外文翻译-政府绩效-教训和挑战

PAGE中文4350字外文文献翻译原文：GovernmentPerformance:LessonandChallengesThisarticleconcentratesonattemptsbyOECDcountriestointroduceperformance-basedorresults-basedbudgetingandmanagement.Theneedtoenhancepublicsectorperformancehasbecomemoreurgentasgovernmentsfacemountingdemandsonpublicexpenditure,callsforhigherqualityservicesand,insomecountries,apublicincreasinglyunwillingtopayhighertaxes.Performancebudgetingandperformancemanagementseektomovethefocusofbudgeting,managementandaccountabilityawayfrominputstowardsresults,i.e.bettervalueformoney.DrawingondatafromtheOECD/WorldBankBudgetPracticesandProceduresDatabase,thearticleexploresthetrendsandcountryapproaches(differentphases,variousobjectives),discussesaccountabilitytothepublic(includingexternalperformanceauditing),andrecognisestheimportanceofcontextandawhole-of-governmentapproach,inparticularforchangingthebehaviourofkeyactorsandmotivatingpoliticianstouseperformanceinformation.Thelimitationsandtensionsofperformancebudgetingandperformancemanagementarealsodiscussed,aswellasproblemsofmeasurementandtheefficientuseofperformanceinformation.Agreatdealofrhetorichassurroundedtheintroductionofperformancemanagementandbudgeting.Supportersclaimthatithasthecapacitytotransformgovernments.However,itisimportantthatthisreformshouldnotbeseenasapanaceaandthatgovernmentshaverealisticexpectationsaboutwhatitcanachieveandthetimeneededtoreachtheseobjectives.Evencountriesthathavebeenusingthisapproachforover15yearscontinuetostrugglewithissuesofmeasurement;thisisespeciallythecaseforoutcomes.Akeychallengeforallcountriesisobtaininggoodqualityinformationwhichisvalid,reliable,andtimely.Numerouschallengescanbeencounteredincludingsettingclearobjectives,findingaccuratemeasuresofperformanceandhavinggoodsystemsofdatacollection.Settingobjectives:Forsomeagenciesorprogrammes,evensettingclearobjectivescanbeaproblemwhenthereisnoagreementonwhatthemissionis,ortherearediversemissions,overlappingandfragmentedprogrammes,andstakeholderswithdifferentinterests.Findingaccuratemeasuresofperformance:Thedesignofmeasuresismadedifficultbyfindingmeasuresforspecificactivities,andbyrelatingwhatanagencyorprogrammeactuallycontributestowardsachievingspecificoutcomes.Outputandoutcomemeasureseachpresentadifferentsetofchallenges(OECD,2002b).Outcomesaretechnicallymoredifficulttomeasure;theyarecomplexandinvolvetheinteractionofmanyfactors,plannedandunplanned.Also,thereareproblemswithtimelagissuesandinsomecasestheresultsarenotwithinthecontrolofthegovernment.Outcomes,however,haveastrongappealforthepublicandpoliticians.Mostcountriesappeartohaveadoptedacombinationofoutputsandoutcomes.Establishingandmaintainingsystemsofdatacollection:Toensurequalitythereneedstobeaprocessbywhichdatacollectedareverifiedandvalidated.However,settingupandmaintainingthesesystemscanbebothcomplexandcostly.AsdiscussedinSection6,theauditingofperformanceinformationcanhelptoimprovestandardsandprovidesomelegitimacyforthereportedresults.Itisespeciallychallengingtoassurethequalityofthedatawhenagenciesaredependentonthirdpartiestoprovidetheinformation.Thisisparticularlyaprobleminfederalistsystems(Curristine,2002).Performancetargetshelptoclarifyperformanceexpectationsforanorganisationforagiventimeperiod.Countries,however,continuetostrugglewiththeissuesoftargetlevelandnumbers.Thereareproblemswithsettingtargetstoolowand/ortoohigh.Settingtargetstoolowmeansthatagenciesarenotchallengedtoimproveperformance.Settingthemtoohigh,whileitcanmotivateorganisations,alsocreatesunrealisticexpectationsandsituationsinwhichagencieswillfail(Perrin,2002).Ittakestimetogettherightlevelandtogetthecomparativedatatorealisethattargetsaresetattoohighortoolowalevel.Toomanytargets:Thereisalsoanissueabouthowmanytargetstohave.Toomanytargetscreateinformationoverloadandmakeitdifficulttoselectpriorities;toofewtargetscreatedistortioneffects.Againittakestimetogetarealisticbalance.Severalcountrieshavestartedoutwithalargenumberoftargetsandsubsequentlyreducedthem.Forexample,intheUnitedKingdomwhenperformanceagreementsfordepartmentswerefirstintroducedaspartofthecomprehensivespendingreviewin1998,therewereintotal600targetsacrossgovernment.Bythetimeoftherevisedspendingreviewin2002,thatnumberhadbeenreducedto130targets(H.M.Treasury,2004).Avoidingdistortingbehaviour:Thisisachallengeforallgovernments.Possibleperverseeffectsincludegoaldistortion–thatis,organisationsandmanagersfocusingonafewspecificindicatorsandtargets,usuallythemostachievableor“saleable”,attheexpenseoftheoverallobjectivesorprogramme.Inextremecasesofgoaldistortion,agenciesorstaff,underpressuretomeettargets,maydeliberatelypresentmisleadinginformation.InmanyOECDcountries,theobjectiveofintroducingperformanceintothebudgetprocessistoimprovebudgetarydecisionmakingandtoactasanincentiveforagenciestoimproveperformance.Mostcountries,however,continuetostrugglewiththisapproach.Asdiscussedabove,oneofthekeyissuesisobtaininggoodqualityandreliableperformancedata.Briefly,otherchallengesincludeestablishingsomelinkbetweenfinancialinformationandperformanceinformation.Thisisparticularlychallengingforoutcomemeasures.Inmanycountriestherearealsoproblemswiththestructureofthebudgetandaccountingissues.Budgetstendtobestructuredinaccordancewithinstitutionalandfunctionalboundariesandnotaccordingtoresultscategories.Alsoifthereisnosystemofcostrecording,itisdifficulttorelatetruecoststoresults.Gettingtherightmixofincentives:Thisisparticularlyimportantwhencountriesuseperformanceinformationinresourceallocation.Afundamentalquestioniswhetherfinancialrewardsshouldbegivenforgoodperformanceandbadperformanceshouldbepunishedand,ifso,how.Punishingfailurebyremovingresourcescreatesaclearsignaltootheragenciesthatperformanceisconsideredimportant.However,itdoesnothelpaddresstheunderlyingcausesofpoorperformance.Indeedinsomecasesfailuretomeettargetscanbetheresultoflackoffundingorotherresources.Whilerewardinggoodperformanceisintuitivelyappealing,itdoesnottakeintoaccountcostissuesandgovernmentpriorities.Inaclimateofbudgetarysaving,aquestioniswhethertogiveadditionalfundingtoanagency,especiallyonethatisnotagovernmentpriority.Ineithercase,thereisalwaysthedangerthatlinkingresultstofinancialresourcescancreateincentivestodistortandcheatinpresentinginformation.Oneofthemostdifficultchallengesistocreatearesults-basedculturewithinorganisationsandthroughoutgovernment.Toachievechangeinbehaviourandcultureacrossgovernmentrequiresawhole-of-governmentapproachandthecreationoftherightmixofincentivesthattakesaccountofhowtheactionsofkeyactorsinfluenceeachother.Mostcountriescontinuetostrugglewithachievingchangeinthebehaviourofpublicservantsandpoliticians;thisisalong-termprocess.Obtainingandmaintainingthesupportofmanagersandemployeeswithingovernmentorganisationsiscrucial.Thisreformhasthepotentialtoimprovethefocusonorganisationalgoals,toprovidemanagerswithbetterinformationfordecisionmakingonprogrammes,budgetsandpolicies,andtoimproveinternalreportingandcontrols.Gainingthesebenefitsischallengingbecauseitrequirestechnicalaswellasculturalchange.Intechnicaltermsitcanbedifficulttomeasurewhatanagencydoesandtolinkorganisationalobjectivestoindividualgoals.Itisimportanttoobtainthebuy-inoffrontlineemployees;thiscanbefacilitatedbytherightmixofformalandinformalincentivesandcontrols.Obtainingthestrongsupportoftheorganisationalleadershipandmanagerscanbefacilitatedbygivingthemthenecessaryflexibilitytoachievegoals.Withoutthisflexibility,managerswillhavetheresponsibilityforachievingtargetswithouttheabilitytodeliver,andnoonewantstobeheldaccountablefortargetsthatarenotwithinhis/hercontrol.Withinthecontextofagovernment-wideapproach,ifandhowtheperformanceinformationisusedbypoliticiansandtheMinistryofFinancecancreateincentiveswhichimpactonhowmanagersbehave.Ifperformanceinformationisrequiredbutnotusedbyleadersormanagersindecisionmaking,thereisadangerofitbecomingaburdenonorganisationsintermsofcostofinformationsystemsandstafftime.Theprovisionofthisinformation,inadditiontotherequirementsofthetraditionalcontrolmechanisms,caninterferewithgettingthejobdone.Ifthishappens,thenperformancemanagementandbudgetingcanbecomeadistraction,adistortionoranexpensivepaperexerciseratherthanameanstotransformorganisationsandanessentialpartofgoodmanagement.Obtainingandmaintainingthesupportofpoliticians:AsdiscussedinSection7,thisisakeychallengefacingreformers.Thesupportofpoliticiansinthelegislatureandtheexecutivehelpstoreinforcetheneedforchangeandtopushreform,althoughitisparticularlydifficulttoobtainthesupportofpoliticiansinthelegislature.Issuesofhorizontalandverticalco-ordination:Manygoalsandoutcomescutacrossgovernmentorganisationsandinvolvetheworkofmanyagencies.WhilesomeOECDcountrieshaveestablishedcross-governmentalhorizontalgoalsandtargets,itisprovingdifficulttoachieveco-ordinationacrossdepartmentsandtoholdthemaccountableforresults.Ataverticallevelthereisanissuewithdifferentactorswantingthesameinformationfordiversepurposes;theirinformationalneedsarenotthesame.Managingexpectations:Realisticexpectationsareneededbothaboutwhatcanbeachievedbythisreformandhowlongitwilltake.Along-termapproachandpersistenceareneeded:ittakestimetoovercomethetechnicalissuesandtochangethebehaviourofpublicservantsandpoliticians.Theperformanceofgovernmentcanbeimprovedthroughafocusonresultsinpolicyadvice,centralanddepartmentalmanagementprocesses,andparliamentaryandpublicaccountability.Itisimportanttofirstidentifytherelativepriorityoftheseareasinaparticularcountry.Whatagovernmentshoulddoisdifferentineachcase.ThemajorityofOECDcountriesareimplementingperformancemanagementandperformancebudgeting,althoughtheextentandtheapproachesvarywidelyacrosscountries.Theintroductionofperformancemanagementandbudgetingappearstobeanimportantandenduringinnovationinpublicmanagement.Itisclearlyastrongdeviceforhorizontalprioritysetting,policyalignmentandcostanalysis.Thesereformshaveimprovedtransparencythroughtheprovisionofmoreinformationongovernmentperformancetothepublic.However,someinitialhopeshavebeentooambitious.Mostcountriescontinuetostrugglewithchangingthebehaviourofpublicservantsandpoliticians.Thisisalong-termprocess.Toachievechangeinbehaviourandcultureacrossgovernmentrequiresawhole-of-governmentapproachandthecreationoftherightmixofincentivesandcontrols(formalandinformal)andanunderstandingofthesystemsandhowtheactionsofkeyactorsinfluenceeachother.Thereisnoclearpatternofinputcontrolsbeinglightenedasperformanceindicatorsarestrengthened.Thisraisesissuesaboutbalancingaccountabilityandflexibility.Whatevertheaccountabilitysystemsinplace,theyneedtobebalancedagainstthefreedomrequiredbymanagerstodotheirjobs.Criticsofthetraditionalsystemofaccountabilityarguethatruleshadbecomeendsinthemselves,thataccountabilitystressedcompliance,andthathierarchicalstructureshinderedefficiencyandperformance.Thus,thecriticsemphasisedtheneedstorelaxinputcontrols.Thereareobviousdangersinrelaxinginputcontrolstoosoonaftertheintroductionofoutputandoutcomemeasures.However,therearealsodangersinfailingtorelaxthesecontrolssufficiently,withthepossibleeffectthatoutputandoutcomemeasuresbecomeanexpensivepaperexercise,withlittleimpactonmanagers’abilitytoimproveperformance.Ifthesystemhastoomanyrestrictionsandmanagersdonothaveenoughfreedomtoimproveperformance,thenfailuretorelaxinputcontrolscanresultininefficiency.Thecommonassumptionthattheperformanceinformationthatisusefulfortheexecutivewouldalsoservethelegislatureremainsunproven.Withafewexceptions,performancereportinghasbeenneitherwelcomednorusedbyOECDmembercountrylegislaturesintheiroversightanddecisionmaking.Performancemeasuresandtargetsareonlyonesourceofinformationaboutperformance,andtheyarenosubstitutefortheindependent,in-depthqualitativeexaminationoftheimpactofpoliciesthatevaluationscanprovide.ThecombinedexperiencesofOECDcountrieshighlighttheimportanceoftakingalong-termapproachandhavingrealisticexpectationsaboutthecapacityofperformancemanagementandbudgetingtoimproveperformanceandaccountability.Along-termapproachandpersistenceareneededtoachievethenecessarytechnicalandbehaviouralchangesthatthisleverrequires.Finally,fromawiderperspective,thedesignofcross-governmentperformanceinterventionsneedscarefulanalysisandconsiderationofoptions.Broadly,theseinterventionsare:leadership;strategicplanning;performancemanagement;theinclusionoftargetsandmeasuresintheformalbudgeting,managementandoversightprocesses;andpolicyevaluation.Eachhasdifferentstrengthsandlimitations.Thereisadangerofgovernmentsbecomingfixatedonaparticularformalsolutiontotheproblemofimprovingperformance.Theperformanceorientationofpublicmanagementisheretostay.Itisessentialforsuccessfulgovernment.Societiesarenowtoocomplextobemanagedonlybyrulesforinputandprocessandapublic-spiritedculture.Theperformancemovementhasincreasedformalisedplanning,reportingandcontrolacrossmanygovernments.Thishasimprovedtheinformationavailabletomanagersandpolicymakers.Butexperienceshowsthatthiscanriskleadingtoanewformofbureaucraticsclerosis.Moreattentionneedstobegiventokeepingperformancetransactioncostsincheck,andtomakingoptimaluseofsocialandinternalisedmotivatorsandcontrols.Source：TeresaCurristine.GovernmentPerformance：LessonsandChallenges[J].OECDJournalonbudgeting，2005，5(1)：127-151.译文：政府绩效：教训和挑战本文将集中介绍经济合作与发展组织国家引入的，以绩效结果为基础的预算编制和绩效管理。在一些国家，公众越来越不愿意支付更高的税款，而各国政府的公共支出需求却越来越大，因此面临着很大的财务危机，且压力巨大，因此需要在支出不增加的基础上满足公共服务需求是关键，政府绩效是一种以寻求实现政府服务更高质量的重要工具，可以舒缓财务危机的巨大压力，因此必须加强公共部门的政府绩效。绩效预算和绩效管理使公众忽略了对政府公共服务项目落成和项目开销的关注，转而重视预算编制、管理和问责制，即追求更好的经济效益。结合经合组织、世界银行的预算方式和程序数据库编制的数据，文章探讨了政府绩效的发展趋势和国家的行政手段（不同阶段，不同的目标），讨论了对公众的问责（包括审计的外在表现），并认识到环境的重要性和总体的政府方针是改变关键行为者的行为和激励政客利用特定的绩效信息。文章也对绩效预算和绩效管理受到的限制和所处的紧张局势，以及计量问题和绩效信息的有效利用进行了讨论。绩效管理和预算编制的引入已经受到很多舆论的关注。支持者认为政府进行绩效行为可以改变政府活动。然而，需要认识到的是，绩效行为不应该被看作是灵丹妙药。各国政府关于它能达到什么效果，以及达到绩效目标所需要的时间，都要切合实际，不能有过高的期望。即使国家使用政府绩效这种手段解决计量问题已经持续超过了15年，但效果不彰。对于所有国家来说，关键的挑战在于要取得良好的质量信息（包括有效，可靠，及时）。在这之中可能会遇到诸多挑战：包括设定明确的目标，寻找准确的绩效计量措施，并具有良好的数据收集系统。设定目标：对于某些机构或方案，即使是设定了明确的目标，但当人们没有明确绩效任务，或没有达成一致的意见，或出现有不同的绩效任务，或方案又有重叠或大相径庭，或利益相关者有不同利益等许多情况下，设定目标都无法完成。寻求精确的绩效措施：绩效措施的设计工作难点在于需要具体问题具体分析，针对不同的活动需求来设计不同的方案。比如，在实际工作中怎样联系相关机构，具体的操作步骤该怎么做，使得最后可以得到高质量的绩效成果。这对要实现生产和成果的每项措施都提出了不同的挑战（OECD，2002b）。结果在技术上是难以衡量的：它们非常复杂，涉及很多的因素，是计划内的、计划外的相互作用形成的。另外，因为时间滞后的原因，以及在某些情况下绩效结果是不受政府控制的。绩效结果对于公众和政界来说，会形成强烈的反响。多数国家采取了生产和成果的相结合的方式以寻求精确的绩效措施。建立和维护数据收集系统：为了保证信息质量，需要有一个对收集的数据进行验证和确认的过程。但是，建立和维护这些系统可能既昂贵又复杂。绩效审计信息可以有助于提高绩效标准，并为立法机关提供报告结果。机构依赖于第三方所提供的信息以保证数据的质量，是特别具有挑战性的做法。尤其在联邦制系统中，是一个关键问题(Curristine，2002)。绩效目标有助于证实组织在给定的时间内的绩效期望是否能够完成。国家则继续为目标的标准问题，比如水平和数字而寻求解决方案。对目标的设定过高或过低都是问题。设定目标太低意味着各机构在提高绩效时不会有挑战。如果设定目标太高，虽然可以激发组织的动力，但也会造成政府不切实际的期望，在某些情况下机构会失败(Perrin，2002)。因此需要花费时间去确认绩效水平，并获得比较数据，以实现制定的目标不会过高或过低。过多的目标：目标的多少也是一个问题。过多的目标会造成信息过载，并难以选择先后次序。过少的目标会造成信息失真。同样的，这也需要时间来平衡。有些国家一开始进行绩效时有大量的政府绩效目标，但随后越来越少。例如，在英国，当部门的绩效协议第一次被作为1998年综合开支审查的一部分介绍给公众时，总共有超过600个政府绩效目标。到了2002年修订的支出审查进行时，这一数字已减少到130个(H.M.Treasury，2004)。避免扭曲行为：这对于所有政府来说都是挑战。可能造成的负面影响包括目标失真，即组织和管理人员要重点关注一些具体的指标和目标——通常是最可实现的或“实用”——在总体目标或计划上的开支。在目标失真、机构或工作人员、存在实现目标的压力，在极端的情况下实现目标，可能会出现故意误导的信息。在许多经合组织国家，引入绩效目标是进入预算过程，提高预算决策，作为提高绩效的一种鼓励机制。关键问题之一是取得有良好质量和可靠的绩效数据。而另外有的一些挑战包括建立一些财政信息和绩效信息之间的联系。这是特别具有挑战性的成果措施。很多国家也有关于预算和会计结构的问题。财政预算往往是按照体制和职能界限构建的，而不是按结果类别。此外，如果没有成本记录系统，它是很难讲清真正的成本与成果的。获得奖励的正确组合：当国家在资源配置中使用绩效信息时，这是特别重要的。一个根本的问题是，是否应对好的绩效给予经济回报，对坏的绩效进行处罚。如果真的这么做了，应该怎么做？通过没收资源来惩治失败的绩效，制造了一个明确的信号给其他机构，让它们认识到绩效的重要性。但是，它并不能帮助解决质量较差的绩效的根本原因。事实上，在某些情况下，未能达到目标，可能是因为资金或其他资源的缺乏。同时，奖励良好的绩效是直观的表现，但它没有考虑到成本问题以及政府的优先事项。在节约预算的大气候下，有一个问题是：是否能提供额外资金给进行绩效的机构，尤其当这不是一个政府的优先事项的情况下。而在同个大气候下，总有一种危险，就是让财政资源与结果挂钩，激励措施可能会造成提供信息的歪曲和欺骗。最困难的一个挑战是通过政府和组织建立一个以绩效结果为基础的风气。为了达到行为和文化的改变，通过政府寻求政府整体方式，该奖励的正确组合结果需要考虑关键人员会怎么行动来互相影响。大多数国家不断的在解决这个对于达到公务员和政治家的行为的变化问题——这是一个长期的过程。获取和保持管理者和人员在政府内部组织的支持是至关重要的。这项改革有可能提高对组织目标的重视，向管理者做出方案，预算和政策，提供更好的决策信息，并改善内部报告和内部控制。但获得这些好处是不容易的，