产权理论与财务和会计研究

产权理论与财务和会计研究魏明海教授PhoneYSU-minghai2内容提要为什么选择产权理论？如何运用产权理论研究财务与会计问题？专用资产与继承对财务和会计问题的解释关系资产与腐败对财务和会计问题的解释股权分置改革后的相关问题〔股权可交易性对会计问题的解释〕SYSU-minghai3第一局部为什么选择产权理论？SYSU-minghai4先看Top-downresearchapproachSYSU-minghai5InstitutionsGovernmentFirmorganizationsystemCorporate

governanceRoleofaccounting

andcorporatepoliciesTop-downResearchFrameworkSYSU-minghai6CountryInstitutionsThelegalsystem(thecourtandthelaw)Thegovernment(regulations,publicsectorgovernance)Thesociety(religion,ideology,custom,socialnorm)MarketsProduct,labor,manager,rawmaterial,financialcapitalFirmsFirmboundary(verticalintegration,diversification)OwnershipandcontrolstructuresGovernancestructures(accounting,boardsofdirectors,executivecompensation,reputationmechanisms)SYSU-minghai7Top-downresearchapproach

(FAN2006)ObserveIdentifyakeyinstitutionalfactorDevelopaseriesofresearchissuesAnalyzehowincentivesandbehaviorsofeconomicagents(governmentsorfirms)areaffectedwhenweimposetheinstitutionalconstraintAnalyzehowthegovernancestructuresofcontractsandorganizationsarechosensubjecttotheinstitutionalconstraintDatacollectionandempiricaltestsSYSU-minghai8keyinstitutionalfactorsOwnershipConcentration,transferabilityGovernmentownershipFamilyownershipOrganizationVerticalintegration,diversification,groupaffiliationAllocationofdecisionrightswithinafirmSYSU-minghai9Top-downApproach的程序是〔T.J.Wong,2005〕IdentifykeyinstitutionalfactorsthatshapeorganizationandincentivesThesefactorsincludepropertyrules,government’sroleineconomy,marketandlegaldevelopmentThesefactorsalsoshapethecorporategovernance,accountingandcorporatepoliciesApplycommontheoriesoranalyticalframeworks--onlyinstitutionsaredifferentSYSU-minghai10可以从哪些方面理解

InstitutionalSettingInstitutionsofEastAsia〔T.J.Wong,2005〕PoliticaleconomyClosetiesbetweengovernmentandbusinessRentseekingsocietyLegalsystemsPoorprotectionofpropertyrightsPrivateenforcementofcontractsWeakprotectionofoutsideshareholdersCultureandsocialnormLowtrustsocietyRelationship-basedtransactionsFamilyfirmsSYSU-minghai11China’sInstitutionalSetting〔EconomicintransitionGovtvs.Market〕〔T.J.Wong,2005〕Capitalmarkets(statevs.market)IPO,rightsofferingsanddelistingcontrolledbygovt(quotasystem;ROEtargets)Statebanks–relatedlendingGovernmentnotmarketplaysabigroleMajorityownershipbythestatepartialprivatization(minorityshares)ofSOEsdirect(SAMB)andindirect(parentSOE)governmentmajorityownershipGovernmentsharescannottobesoldeasilyIncentiveissues:softbudgetconstraints;SOEpursuingnon-economicgoalsSYSU-minghai12Control(mgmtvs.state)1992,centralgovtgrantedSOEs14rights,mainlyoperatingrightsRightsnotgiven:M&A,disposalofassets,appointmentofchairmanandCEOBoardsandmanagementfilledwithgovtbureaucrats;notprofessionalIncentivesissue:governmentinterventions;doubleagencyofmanagement

EconomyisdecentralizedLocalgovernmentsownSOEsandhaveproductionandfiscalautonomyListedSOEcanbringresourcesandpoliticalcapitaltolocalgovtWeaklegalsystemsandundevelopedmarketsPoorlydevelopedlegalsystemandmarkets,moregovernmentinterventionsInstitutionsvaryacrossprovincesinChina,whichallowsx-sectionalcomparisonsacrossregionsSYSU-minghai13再看一篇论文及投资者保护会计研究

BushmanR，ASmith.2001.Financialaccountinginformationandcorporategovernance.JournalofAccountingandEconomics.32:237–333.SYSU-minghai14财务会计信息股价信息经济业绩渠道1更好地辨识好项目和坏项目（项目辨识）渠道2对经理人项目选择和利益侵占的约束（治理作用）渠道3减少投资者之间的信息不对称（逆向选择）降低外部融资成本财务会计信息影响经济业绩的三条渠道转引自Bushman和Smith（2001）SYSU-minghai15当投资者权利的法律保护较强时，经济业绩可以作为投资者保护程度的一个替代变量。Bushman和Smith〔2001〕在综述相关的会计实证研究时，详细分析了会计信息提高经济业绩的三条渠道。SYSU-minghai16在不考虑逆向选择和道德风险的情况下，公司高管人员和投资者仍然可能由于缺乏相关、可靠的信息对投资工程进行错误的判断，从而导致无效投资。会计信息能够帮助公司高管人员和投资者区分投资工程的优劣，提高投资的效率，发挥工程辨识的作用〔如图中渠道1所示〕。然而，在研究设计中往往难以单独区分出这一渠道的作用机制，与其他渠道的作用相别离，因此，相关的实证研究并不多见〔Biddle和Hilary，2006〕。SYSU-minghai17考虑到公司高管人员可能存在的道德风险，会计信息在投资者与公司高管人员的鼓励和约束机制中可发挥重要的治理作用〔如图中渠道2所示〕，降低公司内部的代理本钱。这个领域的研究随着公司治理相关研究的扩展得到了迅速的开展。SYSU-minghai18由于公司内部人与外部投资者〔包括潜在投资者〕之间存在着信息不对称，会计信息有助于缓解这种信息不对称，帮助外部投资者对公司资产进行合理定价，减少可能发生的逆向选择现象〔如图中渠道3所示〕。这个领域的研究大都伴随着对资本市场有效性的检验和讨论。SYSU-minghai19财务会计信息是公司财务会计过程和外部报告系统的产品，并按要求公开披露，反映公司财务状况和业绩。在投资者保护中，财务会计信息主要有定价和治理两个方面的作用机制：SYSU-minghai20一方面，财务会计信息能够降低公司内部人与外部投资者之间的信息不对称程度，促进投资者事前准确定价和形成正确的投资决策；另一方面，财务会计信息进入治理过程，约束和限制公司内部人的时机主义行为或利益侵占行为，减少事后可能的代理本钱，保护投资者获取投资回报〔Healy和Palepu，2001〕。SYSU-minghai21SYSU-minghai22SYSU-minghai23SYSU-minghai24SYSU-minghai25SYSU-minghai26PropertyrightsandtransactioncostsasusefulanalyticaltoolsforunderstandinghowgovernanceworksSYSU-minghai27EconomicsofPropertyRightsEconomicsofTransactionCostsAgencyTheorySYSU-minghai28Thepropertyrightstheory–overviewAnyassetisattachedwithabundleofpropertyrightsThepropertyrightsoftheassetareassigned(partitioned)amongeconomicagentsthroughlaws/rulesandexchangesThepropertyrightstheoryanalyzeswhatdeterminethepartitionofthepropertyrights,andtheireconomicconsequencesPropertyrightstheoryaddressesoptimalallocationofrightsthatmaximizeenforcement(publicorprivate)Transactioncostsareimportantdeterminantsofthepropertyrightsassignments,becausetheyaffecttheexchange/transferofpropertyrightsWecanapplythepropertyrighttheorytostudyhowthepropertyrulesandtransactioncostsofamarketaffecttheformandgovernanceofeconomicorganizations(contracts,ownership)SYSU-minghai29BasicconceptsCostsoftransferringpropertyrightsSpecializedassetsRelationship-basedcontractingSYSU-minghai30Thecostoftransferringpropertyrights(Alchian,1965)Exchange(transfer)cost,atypeoftransactioncost,criticallydeterminetheallocationofpropertyrightsTransfercostoftenoccurduetogovernmentregulation,orevenprohibition,oftradeThedifferencesbetweenpublicandprivateownershiparisefromtheinabilityofapublicownertosellhisshareofpublicownership.Theinabilitytosellone’sshareofpublicownershipremainsapotentfactorinthecosts-rewardsystemimpingingonallmembersofthepublicandontheemployeesofthepublicownedinstitution.SYSU-minghai31ThecostoftransferringpropertyrightsSoon,wewilllearnhowtransfercostimportantlydeterminesgovernancestructureLet’sreviewtheconceptofassetspecificityandhowitaffectsgovernancestructureoftransactionSYSU-minghai32TypesofassetspecificityPhysicalcapitalspecificityHumancapitalspecificityReputationandpersonaltrustmaydevelopthroughtransactionsSite(proximity)specificityTemporalspecificityExamples?SYSU-minghai33Howcantheriskofappropriationbeavoid?Long-termcontractsAnexplicitlystatedcontractualguaranteelegallyenforcedbythegovernmentorsomeotheroutsideinstitutionAnimplicitcontractualguaranteeenforcedbythemarketmechanismofwithdrawingfuturebusinessifopportunisticbehavioroccursSYSU-minghai34Marketmechanisminimplicitlong-termcontracts(Klein,Crawford,Alchian,1978;KleinandLeffer,1982)Onewayofmarketenforcementisbyofferingtothepotentialcheaterafuturepremium(e.g.,repeatedbusinessopportunities),apricesufficientlygreaterthanaveragevariablecosttoassureaquasi-rentstreamthatwillexceedthepotentialgainfromcheatingThepresentdiscountedvalueofthisfuturepremiumstreammustbegreaterthananyincreaseinwealththatcouldbeobtainedbythepotentialcheaterifheinfactcheatedandwereterminatedTheofferofsuchalong-termrelationshipwiththepotentialcheaterwilleliminatesystematicopportunisticbehaviorSYSU-minghai35CategorizingtransactionsNonspecificinvestmentMixedinvestmentIdiosyncraticinvestmentOccasionaltransactionPurchasingstandardequipmentPurchasingcustomizedequipmentConstructingaplantRecurrenttransactionPurchasingstandardmaterialPurchasingcustomizedmaterialSite-specifictransferofintermediateproductacrosssuccessivestagesSYSU-minghai36CategorizinggovernancestructuresoftransactionsNonspecificinvestmentMixedinvestmentIdiosyncraticinvestmentOccasionaltransactionMarketgovernance(Classicalcontracting)Trilateralgovernance(Neoclassicalcontracting)Trilateralgovernance(Neoclassicalcontracting)RecurrenttransactionMarketgovernance(Classicalcontracting)Bilateralgovernance(Relationalcontracting)Unifiedgovernance(Verticalintegration;Relationalcontracting)SYSU-minghai37第二局部运用产权理论研究财务与会计问题：专用资产与继承对财务和会计问题的解释Succession:

TheRolesofSpecializedAssetsandTransferCostsJosephP.H.FanMingJianYin-HuaYehSYSU-minghai39SomeObservationsaboutFamilyBusinessPersistentconcentrationofownershipFamily(heirorcloserelative)successionMixedperformanceinsuccession,especiallyinfamilysuccessionPerez-Gonzales(2006),Bennedsenetal.(2007),VillalongaandAmit(2006)SYSU-minghai40ResearchQuestionsusesuccessionasaneventtoaddressthefollowingquestions:Whyfamilysuccession,hencetheemergenceoffamilyfirms?Whypersistentconcentrationofownership?Whatarethefundamentaldeterminantsofsuccessionperformance?Howdofirmgovernancestructuresevolvearoundsuccession?SYSU-minghai41ExplanationsofMixedPerformanceof

FamilyOwnershipandHeirSuccessionOutsiderexpropriationThoughaprofessionalmanagerismoreproductive,hisinterestisnotnecessarilyalignedwiththefamily(BhattacharyaandRavikumar,2002).Seriousinweakinstitutionalenvironments(Burkart,Panuzi,andShleifer,2003)InsiderexpropriationFamilyfirmsarecompetitive,butinsiderscapturemostofthegain,leavinglittletooutsideinvestors(VillalongaandAmit,2007)Transfercostsofspecializedassets(thisfocus)SYSU-minghai42ThepropertyrightapproachCoase(1937)FirmsexisttomitigatecostsinmarketexchangesKlein,Crawford,Alchian(1979),Williamson(1979),GrossmanandHart(1985)Holdupproblemsintransactionsinvolvingspecializedinvestments,andverticalintegrationasaviablegovernancestructureofthetransactionsDemsetz(1967),DemsetzandLehn(1985)ThestructureofcorporateownershipandhowitevolvesovertimeJensenandMeckling(1976)andmostsubsequentpapersinaccountingandfinanceConflictofinterestbetweenmanagersandshareholdersasfirmownershipbecomediffusedSYSU-minghai43KeyhypothesisGobacktotheoldpropertyrightliterature(Alchian,1965,1969;Klen,Crawford,Alchian,1979;Williamson,1978),testingthepossibilitythat

Familyownershipandfamilysuccessionarearrangementstoprotectspecializedassetsthataredifficulttopartition,value,andtransferacrossindividualsororganizationalboundariesSYSU-minghai44Specializedassetsinentrepreneurialactivities1.EntrepreneurialactivitiesarespecialEntrepreneurs’superiormanagementskills,creativity,leadershipcharisma,secretformula,reputation,business/politicalconnections,etc.Theseassetsarespecifictotheentrepreneursbecausethey

cannotbequicklylearnedoreasilyboughtandsoldinmarketplaceSYSU-minghai45Specializedassetsinentrepreneurialactivities2.Thereexiststrongideologies(personalinterests)inentrepreneurialactivitiesEntrepreneurialactivitiesoftenconsumealargeamountofentrepreneurs’time,effort,andfinancialcapital,dictatinganideology(strongpersonalinterest)totakeontheseactivitiesandassociaterisksBecauseoftheirextraordinaryinterestsandefforts,entrepreneursattachahighvalueoftheirfirmsthatarenotcomparablypricedbythemarketSYSU-minghai46Specializedassetsinentrepreneurialactivities3.EntrepreneurialactivitiesoftenhavestrongteamspiritWhentherequiredlabor,financialandhumancapitalinputsarelargeandbeyondwhatanindividualentrepreneurcansupply,friendsand/orfamilymembersoftenjointobecomebothhighlymotivatedanddisciplinedlaborforceandcontributorsoffinancialcapital.Bondedandenforcedbyfriendshiporbloodtie,contractswithco-foundersorfamilymembersareoftenshortofdetailsTheseimplicit

contractscanbehardtoenforceuponsuccessionSYSU-minghai47HightransfercostsofspecializedassetsSpecializedassetscontributetotheinitialsuccessofentrepreneurialactivitiesButdifficultiesarisewhentheseassetsaretobetransferredacrossindividualsororganizationalboundariesEveninstandardizedbusiness,familymembersorbusinesspartnersmaydisputeabouttheirindividualcontributionstoandhencerewardsoftheirteamactivities,resultingincostlyinfightingSYSU-minghai48PredictionsOwnershipconcentrationCross-sectionally,ownershipconcentrationincreasewithassetspecificity,sothatthecostsandbenefitsofthespecializedassetsconcentrateontheentrepreneur

FamilyoroutsidesuccessionThechoiceofsuccessordependsonhowwellthevalueofthespecializedassetscanbepreserved,orconverselyhowlargeisthevaluedissipationduringandafterthetransferAnheiroracloserelativewouldbechosenasthesuccessoriftheextentofassetspecificityislargeFirmvalueAnoveralldeclineinfirmcapitalizedvaluewithintheprocessofsuccessionAcrossfirms,theextentofvaluedissipationdependsonthedegreeofassetspecificityintheirbusinessactivitiesSYSU-minghai49PredictionsofgovernancestructurechangesAssumingthatthesuccessoronlypartiallyinheritsspecializedassets,suchasreputation,politicalconnection,etc,hewouldneedtoshoreuphiscredibilitytostakeholdersbyenhancinginternalgovernanceMoreconcentratedownershipMoreoutsiderparticipationonboardandmanagementSeparatingchairmanandCEOpositionsMorecashdividendsSYSU-minghai50DefiningsuccessionAnentrepreneursteppingdownfromthetopexecutiveposition(typicallythechairmaninAsia),replacedbyafamilymemberoranunrelatedprofessionalDifferentfromordinaryamanagerialturnover,successionistypicallyassociatedwithtransferofcontrollingownershipSYSU-minghai51SamplingprocedureStartingwithallpubliclytradedfirmsinHongKong,Singapore,andTaiwanExcludingSOEs,foreignercontrolledfirms,andfinanciallydistressedfirmsTrackingtopexecutiveturnoversstartingfromtheIPOyearExcludingthefirstturnoverifthesubsequentturnoveroccurwithin5yearsSYSU-minghai52TheSuccessionSampleYearHongKongSingaporeTaiwanTotal198700221988004419890066199000661991005519920461019930549199406713199504610199645112019977261519983381419999412252000124132920019112222002830112003640102004210320052103Total6247108217SYSU-minghai53SamplebyindustryIndustryHongKongSingaporeTaiwanTotalAgriculture,ForestryandFishing0101ConstructionandRealEstate206834FoodandKindredProducts1157TextileandApparel311317Lumber,Furniture,PaperandPrinting1247Chemicals,Petroleum,Rubber,PlasticandLeather501520MineralsandMetals121316Machinery,EquipmentandInstrument1172644TransportationandCommunication241016Utility1012Commerce85619FinancialCompany47314Service511420SYSU-minghai54SuccessorChoices

HongKongSingaporeTaiwanTotalFamilymember4369%1736%8074%14065%Heir1829%49%5753%7936%Relative2540%1328%2321%6128%Outsiders610%1736%2422%4722%Sold-out1321%817%44%2512%Unknown00%511%00%52%Total62100%47100%108100%217100%SYSU-minghai55MeasurementofAssetSpecificityIdeology(personalinterest)WhethertheoldchairmanisthefounderWhethertheentrepreneurhasanybusinessinmuseum,gallery,recreationfacilities,club,garden,movie,newspaperorbookpublication,advertisement,restaurantandhotel(DemsetzandLehn,1985)IndivisibilityofcommonpropertyWhetherco-foundedNumberoffamilymembersco-managingthebusinessRelationshipandreputationcapitalWhetherthebusinessislaborintensiveAccesstolongtermloansSYSU-minghai56SummarystatisticsSYSU-minghai57CharacteristicsofoutgoingandincomingleadershipOutgoingchairmanSuccessorMeanAge67.3550.22Education1.812.26Whetherafounder0.51Tenurewithfirm24.228.65Whetheroldchairmanholdcompanypositionaftersteppingdown0.25Whethersuccessor'spriorpositionisCEO0.36MedianAge70.0049.00Education2.002.00Whetherafounder1.00Tenurewithfirm25.754.50Whetheroldchairmanholdcompanypositionaftersteppingdown0.00Whethersuccessor'spriorpositionisCEO0.00SYSU-minghai58SuccessorChoiceand

OwnershipStructure

SYSU-minghai59Successionandfirmvalue

Monthlycumulativeabnormalstockreturn(CAR)aroundsuccessionSYSU-minghai60Successionandfirmvalue

Monthlycumulativeabnormalstockreturn(CAR)aroundsuccession,byeconomySYSU-minghai61StatisticsofCARaroundsuccession

VariableObs.MeanMedianStd.Dev.FullsampleCAR(-60,0)144-0.5558-0.54121.1225CAR(-36,0)161-0.1560-0.27280.8471CAR(0,+48)179-0.0288-0.07540.8302HongKongCAR(-60,0)54-1.2567-1.02240.8656CAR(-36,0)58-0.5400-0.76000.7163CAR(0,+48)540.0233-0.09301.0643SingaporeCAR(-60,0)300.22170.04840.7734CAR(-36,0)320.1884-0.09500.7176CAR(0,+48)32-0.1849-0.37340.8080TaiwanCAR(-60,0)60-0.3139-0.41011.1270CAR(-36,0)710.0025-0.22440.8902CAR(0,+48)93-0.0054-0.04090.6712SYSU-minghai62RegressionresultsoffirmvaluechangesaroundsuccessionSYSU-minghai63DailycumulativenetofmarketstockreturnofaHK-basedconglomeratearounddeathofthefounderSYSU-minghai64DailycumulativenetofmarketstockreturnofaHKlistedcompanyaroundthenewsthatits98year-oldfounderwassenttohospitalDepartmentRetreat@Shenzhen202164CumulatedDailyStockReturnSYSU-minghai65TheRoleofEntrenchmentItissometimesdifficulttoremoveanowner-managerrefusingtochangeuntilheisveryoldordead.FirmvaluedeteriorateuntiltheentrenchmentproblemiscorrectedbysuccessionIsthestockreturnpatternprimarilydrivenbyentrenchment?Overall,CARdidnotincreaseaftertheoldchairmanleftposition,suggestingentrenchmentisnotthefullstoryWeareinvestigatingthispossibilitymorethoroughlyFindingthatbothpre-andpost-turnoverCARnegativelyrelatedtowhethertheoutgoingchairmanremainsonboardafterturnover,Donotfindsimilareffectsofoutgoingchairman’sageandtenureSYSU-minghai66RegressionresultsofgovernancestructurechangesaroundsuccessionSYSU-minghai67SummaryandConclusionSpecializedassetsplayacrucialroleintheemergenceoffamilyownershipAtendencythatentrepreneurialfirms,throughfamilysuccessions,evolveintofamilyownedandmanagedfirmsAtendencythatfamilyownershipstaysconcentratedacrossgenerationsofmanagementTheslow(orlackof)diffusionofownershipandcontrolcanbeexplainedbythedesiretoprotectvalueassociatedwithspecializedassetsApronounceddissipationoffirmvalueduringsuccession,whichispositivelyrelatedtoassetspecificityFirmownershipandgovernancestructuresevolvetoadapttothenewleadershipSYSU-minghai68FounderSuccessionandAccountingProperties68JosephFanTJWongTianyuZhangSYSU-minghai69BroadResearchQuestionsUsingthesampleoffamilysuccessionof3Asianeconomies(HK,SingaporeandTaiwan),totestwhetherchangefromrelationship-basedcontractingtoarm’slengthcontractinginfluencesaccountingpropertiesSuccessioneffectonlytotestwhethertheeffectismorepronouncedinfoundersuccession69SYSU-minghai70MotivationBalletal(2003)findsthatAsianfirmspracticeinsider-basedaccountingthathaslesstimelylossrecognition.FanandWong(2002)findsthatcontrolconcentrationofAsianfirmsisassociatedwithloweraccountingquality(earnings-returnrelation)Specializedassetsandrelationship-basedcontracting,whichliesdeeperthanownershipandagencyconflicts,explainstheaboveobservationSuccessioncomparesbeforeandafterperiods,reduceendogeneity70SYSU-minghai71DefinitionofSuccessionSuccessionasaneventinwhichacontrollingowner/managerstepsdownfromthetopexecutive(usuallychairmaninAsia)positionsItisanticipatedthatsometimesitwillbeambiguousaboutwhenasuccessionstartsandends.Typicallysuccessionisaprocessthat

takestimetocompleteTheytrackfirmsfrom5yearsbeforeto5yearsaftertheirchairmanturnovers.Theeventwindowissetbydataavailability71SYSU-minghai721.SpecificAssets,FamilyownershipandRelationship-basedcontractingAnimportantbenefitoffamilyownershipistoprotectandcapitalizeonspecificassetsornon-transferablepropertyrights(Alchian,1965,1969;Coase,1937,1960;Demsetz,1964,1967)Entrepreneurs’superiormanagementskills,creativity,secretformula,reputation,business/politicalconnections,etc.Specializedassets,aswellasfamilyownership,facilitaterelationship-basedcontractinginplaceofarm’slengthcontracting72SYSU-minghai732.Relationship-basedcontractingandaccountingpropertiesRelationship-basedcontractingArisingfrompossessionofspecializedIndicatedbyfamilycontrolToprotectrentofspecializedassetsAccountingpropertiesOpaqueaccountingtoprotectspecializedassetsSpecializedassetsisdifficulttobemeasuredbyaccountingLessexternaldemandforaccountinginformation73SYSU-minghai743.SpecializedassetsaroundsuccessionManyofthesespecializedassetsarenotfullytransferable,noteventoone’schildrenThisdisruptionduringfamilysuccessionallowsustoexamineifthereductioninassetspecificityisassociatedwithincreaseinaccountingqualityaroundsuccessionSuccessionwillleadtoimprovementinaccountingqualityFoundersuccessionwillleadtoevenhigherimprovementinaccountingqualitybecausefoundertendstopossessmorespecificassetsAnexampleofspecializedasset…74SYSU-minghai7575SYSU-minghai76LiKa-shing〔77〕wassenttohospitalonSep.6th,2005.76CumulatedDailyStockReturnSYSU-minghai77MeasuringAccountingQualityHowtomeasurequalityinliterature?Accruals(unsigneddiscretionaryaccruals)[Leuzetal.]TimelylossrecognitionMarket-basedModel(Basu,1997)Incomepersistence(BallandShivakumar,2005)77SYSU-minghai78Table1Sample78SYSU-minghai79Question1Whethersuccessionleadtoimprovementinaccountingquality?79SYSU-minghai80Table2DiscretionaryAccruals80SYSU-minghai81Table3TimelyLossRecognition81SYSU-minghai82Question2Whetherfoundersuccessionleadstomorepronouncedimprovementinaccountingquality?Whetherfounder-controlledfirmsareassociatedmoreopaqueaccountingpriortosuccession?82SYSU-minghai83Table4FounderEffectondiscretionaryaccruals83SYSU-minghai84Table5PanelA:Foundereffectontimelylossrecognition84SYSU-minghai85Table5PanelB:Foundereffectinpre-successionperiod85SYSU-minghai86Inaddition…Founder’sageandeducationmatterforaccountingqualityinpre-successionperiodSYSU-minghai87Table6EffectofFounder’sageandEducationondiscretionaryaccrualsinpre-successionperiod87SYSU-minghai88Table6EffectofFounder’sageandEducationontimelylossrecognitioninpre-successionperiod88SYSU-minghai89ConclusionAccountingsystemshiftsfrommoreinsider-basedtooutsider-basedaroundsuccessionLevelofspecificassetsmatterfortheshift89SYSU-minghai90第三局部运用产权理论研究财务与会计问题：关系资产与腐败对财务和会计问题的解释PublicGovernanceandCorporateFinance:EvidencefromCorruptionCasesJosephP.H.FanOliverM.RuiMengxinZhaoSYSU-minghai92CorporateFinancingPatternsinEmergingMarketsCompaniesinemergingmarketsrelyondebtmuchmorethanequitytofinancetheirinvestmentMoreover,theyrelyonshort-termdebt,evenwhentheyengageinlong-terminvestmentBanks,notcapitalmarkets,aretheprimarysourcesoffundsforfirmsindevelopingcountriesSYSU-minghai93Cross-countrypatternoffinancialleverageSYSU-minghai94Cross-countrypatternofdebtmaturitySYSU-minghai95ResearchQuestionsinThisStudyToinvestigatetheimpactofpoliticalrentseekingoncorporatefinancingbehaviorsinChinaResearchquestionsHowdorentseekingandcorruptionaffectcapitalstructure,debtmaturity,andlong-termdebtfinancingoftheChinesefirms?Inretrospect,whetherpoliticalconnectionsprovidethefirmsfinancingadvantages?Arethefinancingadvantagesofthepoliticallyconnectedfirmsreflectedintheirstockprices?Doescorruptionaffectcapitalallocationefficiency?SYSU-minghai96WhyChina?

PervasivecorruptionOneoftheworld’shighlycorruptedcountriesAccordingtoChina’sofficialrecord,during1997-2002,therearetotally861917corruptioncasesunderinvestigation842760corruptioncasesconcluded846150peoplepunishedbycommunistlaws,ofwhich137711expelledfromthecommunistpartyAmongthepunishedcommunistpartymembers,28996county〔县〕level2422intermediate〔厅,局〕level98provincial〔省,部〕leveloraboveSYSU-minghai97CorruptioninAsianEconomies

(Source:TransparencyInternational:meanCorruptionPerceptionIndex1992-2000)SYSU-minghai98EmpiricalDesignIdentifying23high(provincial)levelgovernmentofficercorruptioncasesduring1995-2003TrackingpubliclylistedcompaniesinChinathatarebribersorareconnectedwiththecorruptedbureaucratsTrackchangesinfinancialleverageanddebtmaturitiesoftheevent(bribingorconnected)firmsfrom3yearsbeforeto3yearsafterthecorruptioneventSYSU-minghai99EmpiricalDesignComparedwiththepriorstudies,thissingle-economytime-serialempiricaldesignprovidesadvantagesFocusingonaspecificinstitutionalfactor–rentseekingProvidingmoredirectlylinkbetweencorporatefinancingdecisionswithrentseekingandcorruptionMitigatingendogeneityissuesThecorruptioneventsarelikelyshockstoconnectedfirms.Theconnectedfirmsarenon-bribers,hencetheirfinancingpolicychangesuponthecorruptioneventsarelikelycausedbylostconnectionsSYSU-minghai100ACorruptedBureaucratand