货币金融学（第十三版）课件 英文第13章 中央银行与联邦储备体系

TheEconomicsofMoney,Banking,andFinancialMarketsThirteenthEditionChapter13CentralBanksandtheFederalReserveSystemCopyright©2022,2019,2016PearsonEducation,Inc.AllRightsReservedPreviewThischapterconsidersthestructureandactivitiesofcentralbanksfocusingprimarilyontheFederalReserveSystemoftheUnitedStates.LearningObjectives(1of2)13.1RecognizethehistoricalcontextofthedevelopmentoftheFederalReserveSystem.13.2DescribethekeyfeaturesandfunctionsoftheFederalReserveSystem.13.3AssessthedegreeofindependenceoftheFederalReserve.13.4IdentifythewaysinwhichthetheoryofbureaucraticbehaviorcanhelpexplainFederalReserveactions.LearningObjectives(2of2)13.5Summarizetheargumentsforandagainsttheindependenceofthecentralbank.13.6IdentifythesimilaritiesanddistinctionsinstructureandindependencebetweentheEuropeanCentralBankandtheFederalReserve.13.7Assessthedegreeofindependenceofothermajorcentralbanksaroundtheworld.OriginsoftheFederalReserveSystemResistancetoestablishmentofacentralbankFearofcentralizedpowerDistrustofmoneyedinterestsNolenderoflastresortNationwidebankpanicsonaregularbasisPanicof1907soseverethatthepublicwasconvincedacentralbankwasneededFederalReserveActof1913ElaboratesystemofchecksandbalancesDecentralizedStructureoftheFederalReserveSystem(1of2)ThewritersoftheFederalReserveActwantedtodiffusepoweralongregionallines,betweentheprivatesectorandthegovernment,andamongbankers,businesspeople,andthepublic.StructureoftheFederalReserveSystem(2of2)ThisinitialdiffusionofpowerhasresultedintheevolutionoftheFederalReserveSystemtoincludethefollowingentities:TheFederalReservebanksTheBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystemTheFederalOpenMarketCommittee(F

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C)TheFederalAdvisoryCouncilAround2,900membercommercialbanksFigure1StructureandResponsibilityforPolicyToolsintheFederalReserveSystemFederalReserveBanks(1of2)Quasi-publicinstitutionownedbyprivatecommercialbanksinthedistrictthataremembersoftheFedsystemFederalReserveBanks(2of2)Memberbankselectsixdirectorsforeachdistrict;threemoreareappointedbytheBoardofGovernorsThreeAdirectorsareprofessionalbankersThreeBdirectorsareprominentleadersfromindustry,labor,agriculture,orconsumersectorThreeCdirectorsappointedbytheBoardofGovernorsarenotallowedtobeofficers,employees,orstockholdersofbanksDesignedtoreflectallconstituenciesofthepublicNinedirectorsappointthepresidentofthebank;subjecttoapprovalbyBoardofGovernorsFigure2FederalReserveSystemSource:FederalReserveBulletinFunctionsoftheFederalReserveBanks(1of2)ClearchecksIssuenewcurrencyWithdrawdamagedcurrencyfromcirculationAdministerandmakediscountloanstobanksintheirdistrictsEvaluateproposedmergersandapplicationsforbankstoexpandtheiractivitiesFunctionsoftheFederalReserveBanks(2of2)ActasliaisonsbetweenthebusinesscommunityandtheFederalReserveSystemExaminebankholdingcompaniesandstate-charteredmemberbanksCollectdataonlocalbusinessconditionsUsestaffsofprofessionaleconomiststoresearchtopicsrelatedtotheconductofmonetarypolicyOntheSpecialRoleoftheFederalReserveBankofNewYork(1of2)TheFederalReserveBankofNewYorkplaysaspecialroleintheFederalReserveSystemforseveralreasons.First,itsdistrictcontainsmanyofthelargestcommercialbanksintheUnitedStates,thesafetyandsoundnessofwhichareparamounttothehealthoftheU.S.financialsystem.ThesecondreasonfortheNewYorkFed’sspecialroleisitsactiveinvolvementinthebondandforeignexchangemarkets.OntheSpecialRoleoftheFederalReserveBankofNewYork(2of2)ThethirdreasonfortheFederalReserveBankofNewYork’sprominenceisthatitistheonlyFederalReserveBanktobeamemberoftheBankforInternationalSettlements(B

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S).Finally,thepresidentoftheFederalReserveBankofNewYorkistheonlypermanentvotingmemberoftheF

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CamongtheFederalReserveBankpresidents,servingasthevice-chairofthecommittee.Thus,heorsheandthechairandvice-chairoftheBoardofGovernorsarethethreemostimportantofficialsintheFederalReserveSystem.FederalReserveBanksandMonetaryPolicyDirectors“establish”thediscountrateDecidewhichbankscanobtaindiscountloansDirectorsselectonecommercialbankerfromeachdistricttoserveontheFederalAdvisoryCouncilwhichconsultswiththeBoardofGovernorsandprovidesinformationtohelpconductmonetarypolicyFiveofthe12bankpresidentshaveavoteintheFederalOpenMarketCommittee(F

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C)MemberBanksAllnationalbanksarerequiredtobemembersoftheFederalReserveSystemCommercialbankscharteredbystatesarenotrequiredbutmaychoosetobemembersDepositoryInstitutionsDeregulationandMonetaryControlActof1980subjectedallbankstothesamereserverequirementsasmemberbanksandgaveallbanksaccesstoFederalReservefacilitiesBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystemSevenmembersheadquarteredinWashington,D.C.AppointedbythepresidentandconfirmedbytheSenate14-yearnonrenewabletermRequiredtocomefromdifferentdistrictsChairmanischosenfromthegovernorsandservesfour-yeartermDutiesoftheBoardofGovernors(1of2)VotesonconductofopenmarketoperationsSetsreserverequirementsControlsthediscountratethrough“reviewanddetermination”processSetsmarginrequirementsSetssalariesofpresidentandofficersofeachFederalReserveBankandreviewseachbank’sbudgetDutiesoftheBoardofGovernors(2of2)Approvesbankmergersandapplicationsfornewactivities.Specifiesthepermissibleactivitiesofbankholdingcompanies.SupervisestheactivitiesofforeignbanksoperatingintheUnitedStates.ChairmanoftheBoardofGovernorsAdvisesthepresidentoneconomicpolicyTestifiesinCongressSpeaksfortheFederalReserveSystemtothemediaMayrepresenttheUnitedStatesinnegotiationswithforeigngovernmentsoneconomicmattersTheRoleoftheResearchStaffTheFederalReserveSystemisthelargestemployerofeconomistsnotjustintheUnitedStates,butintheworld.ThemostimportanttaskoftheFed’seconomistsistofollowtheincomingeconomicdatafromgovernmentagenciesandprivatesectororganizationsandprovideguidancetothepolicy-makersonthedirectioninwhichtheeconomymightbeheadedandthepotentialimpactofmonetarypolicyactionsontheeconomy.FederalOpenMarketCommittee(F

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C)MeetseighttimesayearConsistsofsevenmembersoftheBoardofGovernors,thepresidentoftheFederalReserveBankofNewYork,andthepresidentsoffourotherReservebanksChairmanoftheBoardofGovernorsisalsochairofF

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CIssuesdirectivestothetradingdeskattheFederalReserveBankofNewYorkInsidetheFed:TheF

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CMeetingReportbythemanagerofsystemopenmarketoperationsonforeigncurrencyanddomesticopenmarketoperationsandotherrelatedissuesPresentationofBoard’sstaffnationaleconomicforecastOutlineofdifferentscenariosformonetarypolicyactionsPresentationonrelevantCongressionalactionsPublicannouncementabouttheoutcomeofthemeetingGreen,Blue,Teal,andBeige:WhatDoTheseColorsMeanattheFed?Upuntil2010,adetailednationalforecastforthenextthreeyearswasplacedbetweengreencoversandwasthusknownasthe“greenbook.”Projectionsforthemonetaryaggregatesalongwithtypicallythreealternativescenariosforthestanceofmonetarypolicy(labeledA,B,andC)werecontainedinthe“bluebook.”Startingin2010,thegreenandbluebookswerecombinedintothe“tealbook.”The“beigebook,”isproducedbytheReserveBanksanddetailsevidencegleanedeitherfromsurveysorfromtalkswithkeybusinessesandfinancialinstitutionsonthestateoftheeconomyineachoftheFederalReservedistricts.WhytheChairoftheBoardofGovernorsReallyRunstheShowSpokespersonfortheFedandnegotiateswithCongressandthePresidentSetstheagendaformeetingsSpeaksandvotesfirstaboutmonetarypolicySupervisesprofessionaleconomistsandadvisersStylesofFederalReserveChairs:Bernanke,YellenandPowellVersusGreenspanEveryFederalReservechairhasadifferentstyle,andthesestylesaffecthowpolicydecisionsaremadeattheFed.TherehasbeenmuchdiscussionofhowrecentchairsoftheFed,formerchairsBenBernanke,JanetYellenandcurrentchairJeromePowell,differfromAlanGreenspan,whowasthechairoftheFederalReserveBoardfor19years,from1987to2006.HowIndependentIstheFed?Instrumentandgoalindependence.IndependentrevenueFed’sstructureiswrittenbyCongress,andissubjecttochangeatanytime.PresidentialinfluenceInfluenceonCongressAppointsmembersAppointschairmanalthoughtermsarenotconcurrentShouldtheFedBeIndependent?TheCaseforIndependenceThestrongestargumentforanindependentcentralbankrestsontheviewthatsubjectingittomorepoliticalpressureswouldimpartaninflationarybiastomonetarypolicy.TheCaseAgainstIndependenceProponentsofaFedunderthecontrolofthepresidentorCongressarguethatitisundemocratictohavemonetarypolicy(whichaffectsalmosteveryoneintheeconomy)controlledbyanelitegroupthatisresponsibletonoone.TheCaseforIndependencePoliticalpressurewouldimpartaninflationarybiastomonetarypolicyPoliticalbusinesscycleCouldbeusedtofacilitateTreasuryfinancingoflargebudgetdeficits:accommodationTooimportanttoleavetopoliticians—theprincipal-agentproblemisworseforpoliticiansTheCaseAgainstIndependenceUndemocraticUnaccountableDifficulttocoordinatefiscalandmonetarypolicyHasnotuseditsindependencesuccessfullyPresidentialAttacksontheIndependenceoftheFedU.S.presidents,includingLyndonJohnson(D)andRichardNixon(R)haveoftentriedtoinfluenceFederalReservepoliciesbyattackingFedindependence.DuringtheClintonAdministration,TreasurySecretaryRobertRubinestablishedthedoctrinethattheindependenceoftheFedshouldberespectedbyhavingthepresidentnotcommentonFedpolicies—whichwasthenadoptedbyGeorgeW.BushandlaterbyBarackObama.WiththepresidencyofDonaldTrump,theRubindoctrinewastotallyabandoned.ThevirulenceofthepublicattacksbyTrumpontheFedstartingin2018wereunprecedented.ExplainingCentralBankBehavior(1of2)Oneviewofgovernmentbureaucraticbehavioristhatbureaucraciesservethepublicinterest(thisisthepublicinterestview).Yetsomeeconomistshavedevelopedatheoryofbureaucraticbehaviorthatsuggestsotherfactorsthatinfluencehowbureaucraciesoperate.ThetheoryofbureaucraticbehaviormaybeausefulguidetopredictwhatmotivatestheFedandothercentralbanks.ExplainingCentralBankBehavior(2of2)Theoryofbureaucraticbehavior:theobjectiveofabureaucracyistomaximizeitsownwelfarethatisrelatedtopowerandprestigeFightvigorouslytopreserveautonomyAvoidconflictwithmorepowerfulgroupsDoesnotruleoutaltruismInsidetheFed:TheEvolutionoftheFed’sCommunicationStrategyTheFedhasdramaticallyincreaseditstransparencyinrecentyearsFollowingtheJanuary,April,June,andNovemberF

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Cmeetings,theChairoftheBoardofGovernorsholdsapressconferencetoclarifymonetarypolicycommunications.Greatertransparencyhasbeenprovidedwiththeannouncementofaspecificnumericaltargetfortheinflationrate.StructureandIndependenceoftheEuropeanCentralBankPatternedaftertheFederalReserveCentralbanksfromeachcountryplaysimilarroleasFedbanksExecutiveBoard:President,vice-president,andfourothermembersEightyear,nonrenewabletermsGoverningCouncilDifferencesBetweentheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandtheFederalReserveSystemNationalCentralBankscontroltheirownbudgetsandthebudgetoftheE

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BMonetaryoperationsarenotcentralizedDoesnotsuperviseandregulatefinancialinstitutionsGoverningCouncilMonthlymeetingsatE

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BinFrankfurt,GermanyNineteenNatio