

32、r david duff. charles schwabs founder and chairman stepped back in as ceo in july after the company announced a 10% drop in earnings for the quarter.amits and villalongs findings illustrate the founder effect. according to this research, firms with a founder-ceo at the helm have the best mean ratio

33、of market value to assets, also known as tobins q. firms with a founder-ceo and chairman had a mean tobins q of 3.12. firms with a founder as chairman and an outside ceo scored almost as high (2.81). the founder-performance link, however, seems to break when descendents enter the picture. when the f

34、ounder is succeeded by a descendent as chairman, tobins q drops by a full point to 1.81. the ratio of market value to assets drops further when the ceo is also a descendent.the lesson: family run companies need to have the founders involved to succeed. our results confirm that founders bring valuabl

35、e skills to their firms, write amit and villalonga. however, when we look at the chairmans position as well as the ceos, we find that founders skills are almost as valuable when they bring them to the firm through their position as chairman but have a hired ceo in place. one likely explanation for t

36、his is the nature of the skills that founders bring to their firms: founders may be inspiring leaders, great visionaries, or exceptionally talented scientists. but they may not-and need not-be good managers as well.the corporate family treedespite the definition of family firm offered earlier, it is

37、nt always clear what constitutes a family-run company. there are companies such as hewlett-packard, founded by bill hewlett and david packard, whose families now control large blocks of shares in h-p. the packard family owns twice as many shares as the hewlett family and is deemed the controlling fa

38、mily by amit and villalonga. cereal maker kellogg company is controlled by the w.g. kellogg foundation. fashion retailer nordstrom is another family-run firm. but other situations arent as obvious. time warner became a family firm in 1996 as the result of the acquisition of turner broadcasting syste

39、m, whose founder, ted turner, became the largest shareholder in the merged entity. the ochs-sulzberger and graham families took over the new york times co. and washington post co., respectively, by acquiring bankrupt companies. amit aggregated family ownership across all family members and represent

40、atives as well as share held in trusts. once family ownership is established, firms fall into the following broad categories:family firms with controlling mechanisms and a family ceo. in these companies, families control the company through mechanisms such as super-voting shares, which may not trade

41、 publicly and give the family a certain number of shares of voting power for every share they own. family firms with controlling mechanisms but no family ceo. these firms have a structure that keeps family voting power, but hire outsiders to run the company. ford hired jacques nasser as ceo in the 1

42、990s, for example, before handing the reins back to a ford descendent. family firms with a family ceo but no control-enhancing mechanisms. in all those cases, whether the founder is involved in the company seems to be the biggest differentiator behind its success.good governancealthough family compa

43、nies often lack independent directors and give insiders more voting power, they still managed to score higher on corporate governance than non-family companies. to amit, this finding is one of the more surprising conclusions. on the corporate governance index, family-run companies had a mean score o

44、f 9.05 compared to a non-family firm score of 10.02. a lower score is better. the family firm is often cleaner, says amit, who adds that family firms have fewer golden parachutes for executives and dont have change-of-control provisions to line executive pockets in the event of an acquisition. never

45、theless, thats not to say there are no governance issues, amit adds. family companies are more likely to employ measures to keep control of the company by issuing shares differentiated by voting power. families own 16% of the equity of the fortune 500 firms they represent, but 50% of them use contro

46、l-enhancement mechanisms. in contrast, 13% of the non-family firms use control-enhancing techniques. these methods allow family shareholders to have more voting power than their ownership stake would suggest. according to amit and villalonga, family firms also maintain control in another way: they k

47、eep the percentage of non-family shareholders low. in addition, family firms have a significantly lower proportion of independent directors compared to non-family companies, says amit. but even when all the potential governance issues are weighed, he adds, family firms still come out ahead. being a

48、shareholder of a company that lacks independent directors and keeps voting power with one family may seem counterintuitive given todays focus on corporate governance. but the bottom line is family-run companies are valuable - especially when the founder serves as chairman and ceo and creates a posit

49、ive corporate culture for the firms employees. altogether, our findings suggest that in order to understand whether and when family firms are more or less valuable than non-family firms, one must distinguish among three fundamental elements in the definition of family firms: ownership, control, and

50、management,” write amit and villalonga. “despite the costs associated with the familys excess control,” they add, “the benefits of family ownership make minority shareholders of founder ceo family firms better off than they would have been in a non-family firm. family firms cultural reconstruction i

51、s a gradually perfect process. only at the right moment carries on the reform and the innovation in view of family firms cultural reconstruction aspect existence realistic question, can enable the family type enterprise to have a better development, can unceasingly promote the family firm the value.

52、 how weighs the family firm the value? we may use enterprise every year only the profit (in order to analyze simply, here has put aside other non- matter essential factor to enterprise value influence) and the enterprise life these two dimensions weighs. along with the enterprise scale expansion, to

53、ok the enterprise owners business owner, should have the rational ability, positively in the suitable time advancement family firms cultural reconstruction, turns this kind of passive study the positive initiative adaption. the y-coordinate expressed the enterprise only the profit, namely the enterp

54、rise every year total income deducts each kind of cost and the normal expenditure remaining sum. the x-coordinate expresses enterprises life. then enterprises value is each year enterprise only profit sum total. as a result of inflation rate and so on various factors influence, different year even i

55、f obtains the same only profit, but they to the enterprise the influence are dissimilar. in order to eliminate this influence, needs to give each year institute to obtain only the profit to bestow on the power, then adds together again. therefore, enterprises value may use the mathematical formula e

56、xpression is y=, i founds after on behalf of the enterprise the year, n represents the enterprise the life, x represents the enterprise the year only profit, w represents the year only profit the weight. at the right moment positively advances the family firm the cultural reconstruction to be allowe

57、d to affect to the relational enterprise value these two dimensions, and lengthens the enterprise life through the increase enterprises every year only profit to promote the enterprise value. presently, our country many family firm all already had the certain scale, the family firm has been carrying on the brand and the cultural reconstruction, this construction certainly was not the result which the scholar taught, but was the enterprise own evolution natural product. the family firm cultural reconstruction not only must depend on the enterprise to advocate p