洛伊国际政策研究所-澳大利亚的南海挑战（英文）-2021.5-24正式版

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Australia’sSouthChinaSeachallenges

MALCOLMCOOK

MAY2021

AUSTRALIA’SSOUTHCHINASEACHALLENGES

TheLowyInstituteisanindependentpolicythinktank.ItsmandaterangesacrossallthedimensionsofinternationalpolicydebateinAustralia—economic,politicalandstrategic—anditisnotlimitedtoaparticulargeographicregion.Itstwocoretasksareto:

producedistinctiveresearchandfreshpolicyoptionsforAustralia’sinternationalpolicyandtocontributetothewiderinternationaldebate

promotediscussionofAustralia’sroleintheworldbyprovidinganaccessibleandhigh-qualityforumfordiscussionofAustralianinternationalrelationsthroughdebates,seminars,lectures,dialoguesandconferences.

LowyInstitutePolicyBriefsaredesignedtoaddressaparticular,currentpolicyissueandtosuggestsolutions.Theyaredeliberatelyprescriptive,specificallyaddressingtwoquestions:Whatistheproblem?Whatshouldbedone?

Theviewsexpressedinthispaperareentirelytheauthors’ownandnotthoseoftheLowyInstitute.

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KEYFINDINGS

ChinawillnotagreetoaSouthChinaSeaCodeofConduct

(COC)thatisconsistentwiththe2016SouthChinaSeaarbitraltribunalruling,andthereforeanyCOCwhichChinaagreeswiththeAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)willharmAustralia’sinterests.ButalackofAustraliansupportforsuchaCodewouldaggravaterelationswithSoutheastAsianstatesandASEAN,andwithChina.

Australiashouldusethetimeaffordedbythedrawn-outCodeofConductnegotiationstocoordinatewiththefivelittoral

SoutheastAsianstatesaffectedbyChina’sunlawfulmaritimeclaims.Australiashouldemphasisetheneedforconsistencywithinternationallaw,especiallythe2016arbitralruling.

TheBidenadministrationislikelytoincreasepressureon

Australiatoconductfreedomofnavigationoperations

(FONOPS)intheSouthChinaSea.SuchactionmayriskasignificantChineseresponseagainstAustralia.

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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Whatistheproblem?

Australia’scurrentSouthChinaSeapoliciesareunderstrainfromtwosides.OntheChinaside,BeijingwillnotagreetoanyCodeofConductthatisconsistentwiththearbitraltribunalrulingitrejects.IftheASEANmemberstatesagreetosuchaCodeofConduct,Australiacannotsupportit.OntheUSside,thereisanincreasinglikelihoodthattheBidenadministrationwillplacemorepressureonAustraliatoconductfreedomofnavigationoperations(FONOPs)insupportofthe2016UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)ruling,forcingAustraliatochoosebetweendamagingourrelationswithChinaorrejectingarequestfromtheUnitedStates.

Whatshouldbedone?

AustraliashouldcoordinatewithwillingSoutheastAsianlittoralstatestoinfluencefutureCodeofConductnegotiationsandencouragestatesnottosignuptoitifthelikelyCodeisnotconsistentwiththe2016arbitraltribunalruling.

AustraliashouldnotconductFONOPsintheSouthChinaSeathatpasswithin12nauticalmilesoffeaturesclaimedbyChina.Rather,AustraliashouldparticipateinbilateralandminilateralnavalexerciseswithwillingSoutheastAsianlittoralstatesintheirrespectiveexclusiveeconomiczonesintheSouthChinaSea;itshoulddothismoreoftenandmorepublicly.

AustraliashouldadvocateforregularQuadrilateralSecurityDialogue(Quad)Leaders’SummitsandinclusionofChina’sunlawfulmaritimeclaimsandactivitiesintheSouthChinaSeaontheagenda.

ThesepolicyadjustmentsshouldadvanceAustralia’sinterestsinstrengtheningSoutheastAsianlittoralstates’handsinCodeofConductnegotiationswithChina,moderatepressuretoconductFONOPsintheSouthChinaSea,andreducethelikelihoodandscaleofChinesepunitivemeasuresagainstAustralia.

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AUSTRALIA’SSOUTHCHINASEACHALLENGES

INTRODUCTION

AkeytestofChina’swillingnesstoacceptthecurrentrules-basedorderisthewayithandlesitsdisputeswithfiveSoutheastAsianlittoralstates(Brunei,Indonesia,Malaysia,thePhilippines,andVietnam)intheSouthChinaSea.ChinaisfailingthistestasitseekseffectivecontroloftheSea—avitalconduitofinternationaltrade.

Overthepastdecade,Chinahasmoreaggressivelypusheditsunlawful‘nine-dashline’

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maritimeclaimsintheSouthChinaSea—anapproachthatviolatesthemaritimeandsovereignrightsofthesefiveSoutheastAsianlittoralstates.ThisposesadirectchallengetoAustralia’ssupportfortherules-basedorderandits“deepstakeinthesecurityofSoutheastAsia”.

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China’saggressiveapproachhasbecomeagreaterconcerninAustralia’srelationswithChina,theUnitedStates,SoutheastAsianlittoralstates,andASEAN,sinceChina’sartificialisland-buildingcampaignintheSpratlysfrom2013.

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ThishasmadetheSouthChinaSeaanincreasinglyimportantarenaforthemountingUS–Chinarivalry.

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TheUnitedStatesexercisesitsfreedomofnavigationandoverflightrightsintheSouthChinaSeatocontestChina’sclaimsandoffersupporttoSoutheastAsianlittoralstates.

SoutheastAsianlittoralstateshavereactedunevenlytoChina’sescalatingaggressioninadvancingitsunlawfulclaimsintheSouthChinaSea,buthavemostlysoughttodefendtheirsovereignandmaritimerights,individuallyandthroughASEAN.Atthesametime,USFONOPschallengingtheseChineseclaimshavebecomemorefrequentandpublic.

AustraliahassupportedtheeffortsofitsSoutheastAsianneighbours,andmayberequiredtodomoreofthisinthecomingyears.Todate,theAustraliangovernmenthasresistedcallstoconductFONOPsthatcouldprovokeapunitiveChineseresponse;ChinesestatemediahaswarnedthatRoyalAustralianNavypresenceoperationsintheSouthChinaSeaareatriskofChineseattack.

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ThePhilippinesinstitutedarbitralproceedingsagainstChinaundertheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)inJanuary2013.ThePhilippines’delegation(pictured)attendedtheMeritsHearinginNovember2015,andin2016thearbitraltribunalruledoverwhelminglyinfavourofthePhilippines.Image:CourtesyPermanentCourtofArbitration.

China’smoreaggressiveapproachhasbecomecleareroverthepastdecade.ThisbeganwithChinesepatrolboatsharassingaseismicsurveyvesselaroundReedBankonthePhilippinecontinentalshelfintheSouthChinaSeain2011.

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Thefollowingyear,Chinaforcefully

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ThePhilippinesacceptedtheUNCLOSrulingasfinalandbindingonthePhilippinesandChina.Chinarejecteditoutright.

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assertedcontrolofScarboroughShoalinthePhilippineexclusiveeconomiczoneintheSouthChinaSea.

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TheseeventsledthePhilippinestofileanarbitrationcaseunderUNCLOSagainstChinainJanuary2013,arguingthatChinawasviolatingPhilippinesovereignandmaritimerightsinthePhilippineexclusiveeconomiczoneintheSouthChinaSea.ChinaattemptedtoavoidthearbitraltribunalbyarguingthatasystemforresolvingdisputesintheSouthChinaSeaalreadyexistedthroughvariousinstruments,includingthe2002China–ASEANDeclarationontheConductofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea(DOC).

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TheJuly2016arbitraltribunalrulingupheldthePhilippinecaseagainst

China.

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Thetribunal:

rejectedChina’sjurisdictionalargument,rulingtheDOCapolitical,non-bindingagreementwhichdidnotexcludeothermeansofdisputeresolution;

acknowledgedthatthethirdpartyinterventionsofVietnam,Malaysia,andIndonesiaintheproceedingssupportedthevalidityofthePhilippinecase;

concludedthatChinahadviolatedthePhilippines’sovereignrightsinthePhilippineexclusiveeconomiczoneintheSouth

ChinaSea;

foundthatthereisnolegalbasisforChinatoclaimhistoricrightstoresourceswithinthe‘nine-dashline’;and

foundthat“noneoftheSpratlyIslandsiscapableofgeneratingextendedmaritimezones”,and“theSpratlyIslandscannotgeneratemaritimezonescollectivelyasaunit”.

ThePhilippinesacceptedtheUNCLOSrulingasfinalandbindingonthePhilippinesandChina.Chinarejecteditoutright.

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AUSTRALIA’SPOSITIONONTHEUNCLOSRULING

OnthedayoftheUNCLOSruling,Australiacalledon“thePhilippinesandChinatoabidebytheruling,whichisfinalandbindingonbothparties”.

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Australiahasrepeatedlyreaffirmedthisposition,ashavethePhilippines,theUnitedStates,andJapan.

TheopposingpositionsofAustraliaandChinaontheUNCLOSrulinghavebeenasignificantfactorindeterioratingAustralia–Chinarelations.ButCanberrahasnotsteppedback.Australia’s23July2020NoteVerbaletotheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNationsrejectedChina’sargumentsagainsttheUNCLOSrulingandaffirmeditsfinalandbindingnature.

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Inthenownotoriouslistof14AustralianbehavioursthatBeijingclaimedinNovember2020are“poisoningbilateralrelations”,seventhwasthatAustraliawas“thefirstnon-littoralcountrytomakeastatementontheSouthChinaSeatotheUnitedNations”.

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MostSoutheastAsianstates’responsestotheUNCLOSrulinghavebeenlessdirectandcategoricalthanAustralia’s.

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ASEAN,aconsensus-constrainedbody,hasnotreferredtotheUNCLOSruling.ThatmaybebecauseofPrimeMinisterHunSenofCambodia—leaderoftheSoutheastAsianstateperceivedasthemostcloselyalignedwithChina.In2016,hereportedlylabelledtheruling“theworstpoliticalcollusionintheframeworkofinternationalpolitics”,andopposed“anydeclarationbyASEANtosupporttheverdictinrelationtotheSouthChinaSeadisputes”.

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ThesevaryingresponseshavecreatedtheimpressionthatAustralia,theUnitedStates,andJapansupporttheUNCLOSrulingmorethantheSoutheastAsianlittoralstatesthatdirectlybenefitfromit.Butthisperceptionmaybechanging.Indonesia’s26May2020NoteVerbaletotheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNationscitedtheUNCLOSrulingasconfirmingIndonesia’spositionon“themaritimeentitlementsofthemaritimefeatures”,andthatChina’s“Nine-DashLinemapimplyinghistoricrightsclaimclearlylacksinternationallegalbasisandistantamounttoupset[ting]UNCLOS1982”.

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TheopposingpositionsofAustraliaandChinaontheUNCLOSrulinghavebeenasignificantfactorindeterioratingAustralia–Chinarelations.

RegionaleliteandPhilippinepublicopinionpollingalsoshowstrongsupportfortheUNCLOSrulingandaCOC.

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On22September2020,PhilippinePresidentRodrigoDuterte,duringhisfirstaddresstotheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,calledonChinatoaccepttheUNCLOSrulinginthestrongesttermshehasused.

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Previously,DutertehadsaidinDecember2016thathewould“setaside”thisrulingtoimproverelationswithChina.

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RegionaleliteandPhilippinepublicopinionpollingalsoshowstrongsupportfortheUNCLOSrulingandaCOCconsistentwithit:

IntheISEASStateofSoutheastAsia:2021Survey

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ofregionalelites,85percentofrespondentsfromthetenASEANmemberstatesagreedthat“ASEANshouldtakeaprincipledstandthatupholdsinternationallaw,includingUNCLOS,andrespectthe2016arbitraltribunalruling.”Inthesamereport,100percentofPhilippine,91percentofVietnamese,91percentofIndonesian,and90percentofBruneianrespondentsagreed.Almost81percentofallrespondentsagreedthat“theCOCmustbealignedwithinternationallawincludingUNCLOS”;

InaJuly2020SocialWeatherStationspoll,70percentofadult

Filipinoswantedtheirgovernmenttoasserttheirrightsinthe

WestPhilippineSea(thelocalnameforthePhilippineexclusiveeconomiczoneintheSouthChinaSea),against13percentwhodisagreed.Fouroutoffiveagreedthat“ThePhilippinesshouldformallianceswithotherdemocraticcountriesthatarereadytohelpindefendingourterritorialrightsintheWest

PhilippineSea.”

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MorefrequentpollingontheUNCLOSrulingandtheCOCinandacrossthePhilippines,Vietnam,Indonesia,Malaysia,andBruneiislikelytoshowverysimilarlevelsofsupportfortheUNCLOSrulingandaCOCbasedonit.New,corroboratedpollingdatawouldstrengthenthepositionoflittoralstatesinCOCnegotiationsandpressuretheirgovernmentsnottoconcede.

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AUSTRALIA’SCOMINGCHALLENGES

TheUNCLOSrulingandChina’srejectionofitframetwoloomingchallengestoAustralia’sSouthChinaSeapolicies:apossibleCodeofConductintheSouthChinaSeabetweenASEANandChina(theCOC);andthelikelihoodofincreasedUSpressureonAustraliatoconductFONOPswithin12nauticalmilesofChinese-claimedfeaturesintheareascoveredbytheUNCLOSruling.

COCChallenge

TheoriginoftheCOCundernegotiationisinChina.In1995,ChinatookcontrolofMischiefReef,alow-tidefeatureinthePhilippineexclusiveeconomiczoneintheSouthChinaSea.ThisprovocativeactspurredSoutheastAsianlittoralstates,throughASEAN,tocallforaCOCwithChinatolowertensionsandtheriskofconflict.In2002,ASEANandChinaagreedtotheinterimDOCthatstated:

“ThePartiesconcernedreaffirmthattheadoptionofacodeofconductintheSouthChinaSeawouldfurtherpromotepeaceandstabilityintheregionandagreetowork,onthebasisofconsensus,towardstheeventualattainmentofthisobjective.”

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NegotiationsstalledforoveradecadeuntilthePhilippinesfileditsarbitrationcaseinJanuary2013.On2April2013Chinaannounceditswillingnesstorestart“consultations”ontheCOC.SincetheUNCLOSrulingagainstChina,Beijinghaspushedforthenegotiationstomovefaster.On13November2018,ChinesePremierLiKeqiangcalledontheparties“tostrivetoconcludeconsultationsonacodeofconductinthreeyears’timeonthebasisofconsensus”.

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China’sthree-yeartimelinewillnotbemet.Noface-to-facenegotiationshavetakenplacesinceearly2020duetotheCOVID-19pandemic.However,China’sinterestintheCOChelpsdeflectattentionawayfromBeijing’srejectionofthisrulingandadvancesChina’spositionthattheSouthChinaSeadisputesdonotandshouldnotinterestorinvolve‘non-regional’powerslikeAustralia.

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ThecourseofCOCnegotiationssince2013hasreinforcedassumptionsthatChinawillnotagreetoanyCOCthatisconsistentwiththeUNCLOSrulingorthatwillonlyincludeissuesnotcoveredbytheruling.Instead,theysuggestthatChinawillusetheCOCtocounter

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SincetheUNCLOSrulingagainstChina,Beijinghaspushedforthenegotiationstomovefaster.

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futureUNCLOScasesagainstitintheSouthChinaSea,andunderminetheSouthChinaSeainterestsof‘non-regional’powers.

China’sproposedCOCtextbecamepublicintheAugust2018COC“SingleDraftNegotiatingText”asagreedbetweenChinaandtheASEANmemberstates.Itsprovisionswouldpreventallpartiesfromcooperatinginmarineeconomicactivitywithcompaniesfrom“outsidetheregion”,andwouldrequirepartiestonotifyeachotherofanymilitaryexerciseswithcountriesfrom“outsidetheregion”thatothersignatoriescouldreject.

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China’srecentSouthChinaSeaactivitiesareconsistentwiththoseprovisions—theyincludeongoingharassmentofenergyprojectsinvolving“companiesfromoutsidetheregion”inthePhilippine,Vietnamese,andMalaysianexclusiveeconomiczonesintheSouthChinaSea.OneexampleofmanyistheNovember2020incidentinwhichaChinaCoastGuardship“harassedadrillingriganditssupplyshipsoperatingjust44nauticalmilesfromMalaysia’sSarawakState”.

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The32ndASEAN–AustraliaForumCo-Chairs’Summarywasheldviavideoconferenceon18May2020todiscuss,amongothermatters,asharedcommitment“topromoteanopen,stableandprosperousregion”.Image:CourtesyASEAN/.

Reflectingthesedevelopments,Australia’ssupportfortheCOChasbecomemoreconditional.TheCo-Chairs’Summaryofthe32ndASEAN–AustraliaForumon18May2020statesthat:

“AustraliaexpresseditsexpectationthattheCOCwouldbeconsistentwithinternationallawincludingUNCLOS,notprejudicetheinterestsof

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thirdparties,andreinforceandnotundermineexisting,inclusiveregionalarchitecture.”

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China’sproposedtextfortheCOCisinconsistentwiththeseAustralianexpectations.Australia’sinterestsmaythereforebebetterservedbyhavingnoCOCatall,ratherthanaCOCthatChinawouldbepreparedtosign.

FONOPsChallenge

AfterthePhilippinesfileditsarbitrationcaseagainstChinaunderUNCLOSinJanuary2013,theUnitedStatesbegantomakepublicitsFONOPsthatchallengeChina’sexcessivemaritimeclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.ThesehaveincludedUSwarshipssailingwithin12nauticalmilesoflow-tidefeaturesthatChinahasdevelopedintofortifiedartificialislands.UnderUNCLOS,suchfeatureshavenoterritorialseasoftheirown.

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Asexpected,ChinahascastigatedtheseUSoperationsandcitedthemasapretextforfurthermilitarisingitsartificialislands.AftertheUNCLOSruling,undertheTrumpadministration,theseoperationsbecamemorefrequent.

TheUnitedStatesistheonlycountrythathasacknowledgedconductingthesetypesofoperations.AustraliaresistedtheObamaandTrumpadministrations’encouragementforotherlike-mindedstatestoconductsimilaroperations.FormerPrimeMinisterMalcolmTurnbullnotesinhisautobiographythathe“consideredundertakingsuchfreedomofnavigationoperations(FONOPs),butwasunsurewhethertheAmericans,underBarackObama,wouldactuallybackusifwedid.”

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VoicesonbothsidesoftheAustralianparliamenthavecalledforsuchoperationsbyAustralia.ThedayaftertheUNCLOSruling’srelease,Australia’sshadowdefenceminister,LaborSenatorStephenConroy,calledontheRoyalAustralianNavytosailwithin12nauticalmilesofChinese-controlledlow-tideelevations.

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However,soonafter,theOppositionappearedtosoftenthisposition.

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AdvocatesforAustralianFONOPsextendbeyondtheparliamentarychamber.On7March2018,formerDefenceSecretaryDennisRichardsonpubliclyremarked:

“IbelieveweshouldbeconductingfreedomofnavigationexercisesthroughterritorialseasclaimedbyChina,generatedbyman-madefeatures.They[China]havetherighttobeintheSouthChinaSea,but

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Asexpected,ChinahascastigatedtheseUSoperationsandcitedthemasapretextforfurthermilitarisingitsartificialislands.

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theydon’thavearighttocreateman-madefeaturesandseektoassertterritorialwatersfromthose.”

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ForeignMinisterBishopresponded:

“Wewillcontinuetoexerciseourrightstofreedomofnavigation,pursuanttointernationallaw,aswehavealwaysdoneandwewillcontinuetodoso.Whatwewon’tdoisunilaterallyprovokeanincreaseintensionsintheSouthChinaSea.”

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HMASBallaratandherembarkedMH-60RhelicopteroperateintheSouthChinaSeaPassage.ThevesselispartofaregionalpresencedeploymentwhereoperationsarebeingconductedwithpartnersacrossNortheastandSoutheastAsiaandtheNortheastIndianOcean.Image:LSISThomasSawtell/D.au.

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TheTrumpadministration,whileseeminglyunilateralistanddismissiveofUSalliances,encouragedAustraliatoconductFONOPsintheSouthChinaSea.TheBidenadministrationmaybemoreinsistent.Becauseitismoremultilateralistandpro-alliances,itwillwantitsalliestodomore.

InthefirstmonthsofthenewBidenadministration,threeoftheseoperationshavebeenmadepublic,suggestingthattherewillbenolet-upinUSFONOPsthataccordwiththeUNCLOSruling.Intheir16April2021JointLeaders’Statement,USPresidentBidenandPrimeMinisterSugaofJapanreaffirmedtheir“objectionstoChina’sunlawfulmaritimeclaimsandactivitiesintheSouthChinaSea”andtheir“strongsharedinterestinafreeandopenSouthChinaSeagovernedbyinternationallaw,inwhichfreedomofnavigationandoverflightareguaranteed”.

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TwoseniorBidenadministrationappointeeshaveparticularexpertiseandinterestintheSouthChinaSeadisputesandmayadvocateforamorerobustUSandalliedpositiononthesedisputes.

ElyRatner,whoworkedwithBidenwhenhewasasenatorandvicepresident,isBiden’snomineeforAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforIndo-PacificaffairsandleadstheDepartment’snewChinataskforce.Ina2017ForeignAffairsarticle,Ratnerarguedforamoreforward-leaningUSpolicyontheSouthChinaSeaandclosercooperationwithAustraliaifChinaweretodeployadvancedmilitarycapabilitiestoitsartificialislandsintheSpratlys.

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Chinahasdoneso.

KurtCampbellisthefirstIndo-PacificCoordinatorattheNationalSecurityCouncil.CampbellisastrongsupporteroftheUS–AustraliaallianceandofalliedcooperationinAsia.In2019,CampbellandJakeSullivan,nowBiden’sNationalSecurityAdvisor,outlinedafutureChinastrategyfortheUnitedStates“thatmuststartwithallies”andseek“asteadystateofclear-eyedcoexistence[withChina]ontermsfavourabletoUSinterestsandvalues”.

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Campbell,asAssistantSecretaryofStateforEastAsianandPacificAffairs,wasintimatelyinvolvedinthefailednegotiationstostopChinatakingcontrolofScarboroughShoalin2012.

USpressureonAustraliatoconductFONOPswithin12nauticalmilesofChina-claimedlandfeaturesintheSouthChinaSea,andthedebateinAustraliaaboutthese,islikelytomountinthecomingyears.

TwoseniorBidenadministrationappointeeshaveparticularexpertiseandinterestintheSouthChinaSeadisputesandmayadvocateforamorerobustUSandalliedpositiononthesedisputes.

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OperationGatewayisAustralia’smainprogramofpresenceoperationsinmaritimeSoutheastAsia.

AUSTRALIA’SSOUTHCHINASEACHALLENGES

WHATAUSTRALIASHOULDDO:

POLICYRECOMMENDATIONS

CoordinatestatementswithSoutheastAsianlittoralstatesonChineseactivitiesinconsistentwiththeUNCLOSruling

AustraliashouldcoordinatewithSoutheastAsianlittoralstatesthatarewillingtocriticiseChineseactivitiesinconsistentwiththeUNCLOSruling,andissuesupportingstatements.CoordinationonstatementscanbedonefromCanberraorthroughAustralianmissions.SuchstatementswouldreinforceAustralia’spositionontheUNCLOSrulingandAustralia’srelationswiththeinfringed-uponSoutheastAsianlittoralstates.

InMarch2021,AustraliajoinedtheUnitedStates,Japan,theEuropeanUnion,andCanadainaPhilippines-ledcriticismofthemassingofChinesevesselsaroundWhitsunReefinthePhilippineexclusiveeconomiczoneoftheSouthChinaSea.Chinarebuffedthesestatementsofsupport,describingthemasbeingcoordinatedand“irresponsible”.

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Themorecountriesissuesuchstatements,individuallyoringroups,themoreeffectiveeachwillbeinreducingthelikelihoodandscaleofChinesepunitivemeasuresagainstanyofthem.

DonotconductFONOPswithin12nauticalmilesofChinese-claimedfeaturesintheSouthChinaSea

AustraliashouldcontinuetoresistanyUSpressuretoconductFONOPsand,instead,strengthenotherformsofcooperationwiththeUnitedStatesontheSouthChinaSeadisputes.

AnAustralianFONOPwouldrequireachangetoAustralia’smaritimeoperationsdoctrine.FONOPsarenotoneofthethirteenmaritimeoperationsidentifiedbytheRoyalAustralianNavy.

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TheclosestAustralianoperationstotheFONOPsconductedbytheUSNavyarepresenceoperations.OperationGatewayisAustralia’smainprogramofpresenceoperationsinmaritimeSoutheastAsia.UnderAustralia’smaritimedoctrine,presenceoperationsareincludedinthenon-coercivecategoryofdiplomaticoperations.AnAustralianFONOPwouldbehardtoclassifyassuch.

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AnyAustralianFONOPintheSouthChinaSeawouldlikelyfacegreateroperationalrisksandleadtogreaterpunitivereactionsfromChinathanUSoperationshave.In2019,ChinesefishingvesselsreportedlydirectedlaserbeamsatRoyalAustralianNavyhelicoptersduringIndo-PacificEndeavourpresenceoperationsfarfromanyChina-claimedlandfeaturesintheSouthChinaSea.

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AnAustralianFONOPshouldexpecttofacegreateroperationalrisks,andChinacouldimposepunitivediplomaticandeconomicmeasuresonAustraliaofagreaterscalethanthosefacingthecountrycurrently.

ConductandpromotemorebilateralandminilateralmilitaryexerciseswithSoutheastAsianlittoralstatesintheSouthChinaSea

AustraliashouldinsteadparticipateinmoreandlargerbilateralandminilateralmilitaryexerciseswithSoutheastAsianlittoralstatesintheirrespectiveexclusiveeconomiczonesintheSouthChinaSea.TheseexerciseswoulddeependefencerelationswithSoutheastAsianlittoralstatesandsignalAustraliaandlittoralstates’oppositiontoChina’sCOCproposalforanotificationandrejectionmechanismforsuchexercises.

SoutheastAsianlittoralstatesaremoreactivelyparticipatinginexerciseswith‘non-regional’powers,ofwhichAustraliaisakeyexample.TheseexercisesincludeAustralia’snowregularparticipationintheannualUS–Philippinemulti-serviceBalikatanexercises;andtheAustralia–VietnamnavalexercisesduringAustralianDefen