高盛-美国经济深度-大选及经济移民 贸易和财政赤子

3September2024|12:53PMEDT

USEconomicsAnalyst

TheElectionandtheEconomy:EstimatingImmigration,Trade,andFiscalEffects(Phillips/Mericle/Krupa)

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Wediscusslikelychangestotrade,immigration,andfiscalpolicyundereachpossibleelectionoutcomeandestimatetheeffectsoninflation,laborforcegrowth,GDP,andthedeficit.

Tradepolicy:IfformerPresidentTrumpwins,weexpecthewouldraisetariffs

onimportsfromChinaatanaveragerateof20ppandonautosfromMexicoandtheEU.Whilemarketparticipantsshouldtakehisproposalofa10%universal

tariffseriously,wedonotquiteviewitasthebasecase.WedonotexpecttariffincreasesifVicePresidentHarriswins.

Immigrationpolicy:IfHarriswins,weexpectthatnetimmigrationwillcontinuetoslowto1.5mnperyear,somewhatabovethepre-pandemictrendof1mn.If

Trumpwinswithdividedgovernment,weexpectnetimmigrationwillfallto

1.25mn.IfRepublicanssweep,Congresscouldincreaseenforcementresources,andweexpectnetimmigrationwouldfallto0.75mn.

Fiscalpolicy:Fiscalpolicyislikelytobetighterunderdividedgovernmentthanundersingle-partycontrol.IfDemocratssweep,personalandcorporatetaxes

andbenefitspendingwilllikelyrise.IfRepublicanssweep,theywilllikelystay

mostlyunchanged.Dividedgovernmentscenarioswouldlikelyresultinamodestnetincreaseinreceipts,asCongresswouldlikelyallowtheupper-incomeportionofthe2017taxcutstoexpire,butlittlechangetobenefitprograms.

Impactoninflation:Weestimatethatevery1ppincreaseintheeffectivetariffratewouldraisecorePCEpricesby0.1pp.IfTrumpwins,tariffsonimportsfromChinaandautoswilllikelycomequickly,raisingtheeffectivetariffrateby3-4ppandcorePCEinflationby30-40bpatthepeak.The10%universaltariffisnotinourbasecasebutwouldhaveroughlytriplethatimpact.

Impactonthelaborforce:WeestimatethatthecontributionfromimmigrationtolaborforcegrowthifHarriswinswouldbe10,000permonthhigherthanif

Trumpwinswithdividedgovernmentand30,000permonthhigherthanifRepublicanssweep.

ImpactonGDP:WeestimatethatifTrumpwinsinasweeporwithdivided

government,thehittogrowthfromtariffsandtighterimmigrationpolicywouldoutweighthepositivefiscalimpulse,resultinginapeakhittoGDPgrowthof

-0.5ppin2025H2thatabatesin2026.IfDemocratssweep,newspendingandexpandedmiddle-incometaxcreditswouldslightlymorethanoffsetlower

JanHatzius

+1(212)902-0394|jan.hatzius@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

AlecPhillips

+1(202)637-3746|alec.phillips@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

DavidMericle

+1(212)357-2619|

david.mericle@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

RonnieWalker

+1(917)343-4543|

ronnie.walker@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

ManuelAbecasis

+1(212)902-8357|

manuel.abecasis@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

TimKrupa

+1(202)637-3771|tim.krupa@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

ElsiePeng

+1(212)357-3137|elsie.peng@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

JessicaRindels

+1(972)368-1516|

jessica.rindels@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegAC

certificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto/research/hedge.html.

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

investmentduetohighercorporatetaxrates,resultinginaveryslightboosttoGDPgrowthonaverageover2025-2026.IfHarriswinswithdividedgovernment,the

effectsofpolicychangeswouldbesmallandneutralonnet.

nImpactonthefiscaldeficit:Thedeficitwouldlikelybesomewhatlargerunder

single-partycontrolthanunderdividedgovernment.Buttheprimarydeficit

(excludinginterestexpense)islikelytoremainstableorshrinkmodestlyinallcases,inpartbecauseitisalreadyunusuallylargeforaneconomyatfullemploymentandthisislikelytolimitappetiteforexpandingitfurther.

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3September20242

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

TheElectionandtheEconomy:EstimatingImmigration,Trade,andFiscalEffects

Therehavebeenfewmajorfiscalpolicychangesunderdividedgovernmentin2023and2024,andourestimateofthefiscalimpulsetoGDPgrowthhasbeenclosetoneutralonnet,asshowninExhibit1.ButtheNovemberelectionsbringthepossibilityof

changestotrade,immigration,andfiscalpolicyin2025thatcouldhaveimplicationsforinflation,laborforcegrowth,GDPgrowth,andthefiscaldeficit.

Exhibit1:FiscalPolicyChangesHaveBeenModestandtheFiscalImpulsetoGDPGrowthHasBeenClosetoNeutralonNetUnderDividedGovernmentin2023and2024

Percentagepoints

FiscalImpulsetoGDPGrowthfrom

Percentagepoints

14

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

FederalPersonalTax&Benefits

FederalSpendingState&LocalTaxTotal

FederalBusinessTax&SubsidiesState&LocalSpending

SecondRoundEffects

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

1234123412341234123412341234

2018201920202021202220232024

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Exhibit2showsthatpredictionmarketsimplythattheelectionisstillveryuncertain.Wesummarizethepossibleoutcomesintofourmainscenarios.InRepublicanand

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Democratic“sweep”scenarios,onepartycontrolstheHouse,Senate,andWhite

House.Individedgovernmentscenarios,thepartythatdoesnotcontroltheWhite

HousecontrolsatleastonechamberofCongress.Thiswouldmostlikelymeana

DemocraticHouseandaRepublicanSenate,thoughotherscenariosarepossible.

PredictionmarketsimplythatifformerPresidentTrumpiselected,itwouldmorelikelybeinthecontextofaRepublicansweep(32%probability)thandividedgovernment

(17%),whileifVicePresidentHarrisiselected,itwouldmorelikelybeinthecontextofdividedgovernment(30%)thanaDemocraticsweep(21%).

3September20243

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit2:PredictionMarketsImplyThattheOutcomeoftheNovemberElectionsIsVeryUncertain

Percent

50

40

30

20

32

10

0

Trump,RSweep

PredictionMarket-ImpliedElectionScenarioOdds

DSenate,RHouseDSenate,DHouseRSenate,DHouse

DSenate,RHouseRSenate,RHouseRSenate,DHouse

1

4

1

0

25

16

Trump,

DividedGov't

Harris,

DividedGov't

21

Harris,DSweep

Percent

50

40

30

20

10

0

Asof9/2/2024.Normalizedtosumtopresidentialodds.

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,Polymarket,PredictIt

Post-ElectionScenariosforTrade,Immigration,andFiscalPolicy

Dividedgovernmentscenarioswouldleadtobipartisanoutcomesonquestionsthatrequirecongressionalapproval(e.g.,fiscalmatters),andthoseoutcomeswouldbesimilarregardlessofwhocontrolstheWhiteHouse.Inotherareas,liketradeand

immigrationpolicy,thepresidenthasmoreauthoritybut,asdiscussedbelow,congressionalcontrolmightstillberelevant.

One-partycontrolallowsthemajoritytopassfiscalpoliciesalongpartylinesviathe“budgetreconciliation”process,whichappliestorevenues—usuallytaxesbuttariffswouldalsobeeligible—spending,and/orthedebtlimit.1

Otherpolicychangesgenerallyneed60votestopasstheSenateduetothelegislative

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filibuster,meaningthatlegalandregulatorychanges—e.g.,immigrationreform,

environmentalrules,etc.—needbipartisansupport.SenateDemocraticLeaderSchumerhassaidheintendstooverturnthisruleifDemocratswincontrolofCongressandthe

WhiteHouse.Whetherhewouldhavethesupporttodosoisunclear.2Eliminationofthefilibusterwouldraisetheoddsofsubstantiallegalandregulatorychanges.Itcould

alsoleadtomorefrequentfiscalpolicychanges,ratherthanpassingonemajor“reconciliation”billeachyear.

1Onlypolicieswithadirectfiscalimpactmaybeincludedinareconciliationbillandthebillcannotincreasethedeficitafter10years(thisiswhythe2017taxcutsaresettoexpireafter2025).Annualspendingbills

(“appropriations”)donotpassviareconciliationandchangestoSocialSecurityarespecificallyprohibitedfrompassingviareconciliation.Intheory,uptothreereconciliationbills–oneeachfortaxes,spending,andthe

debtlimit—maypassaftereachannualbudgetresolutionCongressapproves,butinrecentyearsCongresshaspassedatmostoneperyearundersingle-partycontrol.

249Democratsvotedtochangetheruleinearly2022,buttwo(Sens.SinemaandManchin)objected.Bothsenatorsareretiring,andRep.Gallego,theDemocraticcandidaterunningtoreplaceSinemainArizona,has

saidhewouldsupportthechange,takingthecountto50(intheeventofatie,thevicepresidentcaststhedecidingvote).

3September20244

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

Tariffs:HigherUnderTrump,MostlyUnchangedUnderHarris

FormerPresidentTrumpraisedtheeffectivetariffratebyabout1.5ppwhileinofficeandhasstatedhewillraisetariffsfurtherifhewinsasecondterm.Hehasthreemain

proposalsontariffs:

nHighertariffsonimportsfromChina.Theofficialcampaignproposalistorepeal

permanentnormaltraderelations(PNTR)withChina,leadingtoa~40ppincreaseintheaveragetariffrateonimportsfromChina.Trumphasalsodiscussedasimple

60%tariff(andotherratesrangingfrom50%to100%).WhilePNTRrepealwould

takeanactofCongress,raisingtariffsonsomeorallimportsfromChinawouldnot,asthe2018-2019experiencemadeclear.

nA“universalbaseline”tariff.Neithertheofficialcampaignpositionnorthe

Republicanplatformmentionsaspecifictariffrate,butTrumphasmentioneda10%rateonseveraloccasions(morerecentlyhealsodescribedthisas“10%to20%”).

nThe“ReciprocalTradeAct.”ThiswouldmatchUStariffratesonindividualproductsfromeachcountrytothatcountry’stariffontheequivalentproductfromtheUS.

Whilethepresidenthasfairlyclearauthoritytoincreasetariffratesonindividualproductsfromspecifictradingpartners,thissystematicapproachwouldinvolvelegislationpassedbyCongress.

TradewiththeEuropeanUnionandMexicoingeneral,andintheautosectorin

particular,alsoseemslikelytobeafocusinasecondTrumpadministration.TrumphaslongcriticizedtheEU’svalueaddedtaxes(VAT)andthreatenedtoimposesteeptariffsonautoimportsfromtheEUinhisfirstterm.Herecentlyfloateda100%tariffonautosfromMexicobuiltinChinese-ownedfactories,andTrumpmightputotherchangeson

thetableaheadofthemandatedUSMCAreviewin2026.

WhileitisdifficulttopredictwhattradepolicymightlooklikeunderasecondTrump

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administration,wewouldexpecttariffstoriselessthanhehasproposed,whichwasalsothecasefollowingthe2016election.WhiletariffshavebroadersupportnowthantheydidwhenTrumpcameintooffice,thatsupportisstillmostlylimitedtotariffsonimportsfromChina.AndwhileitistruethatasecondTrumpadministrationwouldbemorepreparedandmoreunifiedaroundatariffagendain2025,executiveauthoritytoimposetariffshaslimits.

Exhibit3:TariffScenariosinaSecondTrumpAdministration

GSOdds:IfTrumpWinsUSElection

Country

Coverage

Amount($bn)

Current

TariffIncrementalTariff

PossibleFinalTariff

LegalAuthority

Lists1-2(noconsumergoods)

40

25%

60%

85%

Sec.301

List3(20%consumer)

120

25%

35%

60%

Sec.302

90%

China

List4a(mostlyconsumer)

90

7.5%

10%

17.5%

Sec.303

List4b(mostlyconsumer)

200

0%

5%

5%

Sec.304

70%

Mexico

AutoImports

Verysmall

0-2.5%

97.5%

100%

Sec.232

50%

EU

AutoImports

80

2.5%

22.5%

25%

Sec.232

40%

Global

AllImports

3100

2.7%

10%

12.7%

IEEPAorSec.122

30%

China

AllImports

450

13.7%

40%

53.7%

RevokePermanentNormalTradeRelations(requireslegislativeaction)

10%

Global

AllImports

3100

2.7%

TBD

TBD

FairandReciprocalTradeAct(requireslegislativeaction)

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

3September20245

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit3summarizesourviewsontheprobabilitiesofpotentialtariffsunderasecond

Trumpadministration,whichwerecentlywroteaboutinmoredepth.Ifreelected,TrumpseemslikelytoquicklymovetoraisetariffsonimportsfromChina.However,wedonotexpectCongresstorepealPNTR,nordoweexpectanacross-the-boardChina-focusedtariff.Instead,wewouldexpectadditionaltariffspredominantlyoncapitalgoodsand

intermediateinputs,withlessofanincreaseonconsumerproducts,similartothe

2018-2019experience.Overall,weexpectanincreaseofaround20ppintheeffectivetariffrateonimportsfromChina.

WethinkthereisafairchancethataTrumpadministrationwouldimposetariffsonautoimportsfromMexico,andweviewtariffsonautoimportsfromtheEUasa50-50

proposition.

Whilethe10%universaltariffisarealproposalthatmarketparticipantsshouldtake

seriously,wedonotquiteviewitasthebasecaseinasecondTrumpadministration.

SupportforbroadtariffsisweakerthanforthosefocusedonChina,asisthelegalbasisforimposingthem.AndwhileformerPresidentTrumphasoftenspokenoftariffsas

leveragetoachieveothergoalsinnegotiations,auniversaltariffwouldnotbeconducivetobilateralnegotiations.

IncontrasttothewiderangeoftradepolicyoutcomesunderaTrumpadministration,

tariffsareunlikelytochangemateriallyunderaHarrisadministration.AlthoughtheBidenadministrationannouncedhighertariffson$18bninimportsfromChinaearlierthisyear,

thisisafractionofthe$370bnthatTrumptargetedduringhisterm,anditseemsunlikelythataHarrisadministrationwouldraisetariffsonChinamuchfurther.

Immigration:SlowsSlightlyUnderHarrisbutFurtherUnderTrump

Onimmigration,formerPresidentTrumphaspledgedtoreduceunauthorized

immigrationandhaspromisedtocarryoutthe“largestdomesticdeportationin

Americanhistory.”However,aswehavewrittenpreviously,therearelegalandlogisticallimitstoexecutiveaction.Trumpcouldcutbackhumanitarianparolepoliciesthatthe

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Bidenadministrationexpanded,whichaccountedforaround800kinnetimmigrationin2023.HowmuchaTrumpadministrationcouldreduceunauthorizedborder-crossingsislessclear,forthreereasons.First,manyborder-crossersclaimasylum.Courtsblocked

theTrumpadministration’s2018attempttorestricttheseclaimsanditmightbedifficultforthenextadministrationtogobeyondtheBidenadministration’sJune2024asylum

restrictions.Second,someborder-crossersnevercomeintocontactwithUSauthorities,sopolicychangesalonemighthavelittleeffectinthosecases.Third,themajorityof

border-crosserswhocomeintocontactwithUSauthoritiesarereleasedintothecountrypendingfurtherproceedings,dueinparttocapacityconstraints.

WeexpectasecondTrumpadministrationwouldreduceimmigrationtoalevelsimilarto

thefirstTrumpadministration.ControlofCongresscouldalsoinfluencetheresourcesavailabletoenforceexistingimmigrationpolicies.Forthisreason,weassumethatnetimmigrationslowsto750k/year—slightlybelowthe2017-2019rate—inaRepublicansweepbutthatitruns1.25mn/year—slightlyabovethe2017-2019average—ina

Trump/dividedgovernmentscenario.

3September20246

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit4:WeEstimateNetImmigrationof1.5mnUnderHarris,1.25mnUnderTrumpWithDividedGovernment,and0.75mnUnderaRepublicanSweepin2025

GSEstimateofMonthlyNet

Immigration,byCategoryAuthorized(BasedonCBOestimates)

Unauthorized(Estimatebasedoncourtcases)*Total

Total,UnderHarris

Total,UnderTrumpwithDividedGovernmentTotal,UnderTrumpwithRepublicanSweep

2.4

1.2

00

20182019202020212022202320242025

*Weestimateunauthorizedimmigrationusingmonthlycourtcasedata(newcasesnotresultingindetention-courtcasesresultingindeportation)anddataonthenumberofunauthorizedimmigrantsreleasedunderparole,reportedbyCBP.Wealsoassumethatan

additional10-15%ofunauthorizedimmigrantsdonothaveofficialcourtcases.**Authorizedimmigrantsincludestudents,temporary

workers,andlawfulpermanentresidents,basedonCBO'sannualestimate.Themonthlyestimatesincludeimmigrantsbelowage16.

Millions,Annualized4.8

Thousands

400

GS

Forecast

200

300

100

3.6

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

InaHarrisadministration,weassumeonlyamodestfurtherreductioninnet

immigration,withfewadditionalpolicyshiftsbutageneraldownwardtrendinthenumberseekingentryafterthesurgein2022-2023.

Immigrationreformlegislationdoesnotlookparticularlylikelyunderanypolitical

scenarioin2025,buteliminationofthefilibustermightraisetheoddsofchangesto

immigrationlaws,allowingforagreaterrangeofpotentialoutcomes.Immigration

reformthatclearsthebacklogof3.7millionpendingimmigrationcourtcases—oneof

thegoalsofthefailedbipartisaneffortthisyear—couldbedisruptiveintheshortrun.Forexample,thisyeartodate,roughly1/3ofresolvedcasesendedinremovalorvoluntarydepartureorders.

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FiscalPolicy:TaxesHigherUnderDemocraticControl,MostlyUnchangedUnderRepublicanControl

Theelectionresultwillaffectfiscalpolicyinthreegeneralways.First,itwillinfluence

theoverallfiscalstance:fiscalpolicyislikelytobetighterunderdividedgovernment

scenariosthansingle-partycontrol,andDemocraticcontrolwouldbemorelikelytoleadtodeficitreductionthanRepublicancontrol,thoughsomedeficitreductionfromcurrentlevelsispossibleundereitherscenario.

Second,thecompositionofthebudgetwilldifferbyelectionresult.TaxesandbenefitspendingarebothlikelytoriseunderDemocraticcontrol,whiletheywouldlikelystaymostlyunchangedunderRepublicancontrol(thoughtariffswouldlikelyrise,asnotedabove).Dividedgovernmentscenarioswouldlikelyresultinamodestnetincreaseinreceipts,asCongresswouldlikelyallowtheupper-incomeportionofthe2017taxcutstoexpire,butlittlechangeinbenefitprograms.

Third,theelectionoutcomewillaffectwhenchangesoccur,withsingle-partycontrol

3September20247

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

likelytoleadtoearlieraction.Republicans,inparticular,wouldlikelystartthebudget

reconciliationprocessearlyintheyear,potentiallypassingabillbymid-year.Democratsmighttakeslightlylonger,astheirplansinvolveanumberofnewpolicies,butwewould

expectactionbyQ3.Bycontrast,taxextensionsmightnotpassunderadividedoutcomeuntilthefinaldaysof2025.

Regardlessofpartycontrol,expiringtaxcutswillbethedominantfiscalissuein2025.

Theindividualtaxcutsenactedin2017expireattheendof2025,whentaxeswouldriseby1%ofGDPifCongressdoesnotact.Anumberofbusinesstaxincentivesinthatlawareslatedtophaseout—somehavealready—asareafewotheritemslikeexpanded

healthinsurancesubsidiespassedintheInflationReductionAct.Overall,absent

congressionalactiontheseexpirationsandphaseoutswouldtightenfiscalpolicybyaround1.25%ofGDPin2026.

Exhibit5:BothCandidatesHaveMajorFiscalProposalsButNotAllWillPassandPoliciesinSomeAreasAreStillUnclear

Harris

$bn/10yrs%ofGDP

Trump

$bn/10yrs%ofGDP

Proposal

725

1,850

-200

2,375

550

2,075

2,625

0to2,700

0.20.5-0.1

0.7

0.2

0.60.8

0to0.8

TCJAexpirationupperincomeindividual(incl.estate)Otherpersonaltaxincreases(Bidenproposals)

-200

-1700

-1,900

-700

-700

1,000to4,500

-1,600

1,900

-650

-650

-650

2,550

-950

-0.1-0.5-0.5

-0.2

-0.2

0.3to1.3 -0.40.6

-0.2

-0.2-0.2

0.7-0.3

Excludetipsfromtax

ExcludeSocialSecuritybenefitsfromtax

Totalchangevs.currentpolicy,individualtaxes

TCJAbusinessexpirationsOtherbusinesstaxcuts

Otherbusinesstaxincreases(Bidenproposals)Totalchangevs.currentpolicy,businesstaxes

UnspecifiedtaxincreasestooffsetTCJAmiddle-classextensionNewtariffrevenue

5,000

7,700

1,350

300

-200

0to2000

1,450

3,450

6,250

1,550

1.42.2

0.40.1

-0.1

0to0.60.41.0

1.80.4

Totalrevenuechangevs.currentpolicy(low)Totalrevenuechangevs.currentpolicy(high)

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ChildTaxCredit/EITCHomebuyercredit

RepealIRAenergyincentives

Medicareprescriptiondrugpricecuts

Newbenefits(childcare,paidleave,health,etc)

Totalspendingproposals(low)Totalspendingproposals(high)

0

0

Netbudgetaryeffectvs.currentpolicy(low)Netbudgetaryeffectvs.currentpolicy(high)

*Costestimatesassumeallpoliciesineffectovertenyears,comparedtoanassumptionthatcurrentpolicycontinues.Positivebudgetaryeffectfiguresindicatedeficitreduction

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

VicePresidentHarrishasnotpresentedafullfiscalplan,butsofarherproposalsmostly

followPresidentBiden’sproposals,includinghighercorporateandupper-income

individualtaxes(a1.5%ofGDPtaxincreasecomparedwithcurrentpolicy).However,

weexpectthat,eveninaDemocraticsweep,Congresswouldnotpassthefullrangeof

3September20248

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

taxincreases.Forexample,wethinka25%corporaterateismorelikelythana28%rate.Wealsoexpectonlyamodestincreaseinthecapitalgainsrate(e.g.,a5pp

increase),andweexpectcongressionalDemocratsmightpursueasurtaxonhighincomesoveramorecomplicatedtaxonunrealizedgains,astheydidinthe

House-passedBuildBackBetterAct(BBBA)in2021,whichfailedintheSenate.WealsobelieveDemocratsmighttemporarilyextendorreinstatesomebusinessinvestment

policiesenactedin2017,butatalessgenerousratethanRepublicansprefer(e.g.,50%bonusdepreciation).

HarrishasalsoexpandedonBiden’smiddle-classinitiativesintwoareas.First,she

proposesa$25kcreditforfirsttimehomebuyers,upfromBiden’s$10kproposal(Bidenalsoproposedasimilarcreditforhome-sellers).WhilewedonotbelieveaDemocraticCongresswouldsupporta$25kcredit,weassumea$10kcreditunderaDemocratic

sweep.

Second,Harrisproposesa$6,000childcreditintheyearofbirth.HerexpandedchildcreditotherwiseappearstofollowBiden’s:$3,600perchildunderage6,$3,000perchildotherwise,andtheextrafirst-yearcredit,whichhasamodestfiscaleffect(lessthan$10bn/year).WeexpectthatCongresswouldenactsuchaproposalundera

Democraticsweepscenario,includingmakingitfullyrefundable—i.e.,households

wouldreceivethefullcreditevenifitexceededtheirtaxliability—andadvanceable—paymentswouldbemadeonamonthlybasisduringthetaxyear,ratherthanviataxrefundsthefollowingspring.Ahighercreditamountalsolookslikelyunderadividedgovernmentscenarioaspartofayear-endcompromiseontaxcutextensions,butwewouldnotexpectittobemadefullyrefundableoradvanceableinthatscenario.

Harris’splanssofarleavetwoimportantfiscalquestionsunanswered.First,itisunclear

howshewouldaddresstheexpiring2017taxcuts.Inhisbudgetproposalearlierthisyear,PresidentBidenhadcommittedtoextendtaxcutsonincomeunder$400kwhileoffsettingthecostwithfurtherunspecifiedtaxincreasesonupperincomesand

corporations.Harrisseemstoendorsethisposition,butthesourceofthis$2.7

_

trillion/10yrs(0.8%ofGDP)innewrevenueisequallyunclearintheHarrisplanasitisin

Biden’s.Evenin