EconomicPolicy宏观经济学加州大学詹姆斯·布拉讲义

QuestionsHowhastheworldorganizeditsinternationalmonetarysystem?Whatisafixedexchangeratesystem?Whatisafloatingexchangeratesystem?Whatarethecostsandbenefitsoffixedexchangeratesvis-à-visfloatingexchangerates?1Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.QuestionsHowhastheworldorg1QuestionsWhydomostcountriestodayhavefloatingexchangerates?WhyhaswesternEuroperecentlycreateda“monetaryunion”--anirrevocablecommitmenttofixedexchangerateswithinwesternEurope?Whatwerethecausesofthethreemajorcurrencycrisesofthe1990s?2Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.QuestionsWhydomostcountries2TheGoldStandardBeforeWorldWarI,nearlyalloftheworldeconomywasonthegoldstandardagovernmentwoulddefineaunitofitscurrencyasworthaparticularamountofgoldthecurrencywasconvertiblecouldbeconvertedintogoldfreelythecurrency’spriceintermsofgoldwasitsparity3Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheGoldStandardBeforeWorld3Figure15.2-GrowthoftheGoldStandard4Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.2-GrowthoftheGo4TheGoldStandardWhentwocountrieswereonthegoldstandard,theirnominalexchangeratewasfixedattheratiooftheirgoldparitiesatWorldWarIIparitiestheU.S.dollarwasequalto1/35ofanounceofgoldtheBritishpoundsterlingwassettoequal1/15.58333ouncesofgoldtheexchangerateofthedollarforthepoundwas£1.00=$2.405Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheGoldStandardWhentwocoun5TheGoldStandardExampleofcurrencyarbitragetheU.S.governmentiswillingtobuygoldat$35perouncetheBritishgovernmentiswillingtobuygoldat£15.58333perouncethepoundtradesfor$2.64(10%higherthantheratioofthegoldparities-$2.40)6Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheGoldStandardExampleofcu6TheGoldStandardSomeonewithanounceofgoldcouldtradeittotheBritishTreasuryfor£15.58333tradethosepoundsfordollarsintheforeignexchangemarketandget$38.50tradethe$38.50totheU.S.Treasuryfor1.1ouncesofgoldrepeattheprocessasquicklyaspossible,makinga10%profiteachtimethecircleiscompleted7Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheGoldStandardSomeonewith7Figure15.1-HowtoProfitintheForeign-ExchangeMarket8Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.1-HowtoProfitin8Weaknessesofthe

GoldStandardThegoldstandardtendedtobedeflationaryundersomecircumstances,itpushedcountriestoraisetheirinterestrateswhichreducedoutputandincreasedunemploymentitneverprovidedacountervailingpushtoothercountriestolowertheirinterestrates9Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Weaknessesofthe

GoldStandar9Weaknessesofthe

GoldStandardIftheexchangerateisfloating,foreigners’domesticcurrencyearningsmustbeusedtobuyexportsortoinvestinthehomecountryTheexchangeratemovesupordowninresponsetothesupplyanddemandforforeignexchangeinordertomakeitso10Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Weaknessesofthe

GoldStandar10Weaknessesofthe

GoldStandardUnderagoldstandard,foreign-currencyearningscanalsobeusedtopurchasegoldfromtheforeigncountry’sTreasuryIfacountry’snetexportsplusnetforeigninvestmentarelessthanzero,itsTreasurywillfinditselflosinggoldthecountry’sgoldreservesshrink11Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Weaknessesofthe

GoldStandar11Weaknessesofthe

GoldStandardIfacountry’sgoldreservesareshrinking,ithasachoiceabandonthefixedexchangeratesystemmakeitmoreattractiveforforeignerstoinvestbyraisingdomesticinterestratesputscontractionarypressureontheeconomyCountriesgaininggoldfacenoincentivetolowerinterestratesinordertostayonthegoldstandard12Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Weaknessesofthe

GoldStandar12CollapseoftheGoldStandardThegoldstandardwassuspendedduringWorldWarIAfterthewarended,politiciansandcentralbankerssoughttorestoreittheybelieveditwasanimportantstepinrestoringprosperityAftertheGreatDepressionbegan,thegoldstandardbrokeapart13Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.CollapseoftheGoldStandardT13CollapseoftheGoldStandardFourfactorsmadethegoldstandardalesssecuremonetarysystemeveryoneknewthatgovernmentscouldabandontheirgoldparitiesinanemergencyeveryoneknewthatgovernmentsweretryingtokeepinterestrateslowenoughtoproducefullemployment14Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.CollapseoftheGoldStandardF14CollapseoftheGoldStandardFourfactorsmadethegoldstandardalesssecuremonetarysystemafterWorldWarI,countriesheldtheirreservesinforeigncurrenciesratherthangoldthepost-warsurpluseconomiesdidnotlowerinterestratesasgoldflowedin15Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.CollapseoftheGoldStandardF15CollapseoftheGoldStandardAssoonasarecessionhit,governmentsfoundthemselvesunderpressuretoraiseinterestratesandloweroutputcouldeitherstayonthegoldstandardandfaceadeepdepressionorabandonthegoldstandardthefurthercountriesmovedawayfromtheirgold-standardrates,thefastertheyrecoveredfromtheGreatDepression16Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.CollapseoftheGoldStandardA16Figure15.3-EconomicPerformanceandDegreeofExchangeRateDepreciationDuringtheGreatDepression17Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.3-EconomicPerform17TheBrettonWoodsSystemTheBrettonWoodsSystemwastheresultofaninternationalmonetaryconferencethattookplacein1944Threeprinciplesguidedthissysteminordinarytimes,exchangeratesshouldbefixedinextraordinarytimes,exchangeratesshouldbechangedaninstitutionwasneededtowatchovertheinternationalfinancialsystemtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)18Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheBrettonWoodsSystemTheBr18TheBrettonWoodsSystemTheBrettonWoodsSystembrokedownintheearly1970stheU.S.founditselfwithalargetradedeficitandsoughttodevalueitscurrencySincethen,theexchangeratesofthemajorindustrialpowershavebeenfloatingexchangeratesfluctuateaccordingtosupplyanddemand19Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheBrettonWoodsSystemTheBr19HowaFixedExchangeRateSystemWorksAfixedexchangerateisacommitmentbyacountrytobuyandsellitscurrencyatfixed,unchangingprices(intermsofothercurrencies)thecentralbankorTreasurymustmaintainforeignexchangereservesthesereservesarelimited20Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.HowaFixedExchangeRateSyst20HowaFixedExchangeRateSystemWorksIfthereisahighdegreeofcapitalmobility,therealexchangerateissetbyThehighertheinterestratedifferentialinfavorofthehomecountry,theloweristheexchangerate21Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.HowaFixedExchangeRateSyst21Figure15.4-TheRealExchangeRate,

Long-RunExpectations,and

InterestRateDifferentials22Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.4-TheRealExchang22HowaFixedExchangeRateSystemWorksIfcapitalishighlymobileandthefixedexchangerate(*)islowerthanforeignexchangespeculatorswillwanttosellthehomecurrencyforforeigncurrencythegovernmentspendsdownitsreservestokeeptheexchangerateat*,thecentralbankmustlowerinterestratesmonetarypolicynolongercanplayaroleindomesticstabilization23Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.HowaFixedExchangeRateSyst23Figure15.5-DomesticInterestRatesAreSetbyForeign-ExchangeSpeculators

andtheExchangeRateTarget24Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.5-DomesticInteres24HowaFixedExchangeRateSystemWorksThecentralbankmustsetthedomesticrealinterestrateequaltoanincreaseinforeigninterestrates(rf)requiresapoint-for-pointincreaseindomesticinterestratesanincreaseinforeignexchangespeculators’viewsofthelong-runvalueoftheexchangerate(

0)requiresanincreaseindomesticinterestrates25Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.HowaFixedExchangeRateSyst25Figure15.6-EffectofForeignShocksunderFixedExchangeRates26Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.6-EffectofForeig26HowaFixedExchangeRateSystemWorksIfcapitalmobilityislowtheexchangerateisalsoaffectedbythespeedatwhichthegovernmentisaccumulatingorspendingitsforeignexchangereserves(R)whenthegovernmentisaccumulatingreserves,thevalueofforeigncurrencyishigherthanitwouldotherwisebeitisincreasingforeigncurrencydemand27Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.HowaFixedExchangeRateSyst27Figure15.7-WithLimitedCapitalMobilityaCentralBankCanShiftthe

ExchangeRatebySpendingReserves28Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.7-WithLimitedCap28HowaFixedExchangeRateSystemWorksIfcapitalmobilityislowthecentralbankcanusemonetarypolicyfordomesticdisturbancesthisislimitedbythesensitivityofexchangeratestothemagnitudeofforeign-exchangemarketinterventionsperformedbythecentralbankandbytheamountofreservesthedomesticrealinterestratewillbe29Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.HowaFixedExchangeRateSyst29BenefitsofFixedExchangeRatesFloatingexchangeratesystemsaddriskdiscouragesinternationaltrademakestheinternationaldivisionoflaborlesssophisticatedThisisanimportantreasonbehindthedecisionofmostofwesternEuropetoformamonetaryunionfixtheirexchangeratesagainsteachotherirrevocably30Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.BenefitsofFixedExchangeRat30CostsofFixedExchangeRatesUnderfixedexchangerates,monetarypolicyistightlyconstrainedbytherequirementofmaintainingtheexchangerateatitsfixedparityFixedexchangeratesalsohavethedisadvantageofrapidlytransmittingmonetaryofconfidenceshocksinterestratesmoveintandemallacrosstheworldinresponseFixedexchangeratesalsomakelarge-scalecurrencycrisesmorelikely31Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.CostsofFixedExchangeRatesU31FixedorFloatingExchangeRates?Isitmoreimportanttopreservetheabilitytousemonetarypolicytostabilizethedomesticeconomyratherthandedicatingmonetarypolicytoaconstantexchangerate?Isitmoreimportanttopreservetheconstancyofinternationalpricesandthusexpandthevolumeoftradeandthescopefortheinternationaldivisionoflabor?32Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.FixedorFloatingExchangeRat32FixedorFloatingExchangeRates?EconomistRobertMundellarguedthatthemajorreasontohavefloatingexchangeratesisthattheyallowadjustmenttoshocksthataffecttwocountriesdifferentlythisbenefitwouldbeworthlittleiftwocountriessufferedthesameshocksandreactedtotheminthesamewaythisbenefitwouldalsobeworthlittleiffactorsofproductionarehighlymobile33Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.FixedorFloatingExchangeRat33TheEuropeanCurrencyCrisisof1992AfterreunificationwithEastGermany,theWestGermangovernmentundertookaprogramofmassivepublicinvestmentthisshiftedtheIScurveouttheGermancentralbankraisedinterestratestokeepinflationundercontrol34Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheEuropeanCurrencyCrisiso34Figure15.8-GermanFiscalPolicyandMonetaryResponseintheEarly1990s35Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.8-GermanFiscalPo35TheEuropeanCurrencyCrisisof1992TheincreaseininterestratesgeneratedariseintheGermanexchangeratevis-à-visthedollarandtheyenexportsfellOthercountriesinwesternEuropehadfixedtheirexchangeratestotheGermanmarkaspartoftheEuropeanExchangeRateMechanism36Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheEuropeanCurrencyCrisiso36TheEuropeanCurrencyCrisisof1992TheriseinGermaninterestratesmeantthatthesewesternEuropeancountrieswererequiredtoraiseinterestratesaswelltherequiredinterestrateincreasethreatenedtosendtheotherEuropeancountriesintoarecession37Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheEuropeanCurrencyCrisiso37Figure15.9-EffectofGermanPolicyonOtherEuropeanCountries38Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.9-EffectofGerman38TheEuropeanCurrencyCrisisof1992ForeignexchangespeculatorsdidnotbelievethatthesewesternEuropeangovernmentswouldkeepthispromisetomaintainthefixedexchangerateparitywhenunemploymentbegantorise

0rosewhichcausedanadditionalriseinthedomesticrealinterestraterequiredtomaintainexchangerateparity39Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheEuropeanCurrencyCrisiso39TheEuropeanCurrencyCrisisof1992DifferentgovernmentsinwesternEuropeundertookdifferentstrategiessomespentreservesinthehopethatitdemonstratedtheircommitmenttomaintainingtheexchangerateparitysometriedtodemonstratethattheywoulddefendtheparitynomatterhowhightheinterestrateneededtobesomeabandonedthefixedexchangerateandlettheircurrenciesfloatTheendresultwastheformationoftheEuropeanMonetaryUnion40Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheEuropeanCurrencyCrisiso40TheMexicanCurrencyCrisisof1994-1995TheMexicancurrencycrisiswasasurprisetomosteconomicanalyststhegovernment’sbudgetwasbalancedthegovernment’swillingnesstoraiseinterestrateswasnotinquestiontheMexicanpesowasnotovervaluedThepesolosthalfofitsvalueinfourmonthsstartinginDecemberof199441Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheMexicanCurrencyCrisisof41TheMexicanCurrencyCrisisof1994-1995Concernsaboutpoliticalstabilityreducedforeignexchangespeculators’estimatesofthelong-runvalueofthepesoandraisedtheirassessmentof

0theMexicangovernmentspent$50billioninforeignreservesandeventuallyranoutitdevaluedthepesoandletitfloatagainsttheU.S.dollartheriseincausedafurtherincreasein0thevalueoftheMexicangovernment’sdebtalsoincreased,whichledtofurtherincreasesin042Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheMexicanCurrencyCrisisof42TheMexicanCurrencyCrisisof1994-1995TheMexicangovernmenthadtwooptionsitcouldraiseinterestratesthelevelofinterestratesrequiredwouldproduceaGreatDepressioninMexicoitcouldkeepinterestrateslowandletthevalueofforeigncurrencyrisemuchfurtherMexicancompaniesandtheMexicangovernmentwouldbeunabletopaytheirdollar-denominateddebtsMexico’sforeigntradewouldfalldrastically43Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheMexicanCurrencyCrisisof43TheMexicanCurrencyCrisisof1994-1995TheU.S.madedirectloanstoMexicotheseloansbuiltMexico’sforeign-exchangereservesbacktoacomfortablelevelthisalloweddomesticinterestratestoremainrelativelylowtheMexicangovernmentwasalsoabletorefinanceitsdebtconfidencewasrestoredthattheMexicangovernmentwouldnotbeforcedtoresorttodefaultorhyperinflation44Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheMexicanCurrencyCrisisof44Figure15.10-Mexico’sNominalExchangeRate:TheValueoftheU.S.Dollar

inMexicanPesos45Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.10-Mexico’sNomina45TheEastAsianCurrencyCrisisof1997-1998Inmid-1997,foreigninvestorsbegantoworryaboutthelong-runsustainabilityofgrowthinEastAsiatheybegantochangetheiropinionsofthefundamentallong-termvalueofEastAsia’sexchangerates(

0)thevalueofthecurrenciesfellcausingafurtherchangein046Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheEastAsianCurrencyCrisis46TheEastAsianCurrencyCrisisof1997-1998ItalsobecameclearthatmanyofEastAsia’sbanksandcompanieshadborrowedheavilyabroadinamountsdenominatedindollarsoryentheseloanshadbeenusedtomakenon-profitableinvestmentsthisleadtofurtherdecreasesin047Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheEastAsianCurrencyCrisis47TheEastAsianCurrencyCrisisof1997-1998Therewasaviciouscyclecreatedeachdeclineintheexchangerateraisedtheburdenofforeign-denominateddebtandraisedtheprobabilityofbankruptcyeachriseintheperceivedburdenofforeign-denominateddebtcausedafurtherlossinthevalueoftheexchangerateTheIMFsteppedinwithloanstoboostforeignexchangereservespromisestoimprovebankingregulationweremadeinreturn48Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.TheEastAsianCurrencyCrisis48Figure15.11-ExchangeRatesDuringtheAsianCurrencyCrisis49Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.11-ExchangeRates49Figure15.11-ExchangeRatesDuringtheAsianCurrencyCrisis50Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Figure15.11-ExchangeRates50ManagingCrisesTheexchangerateequationoffersacountryamenuofchoicesforitsvalueoftherealexchangerate()anditsvalueofthedomesticrealinterestrate(r)thehigherthedomesticrealinterestrate,themoreappreciatedistheexchangerate51Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.ManagingCrisesTheexchangera51ManagingCrisesIfinternationalinvestorssuddenlyloseconfidenceinthefutureofthecountry’seconomy,themenuofchoicesthatthecountryhasdeterioratesifthedomesticrealinterestrateistoremainunchanged,theexchangeratemustdepreciateiftheexchangerateistoremainunchanged,thedomesticrealinterestratemustrise52Copyright©2002byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.ManagingCrisesIfinternationa52ManagingCrisesBecausealargerise