欧洲国际政治经济中心（ECIPE）：欧洲的自主、布鲁塞尔效应和全球经济保护主义的兴起

EUROPEANCENTREFORINTERNATIONAL

POLTICALECONOMY

ECIPE

OCCASIONALPAPER-No.01/2024

EUAutonomy,theBrussels

Effect,andtheRiseofGlobalEconomicProtectionism

ByMatthiasBauerandDyutiPandya,

DirectorandJuniorAnalystatECIPE

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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

TheBrusselsEffect,onceemblematicoftheEU'sallegedinfuenceinshapingglobalregulations,hasnowbecomeafactorcontributingtoglobalregulatoryfragmentation.TheEUmustrecalibrateitstrajectorytowardsaliberalandrules-basedtradingorder,prioritizingwidespreadregulatoryliberalizationtocounteracttherisksofglobalprotectionismandregulatoryspirals.Aholisticapproach,bothinternallyandglobally,iscrucialtopreventregulatoryandsubsidyspiralsonaglobalscale.ThisrecalibrationisessentialtokeepglobalmarketsopenandenhancetheEU'sowneconomicandtechnologicalcompetitiveness.

Inresponsetothe2008financialcrises,theEUunderwentashiftinitsapproachtoglobaltrade,transitioningtowardsStrategicAutonomy.However,thisgradualmoveawayfromaliberalglobaltradeorderhasledtoincreasedregulatoryburdensandregulatoryfragmentation,impactingbusinesseswithinandbeyondtheEU.

TheBrusselsEffect,asdenotedinthispaper,highlightstheEU'ssignallingeffectonothergovernmentsinconsideringandimplementingregulations.Thiseffecthascontributedtoincreasedtraderestrictivenessandregulatoryfragmentationglobally.TheEU'sinsistenceon"autonomy"and"Europeanvalues"notonlyempowersotherstofollowsuit,contributingtotheriseinglobalprotectionism,butalsocontradictstheEU'shistoricalsupportforopentradeprinciplesanditscommitmenttoahighlycompetitivesocialmarketeconomy.

AwealthofEUregulatorydatarevealsastagnationand,inmanycases,aregressioninregulatorycooperationwithintheSingleMarket.ThisisevidentfromrisingtraderestrictivenessandatendencytowardsincreasedlegalfragmentationinsteadofconvergenceacrosstheEU.TheevolvingregulatoryacquisoftheEU,coupledwithinsuficientcooperationandstalledtradeagreements,posesrisksbeyonditsborders.TheEU'sparadigmshifttowardsautonomycontributestoglobalregulatoryspiralsandprotectionistmeasures,particularlyevidentinservicestrade.DespitetheEU'shistoricalcommitmenttoharmonizationandliberalization,manysectors,suchastransportandlogistics,telecoms,anddigitalservices,havewitnessedtheimpositionofnewlawsandrulesthathindertrade.

WiththeEU'sshareofglobalGDPexpectedtodecreasetog%by2050,thereisacriticalneedforEUgovernmentstoenhanceitsregulatorycapabilitiesandfosterinnovation.Towieldinfuenceinglobaleconomicdiplomacy,EUpolicymakersmustprioritizepoliciesthatunleashthecollectiveingenuityofindividualsandbusinessesthathelptomaintainhighlevelsofproductivity,competitiveness,andprosperity.

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Inresponsetotheseobservations,weputforthsomeessentialpolicyrecommendations:

ReturntoaLiberalGlobalEconomicOrder:TheEUshouldreaffirmitscommitmenttoaliberalglobaleconomicorder,prioritizingeconomicfreedom,governmentaccountability,knowledge,innovationcapacities,andprosperity.

RefocusontheInternalMarket:TheEUshouldimplementacomprehensiveinternalstrategyinvolvingliberalization,de-bureaucratization,legalharmonization,andtaxcodesimplification.EUpolicymakingshouldfosterregulatorycoherencethroughcollaborationbetweenEUgovernmentsandtheEuropeanCommission.

FlexibleApproachtoEconomicIntegration:TheEUandMemberStategovernmentsshouldadoptamoreflexibleandadaptiveapproachtoeconomicintegration,emphasizingmutualrecognitiontorespondeffectivelytoevolvingglobaldynamicswhilepreservingopenmarkets.EUgovernmentsshouldengageinaconstructivedialoguetostreamlineregulationsandeliminatebarriershinderingthefreemovementofgoodsandserviceswithinEUborders.

PromoteRegulatoryCoalitions:EUinstitutionsandMemberStategovernmentsneedtorecognizethechallengesinachievingconsensusamongallEUmemberstates.TheyshouldpromoteregulatorycoalitionsamongwillingMemberStatesformoreagilehorizontalandsector-specificregulatoryframeworks.

EnhanceGlobalRegulatoryCooperation:TheEUshouldseekmoreregulatorycooperationglobally,emphasizingmutualrecognition(interoperability)ofregulations,and,asaguidingprinciple,worktowardsanopenandrules-basedinternationaltradingsystem.

AdvocateforaStrategicFreeTradeandTechnologyAlliance:EUpolicymakersmustacknowledgetheadverseconsequencesofanevolvingregulatorysilosandchampiontheinternationalcoordinationoftradeandbehind-the-borderpolicies.TheEUshouldactivelyadvocatefortheestablishmentofastrategicfreetradeandtechnologyallianceamongmarket-orienteddemocracies,suchasthelargergroupofOECDorG20countries.TheEUandMemberStategovernmentsshouldembracemarket-ledstandardizationininternationalforumstodevelopglobaltechnologystandards,enablingsmoothercross-borderdigitaltrade.Tofuelintra-EUandextra-EUdigitaltrade,EUpolicymakersshouldtakealeadingroleinharmonizingdigitalandtechnologystandardsbothwithintheEUandglobally.

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1.INTRODUCTION

Globalprotectionismhasincreasedsharplysincetheglobalsovereigndebtandfinancialmarketcrisesof2008,anditshowsnosignsofabating!ThenumberofnewregulationssetbytheEU,OECDandBRICScountriesandtheirrestrictivenesshasbeenincreasingglobally.Traderestrictions,investmentbarriersandmeasuresthatdistortcompetition,firstandforemostsubsidies,arebeingcreatedaroundtheworld.TheEUhaschampionedopenmarketsandaliberalglobaltradeorderfordecades.Butwithpoliciesthatseekautonomyorsovereignty,andinsomeinstancesevenisolation,theEUisputtingitscredibilityandglobalstandardsettingpoweratrisk

TheEU'slong-standingcommitmenttoanopenandliberalizedtradingsystemwillbejeopardizediftheEUstaysthecourseandenactsmorerestrictivelawsthatmaketradewithintheEUandbetweentheEUandthirdcountriesmoredificult.Theimplementationofprotectionistmeasures,leadingtoincreasedtradebarriersandregulatorycomplexities,risksdisruptingthesmoothflowofgoodsandservices,therebyimpedingglobaleconomicintegrationandEU'sparticipationinglobaltradeandinvestment.?ThepreferenceforstringentregulationsbyEUpolicymakersovertheyearshascontinuedtorefectanaversiontoriskandtocommitmenttoasocialmarketeconomy.3

TheEU'spursuitof"StrategicAutonomy"mayeventuallyerodetheopennessithasadvocatedfor,fordecades,diminishingmarketaccessandappeal,andcausingadeclineinEUinluenceininternationalfora.PolicymakersattheEUandMemberStatelevelsshouldthuscarefullyweightheseconsequencesandstartprioritizingmeasuresaimedatsafeguardingtheEU'senduringeconomicsuccessanditsfuturestandinginglobalgeopolitics,recognizingtheintrinsicconnectionbetweenthetwo.

TheEU'sdeparturefromalongstandingcommitmenttoadvancingaliberalworldtradingsystem

TheEU'spursuitof"StrategicAutonomy'hasusheredinanotabledeparturefromitslongstandingcommitmenttoadvancingaliberalworldtradingsystemandchampioningtradeliberalization.Thisstrategicrecalibrationisrefectedinanescalatingregulatoryburdenimposedonbothdomestic(EU-headquartered)andinternationalcompaniesoperatingintheEU,resultinginadiscernibleshifttowardsamoreprotectionistorientationwithintheEU.Aprominentexample

1See.eg..Wiberg.M,andWallen,F(2021).Growingprotectionismafterthefinancialcrisiswhatistheevidence?InstituteofEconomicAffairsCurrentControversiesNo.60.Availableat

/sol

³/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3853657.AlsoseeEvenett,S.(2019).Protectionism,statediscrimination,andinternationalbusinesssincetheonsetoftheglobalfinancialcrisis.JournalofInternationalBusinessPolicy.2,9-36

2See,eg.Kielnstitute(2021.PursuitofeconomicautonomycanbecostlyforEUcountries.Availableathttps//wwwifw-kieldepublications/news/pursuit-of-economic-autonomy-can-be-costly-for-eu-countries/.AlsoseeRabobankResearch(2023).Europe'squestforstrategicautonomyrequiresdealingwithstructuralweaknesses.Availableathttps://www.rabobank.com/knowledge/do11405319-europes-quest-for-strategic-autonomy-requires-dealing-with-structural-weaknesses

3TheEU'scommitmenttosocialmarketeconomyhighlightedasacommonobjectiveforEuropeunder(Article1(4)ofthenewLisbonTreaty)[ITheUnionlshallworkforthesustainabledevelopmentofEuropebasedonbalancedeconomicgrowthandpricestability,ahighlycompetitivesocialmarketeconomyndahighlevelofprotectionandimprovementofthequalityoftheenvironment."1see:Bradford,A.(2012).TheBrusselsEffect.NorthwesternUniversityLawReview,107.1.

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ofthisshiftistherelaxationofstateaidrules,introducinggovernmentfundingthatcreatesdistortionstocompetitionwithinandbeyondtheEU'sownSingleMarket.4

EUpolicymakers,intheirdefenceofnewpoliciesandsubsidies,articulateadualrationale:

1)EUpolicymakersclaimthattheEUiscompelledtosynchronizeitsregulatorylandscapewithglobaltrends,necessitatingtheintroductionofnewregulationsandpotentialtradeandinvestmentbarriers.Thisargumentispresentedwithacertaindegreeofreservation,asEUoficialsacknowledgetheinevitabilityofaligningwithperceivedglobalnorms.

2)EUpolicymakersalsocontendthattheEUconfrontsanarrayofregulatoryandgeopoliticalchallengesthatdemandproactivemeasures,particularlyincontrasttojurisdictionsdeemedinsufficientlyresponsivetothesechallenges.

Inessence,policymakers'perspectivesalignwiththeideathattheirproactivemeasuresareresponsestodiversechallengesfacedbytheEU,especiallywhencontrastedwithperceivedshortcomingsintheapproachesofotherjurisdictions.Theongoingdebateaboutprotectionism,regulatorycooperation,andfreetradeagreements(FTAs)reflectsthecomplexlandscapeofglobaltrade,whereindividualdecisionscanhaverippleeffectsacrosseconomies.

ThisperspectivealignswithanIMFanalysisofdeglobalizationphases,wheretheEU'sapproachcanbeviewedasanuancedresponsetoevolvingglobaldynamics.5Thefirstphase,around2015,markedabacklashagainstglobalization,andEUpolicymakersmayinterpretthisasanimpetustoaddressdistributionalconcernsarisingfromglobaleconomicintegration.

Thesecondphase,triggeredbytheCOVID-19pandemicin2020,sawcallsforresilience(withtheIMFauthorsarguingthatinternationaltradeenhancedresilience).EUpolicymakers,inthiscontext,mightberespondingtospecificshocksandchallengesrevealedbythepandemic,emphasizingtheneedfortailoredapproaches.

Thethirdphase,initiatedbygeopoliticalpressuressuchasRussia'sinvasionofUkrainein2022,reflectsanothershiftinmindsettowardsazero-sumgameininternationalwelfare.EUpolicymakersnowoftenjustifynewmeasuresandinitiativesbycitingsimilargeopoliticalandregulatorychallenges,reinforcingtheideathattheiractionsarenecessitatedbyevolvingglobalcircumstances.Thiscomplexinterplaybetweenglobaleventsandpolicyresponsesunderscorestheintricatelandscapeofglobaltradedynamics.

Thesethreephasesgloballyinfluencedpolicydecisions,butwithintheEU,policymakers'proactivestance,especiallyinareaslikedigitaltrade,technologycompetition,andindustrialsubsidies,suggestsadistinctpoliticaldrivetoleverageglobaltrendsformeasuresthat,rather

4Chee,YF.(2022,December13).EUtoconsultoneasierstateaidrulestocounterU.S.subsidylaw.Reuters.Availableat

/business/eu-consult-easier-state-aid-rules-counter-us-subsidy-law-sources-2022-12-13/

.

5Goldberg.P.andReedT.(2023).Growingthreattoglobaltrade:protectionismcouldmaketheworldlessresilient,more

unequal,andmoreconfictprone.IMF.Availableat

/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2023/06/

growing-threats-to-global-trade-goldberg-reed.

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thanaddressingglobalgeopoliticalchallenges,arefrequentlyjustifiedbythenecessityforswiftanddecisiveregulatoryresponses.

Byadoptinganapproachthatintensifiesregulatoryrequirements,theEUriskscreatingbarriersthathinderthefreecross-borderflowofgoods,services,andcapital,therebycontradictingthefundamentalprinciplesofanopenandliberalizedtradingsystem.Tonamejustafew:

-Prescriptivepolicies,whichdictatespecificrulesandstandards,andproscriptivepolicies,whichprohibitcertainactivities,canleadtoincreasedcomplexityandcompliancecostsforbusinesses.Thisadditionalregulatoryburdenislikelytodisproportionallyaffectsmallerenterprises,potentiallylimitingtheirabilitytoengageincross-bordertrade.Asaconsequence,theEUmayfinditchallengingtofosteranenvironmentconducivetothegrowthofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises(SMEs)-entitiescrucialforeconomicdynamismandjobcreation.

-AnescalationinregulatoryrequirementsmaydiscourageforeigninvestorsfromenteringtheEUmarketorpromptexistinginvestorstoreassesstheircommitments.Investorsaretypicallyattractedtoregionswithclear,stable,andbusiness-friendlyregulatoryframeworks.IftheEU'sregulatorylandscapebecomesexcessivelyintricateorsubjecttofrequentchanges,itmayerodetheattractivenessoftheEuropeanmarketforbothdomesticandinternationalinvestors.

-IncreasedregulatoryburdenstypicallyresultfromalackofharmonisationanddivergentindustryregulationsacrossMemberStates.ThisfragmentationhasledtocountlessinternaltradebarrierswithintheEU,hinderingtheseamlessmovementofgoodsandservices.TheenvisionedStrategicAutonomypursuedbytheEUmayunintentionallyobstructtheveryopennessandintegrationithaschampionedfordecadesevenmore.Aswewillshowbelow,despiteallthepoliticaltalk,therehasbeennosignifcantdeepeningoftheEU'sinternalmarketover(atleast)thepast10years.6

TheloomingriskofanEU-fuelledregulatoryspiralbecomesapparent

TheEU'sshiftingregulatoryapproachhasrepercussionsbeyonditsborders,creatingadominoeffectasgovernmentsindevelopingandemergingmarketeconomiesareinluencedtoadoptsimilarprotectionistmeasures?Thistrend,inspiredbyEUactions,raisesconcernsaboutapotentialglobalregulatoryspiral,asothernationsmayemulatethesemeasurestoaddressperceivedchallenges,disregardingthefoundationalprinciplesoftheliberalworldtradingsystemtraditionallychampionedbytheEU.

6Foradiscussion,see,eg.ECIPE(2022).Europeanstrategicautonomy-WhatroleforEurope'sfragmentedsinglemarket?Availableat

/blog/european-strategic-autonomy-single-market/

.

?Bradford,A.(2020).TheBrusselseffect:HowtheEuropeanUnionrulestheworld.OxfordUniversityPress,USA.

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9iD-ne---uvli-rtaedy-shingtradelegacy.Politico.Availableathttps://www.politicoeu/

Inadditiontoitsregulatoryshifts,theEU'sanaemicattemptstoimproveregulatorycooperationwiththirdcountriesfurtherunderscoresthechallengesinfosteringanopenandcollaborativeinternationaltradeenvironment.8Thelackofeffectivecoordinationandcooperationwithexternalpartnersimpedesthedevelopmentofcohesiveregulatoryframeworksthatcouldfacilitatesmoothertradeinteractions.

Thisdeficiencyinregulatoryalignmentwillultimatelycontributetoanenvironmentwheredivergentstandardsandrequirementshinderglobalflowsofgoodsandservices.

Furthermore,despitetheEU'shistoricalroleasaproponentofFTAs,recenttrendsindicateastagnationinprogress.TheEU'sendeavourstonegotiateandfinalizesignificantFTAsseemtobeencounteringimpediments,resultinginalackofsubstantialbreakthroughs.UrsulavonderLeyen'stradelegacyappearstobediminishingasherambitiousgoalsfacesetbacks,particularlywithtradedealswithSouthAmericanandAustralianpartners.Despiteeffortstodiversifyeconomicrelationships,challengesandfailuresinkeynegotiations,suchaswithMercosurandAustralia,raisequestionsabouttheeffectivenessoftheEU'stradestrategyunderherleadership.9ThisinertiainadvancingFTAsdiminishestheEU'sabilitytoleverageitseconomicinluenceandengagemeaningfullyinshapingtheglobaltradelandscape.

AstheEUcontinuesonitspathtowardsachievingStrategicAutonomy,itbecomescrucialtoconductathoroughassessmentofthebroaderinternationalconsequences.TheevolvingnarrativesaroundtheEU'sapproachestoachievingautonomyinproductionandtradenecessitatesanuancedexaminationofitsimpactonregulatorycooperationand,moregenerally,ofthechallengesitposestomaintainingaliberalandopenglobaltradingsystem.

Inthiscontext,theBrusselsEffect,oncesynonymouswiththeEU'ssubstantialinfluenceinshapingglobalregulations,hasgeneratedcontroversyregardingitsactualsignificance.WhileEUregulationsoftenpromptothernationstoadoptsimilarrules,thisregulatoryfragmentationcanimposesubstantialcostsonbusinesses,creatingbarrierstotradeandhinderinginternationalintegration.ExamplesliketheGeneralDataProtectionRegulation(GDPR)andEUcompetitionpolicyshowcasetheBrusselsEffect'sglobalimpact,albeitwithvariationsandcountry-specificadjustments,contributingtoacomplexglobalpatchworkofrulesandregulatoryfragmentation.

TheBrusselsEffectwasonceemblematicoftheEU'sinfuenceinshapingglobalregulations.ThetermsignifiedthepotentialimpactoftheEUinshapingglobalregulations.Thisinfluence,itwassaid,arosefromtheEU'slargemarket,extraterritorialreach,andimpactsonglobalvaluechains,compellinggovernmentsandcompaniesworldwidetoadoptEUstandards.

at

/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/img/115

_finalpdf.

8Golberg,E.(2019)Regulatorycooperation-arealitycheck.M-RCBGAssociateWorkingPaperSeries|No.115.Available

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globalstandardintheAldevelopment.BecausetherearenoAlregulationsasabenchmark,theEU'sAlregulationwill

/2022/05/privacy-data-protection/the-fourth-anniversary-of-the-gdpr-how-the-

urges-the-us-to-join-the-fight-to-regulate-ai/.ItisalsoconsideredthattechcompaniesmayusetheEUstandardasthe

(GenerälDataProtectionRegulation)(OJL016,p.1).http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/2016-05-04

A.(2022)ThefourthanniversaryoftheGDPR:HowtheGDPRhashadadominoeffect.ReedSmith.Availableat:https://

verylikelyserveasatemplateforotherjurisdictions.

gdpr-has-had-a-domino-effect/.

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WhetherandtowhatextentthereisasignificantBrusselsEffect-inthesensethatgovernmentsoutsidetheEUadoptEUpolicies-iscontroversiallydiscussed.10ButitisevidentthatnewEUregulationsoftenpromptothercountriestocontemplateandadoptsimilarrules,oftenwithspecifcadjustmentstosuittheirnationalpoliticalcontexts."

TheBrusselsEfectisaresultoftheEU'seconomicsize,regulatorycapacities,andthewillingnesstoregulateinlinewiththeprecautionaryprinciple,makingitsregulationshaveamorewidespreadimpactontheglobalscalecomparedtootherregionslikeTokyoorBejing.However,thefragmentationoflawsdoesimposecostsonbusinesses,anditdoescreatebarrierstotrade:

-Thecomplexityandinconsistencyofregulationsacrossdifferentregionsmakesitchallengingforcompaniestonavigateandcomplyefficiently.

-Legalfragmentationintroducescomplexity,compliancecosts,anduncertaintiesforbusinessesoperatingacrossborders,hinderingthesmoothflowofgoodsandservices.

-Differingregulationsamongcountriesmaycreatebarriersthatimpedetheeficiencyandintegrationofglobalmarkets.

-Onaggregate,regulatoryfragmentationcanhaveadeterrenteffectoninternationaltradeandinvestment.

WhilesomeanalystsstillperceivetheBrusselsEffectasconducivetotradebasedonhighstandards,2itisevidentthatanincreasednumberofregulations,coupledwithdefactofragmentation,posesabarriertointernationaltradeandinvestment.

TheEU'sGDPR13isoneofthemostnotableexamplesinthedebateabouttheBrusselsEffect.TheEU'sstringentdataprivacyregulationshaveindeedhadaglobalimpact,withmanygovernmentsusingGDPRasastartingpointfortheirownprivacypolicies,andcompaniesworldwidepartly

10TheJusticeChiefoftheEU.DidierReynders,isencouragingtheUnitedStatestoengageindiscussionsaboutmore

stringentregulationinthetechsector,emphasizingtheimportanceofenforcement.Additionally,heintendstoadvocate

fortechcompaniestovoluntarilyadheretotheguidelinesoutlinedintheyet-to-be-passed'AlAct.Theseinitiatives

July16).TheEUUrgestheUStoJointheFighttoRegulateAl.Wired.Availableat

/story/the-eu

-

suggestadominoeffectinitiatedbytheEU,whichaimstoestablishaninternationalstandardforAl;see:Dave,P(2023.

Availableathttps///content/d466849c-512e-4b66-a8ea-38e3b3gade47.Alsosee:O'BrienandIbraimova.

nMcDougell,M.(2022,December19)EUdealsettotrigger'dominoeffectforglobalminimumtaxdeal.FinancialTimes.

i²See,eg.CentreforEuropeanReform(2023).Intech,thedeathoftheBrusselseffectisgreatlyexaggerated.Availableathttps://www.cereu/sites/default/fles/ZM_brux_effect_8.12.23.pdf

withregardtotheprocessingofpersonaldataandonthefreemovementofsuchdata,andrepealingDirective95/46/EC

13Regulation(EU)2016/679oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof27April2016ontheprotectionofnaturalpersons

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TransatlanticContext.WilsonCenter.Availableat:https://wwwwilsoncenterorg/article/regulating-platforms-eu-way-

-TPhosIinAO(YPeIt)ee-zD-aGtoS

sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id-1960299.

courseoflegislationintheUS;see:Burwell,F(2021,March30)RegulatingPlatformstheEUWay?TheDSAandDMAin

dsa-and-dma-transatlantic-context.ForSouthAfrica,seeCompetitionAct8gof19g8,Preamble(S.Afr).

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adjustingtheirdataprotectionpoliciestoalignwithGDPRstandards:4Nevertheless,GDPRhasnotbeenuniversallyadoptedwithoutcountry-specificmodifications.Variationsandcountry-specificadjustmentsareprevalent,leadingtoacomplicatedglobalpatchworkofdataprotectionrules.

AnotherexampleistheEUcompetitionpolicy.TheEU'scompetitionregulationsandenforcementmeasures,ledbytheEuropeanCommission,doimpactglobalcompetitionrules.Thisisevidentintheformulationofrulesandinthecontrolofmergers.formulationofrulesandinthecontrolofmergers.Manynon-EUcountries,e.g..theUKisandIndia⁶,havetakeninspirationfromEUrestrictionstargetingcommoncommercialpracticesoflargetechnologyplatforms.7Althoughtherulesdiffergreatlyindetail,countriesoutsidetheEUtypicallyrelyonsimilar-thoughvague-principles,suchasnotionsof"fairness"andcontestability",whilemaintainingtheirowndistinctcompetitionpoliciesinfuencedbydomesticeconomicandpoliticalconsiderations.18

InthepursuitofStrategicAutonomy,theEU'sregulatoryinitiatives,especiallyindigitalandcompetitionpolicymaking,impedecross-bordertradeandinvestments.19Thistrend,coupledwiththeEU'ssluggishprogressinregulatorycooperationandfreetradeagreements,raisesconcernsabouthowEUpolicymakingisimpactingtheglobaltradeandinvestmentlandscape.TheEU'sevolvingregulatoryapproachservesasasignaltogovernmentsindevelopingeconomies,inspiringthepotentialadoptionofprotectionistmeasures,leadingtoadominoeffectthatthreatenstheliberalworldtradingsystem.

TheinadequacyofregulatorycooperationwiththeUSandthirdcountriesfurthercompoundsthesechallenges.ConcernshaverecentlybeenraisedbytheUSgovernmentinthecontextoftheWTOandotherinternationalfora.Inheropeningstatementsonthe15thTradePolicyReviewoftheEuropeanUnion,AmbassadorMariaL.Pagán,U.S.DeputyUnitedStatesTradeRepresentative,raisedconcernsaboutpersistentbarriersfacedbyspecificUSgoodsandservicesintheEUmarket.TheseconcernsrangedfromproceduralissuesrelatedtoregulatorynotificationsandtheEU'shazard-basedapproachtoregulations(highlightingtheREACHregulation)tochallengesinmarketaccessforU.S.agriculturalproductsandwineexports.Additionally,sheaddressedissuessuchastheEU'sproposedcybersecuritycertificationscheme(EUCS),itsexclusionaryapproachtostandards-relatedmeasures,andchallengesinEUcustoms

AmericaTheCaliforniaConsumerPrivacyAct;Asia:Japan-ActontheProtectionofPersonalinformation(APPI)(2020),

14SomeexamplesthatfollowedthesimilarroutesofGDPRsuitorhaveexpandedtheirexistingrulesonthesuit:North

globalizationofConvention.M-RCBGAssociateWorkingPapersSeries|No.135.Availableat

/

(2020).AlsoseeGreenleaf,G.(2012).TheinfuenceofEuropeandataprivacystandardsoutsideEurope:implicationsfor

15See,e.g..Lexology(2023).UK:IntroducingRegulationofDigitalPlatformsAndNewCompetitionandConsumerProtectionReforms.Availableathttps://www.lexologycom/library/detailaspx?g-2ab6fc77-48ed-43af-923f-d7587cf5cb1d.

18Seeeg.Singh.M.(2023.June23).TheRecipeforIndia'sGatekeeperRegulation.B.Availableathttps.//botpopulinet/the-recipe-for-indias-gatekeeper-regulation/.

17ArecentdiscussionofpoliticalrationalesandeconomicimpactsisprovidedbyECPE(2023).MergerPolicy.Competition

andInnovationLeadership:ImplicationsfortheUK'sInvestmentAttractiveness.Availableat

newlegalinstrumentswithinther