欧洲能源政策和向低碳经济转型外文翻译

欧洲能源政策和向低碳经济转型外文翻译原文:Energypolicyandthetransitiontoalow-carboneconomyEuropeanenergypolicyfacesanumberofinterrelatedchallenges,includingmakingthetransitiontoalow-carboneconomy,increasingcross-bordercompetitioninelectricityandgasmarketsanddiversifyingEurope’senergysupply.TheEUhasdevelopedacomprehensivestrategyinalloftheseareas,encapsulatedin2020targetsforreducinggreenhousegasemissions,raisingrenewableenergyandincreasingenergyefficiency.ThesetargetsareunderpinnedbyanEmissionsTradingScheme,legallybindingreductioncommitmentsbymemberstatesfortheemissionsnotcoveredbythetradingscheme,thethirdenergyliberalisationpackageandtheEnergySecurityandSolidarityPlan.TheEUshouldbeapplaudedforthesignificantstepsithastaken;theEU’senvironmentalactionsandtargetsareveryambitiousandwillincreasethelikelihoodofaglobalclimateagreementlaterin2009.Butthereisalsoroomforimprovement.Toensurethatthetransitiontoalow-carboneconomyisachievedatalowcost,theEUshouldseriouslyconsiderincludingalltransportsectorsintheEmissionsTradingSchemewhenpracticalandappropriate,andensurethatonlysectorsrigorouslyidentifiedasbeingatgenuineriskofcarbonleakageshouldcontinuetoreceivefreeallowancesuntil2020.ConsiderationshouldbegiventomakinguseofanEU-widemarketinstrumenttodelivertheEU’srenewableenergytarget,anditwillbeimportanttoensurethatthe10%renewabletransportfueltargetefficientlyachievesitsobjectivesofsustainabilityandsecurityofsupplygiventhehighcostofmanyrenewabletransportfuels.Measurestoraiseenergyefficiencywillhavetobedesignedcarefullysothattheoverallcostofmitigationisnotraised.TheCommission’sthirdenergymarketliberalisationpackageshouldbestrengthenedbyrequiringfullownershipunbundlingoftransmissionserviceoperatorsandensuringthepowersoftheproposedAgencyforCo-operationofEnergyRegulatorsarebroadenoughtocontributeeffectivelytoatrulysingleEuropeanenergymarketEuropeanenergypolicymakersfaceanumberofcomplexchallenges,aswellassignificantopportunities.Europemustmakethetransitiontoalow-carboneconomyaspartofacoordinatedglobalapproachtomitigatinggreenhousegasemissionsandavoidingirreversibledamageofclimatechange.Cross-bordercompetitioninelectricityandgasmarketsmustincreasemarkedlysothatthegoalofasingleEuropeanenergymarketisfinallyrealised.EnergysecuritymustbestrengthenedsothatEuropeislessvulnerabletosupplydisruptionsthatoriginateinothercountries.Thesechallengesareofcourseinterrelated.ReducingEuropeangreenhousegasemissionswillbemorecostlyifsegmentationinenergymarketsdullsthepricesignalsfromemissionstrading.Andwithoutmorecompetitioninenergymarkets,necessaryinvestmentsincross-bordertransmissionnetworkswillbedelayed,therebyinhibitingEuropeanenergysecurityPerhapsthemostsignificantofthesechallengesisclimatechange.Climatechangerepresentsaglobalmarketfailure.Thesocialcostofconsumingandproducinggreenhousegas-intensivegoodsandservicesandtheatmosphericconcentrationofgreenhousegasesishigherthantheprivatecostTomeettheenergyandclimatechallenges,theEuropeanCommissionwillneedtoworkcloselywithmemberstatesaswellascountriesoutsidetheUnion,andmakeuseofacomprehensivesetofinstrumentsthataddressallthemarketfailuresthatplagueenergyandclimatechangepolicy.Inadditiontoaddressingthewedgebetweenthesocialandprivatecostofgreenhousegasemissions,policywillalsohavetoovercomeothermarketfailures,includingcapitalmarketimperfections,externalitiesinR&D,lackofsufficientinformation,monitoringandenforcementcosts,themarketpowerofincumbentfirmsandtheincentivesforfree-riding.Recognisingthis,theEUhasdevelopedacomprehensiveenergyandclimatepolicystrategy.Tocontributetoclimatechangemitigation,theEUhassetatargetforreducingitsgreenhousegasemissionsby20%below1990levelsby2020andincreasingtheshareofrenewablesourcesingrossfinalenergyconsumptionto20%by2020.Tointernalisethesocialcostofgreenhousegasemissionsandsendalong-termpricesignalinfavourofinvestmentinlow-emissiontechnologies,theEUhasintroducedanEmissionsTradingSchemeETS.Toimprovetheefficiencywithwhichhouseholdsandfirmsuseenergy,theEUhassetanindicativetargetforreducingenergyconsumptionby20%by2020andupgradingefficiencystandardsapplyingtonewbuildings,passengercarsandappliances.Athirdliberalisationpackagehasbeenagreedtoincreasecompetitioninelectricityandgasmarkets,raisetheeffectivenessofpricesignalsfromtheETSandstimulateinvestmentingridsthatcanabsorbnewrenewableenergycapacityHowever,itisessentialthattheinstrumentstoreachthesetargetsareasefficientaspossible,correctonlygenuinemarketfailuresandareflexibleenoughtocopewithfuturescientific,economicandtechnologicalchanges.Intheshortandmediumterm,policiestomitigateclimatechangewillslowpotentialGDPgrowthasthehighercostofcarbon-intensivegoodsandservicesreducestheproductivityoftheexistingcapitalstock,andlowercosttechnologiesaresubstitutedforhighercosttechnologies.Tominimisetheimpactongrowth,theEUshouldavoidpoliciesthatunnecessarilyraisethecostofcarbonabatement,potentiallylock-ininefficienttechnologiesandoverlaptoomuchwithother,moreefficientpolicies.ThischapterassessestheEU’spolicystrategyinthislight.TheenergypolicyframeworkTogetenergypolicyright,policymakersmusthaveagoodsenseofthefactorsthatwillshapeenergydemandandsupplyoverthecomingdecadesandplanaheadaccordingly.Energypoliciesenactedtodaycanhavelong-lastingimpactsbecausetheeconomiclifeoftheenergycapitalstockisoftenverylongTable4.1.Thisiscomplicatedbytheuncertaintythatsurroundsfutureeconomicdevelopments,thestateofscientificknowledgeaboutclimatechange,potentialbreakthroughsinlow-emissionenergytechnologiesandtheelasticityofsuchbreakthroughswithrespecttocarbonprices,andtheenergypoliciesofothercountriesRecognizingtheimportanceofaforward-looking,comprehensiveenergystrategy,theEUhasagreedtotheEUenergyandclimatechangepolicyin2007.Keyelementsofthestrategyare:●Reducinggreenhousegasemissionsby20%below1990levelsby2020.ThemaininstrumentstoachievethistargetaretheETSandothermeasurestargetedatsectorsnotcoveredbytheETS.Toachievetheoverallreductionof20%relativeto1990levels,theEUneedstocutitsgreenhousegasemissionsby14.5%relativeto2005levels.ThiswillbeachievedbycappingemissionsforallinstallationsacrosstheEUcoveredbytheETSat21%below2005levelsandthroughindividualmemberstatetargetsforemissionsreductionsinallsectorsoutsidetheEUETS,whichadduptoareductionof10%relativeto2005levels.●Involvingnon-EUcountriesinaninternationalagreementtoreduceglobalgreenhousegasemissionsthroughtheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangeprocess.TheEUiswillingtogofurtherandsignuptoa30%reductiontargetinthecontextofanambitiousandcomprehensiveinternationalagreementiftherearecomparablereductionsbyotherdevelopedcountriesandappropriatecontributionsbytheeconomicallymoreadvanceddevelopingcountriesbasedontheirresponsibilitiesandcapabilities.●Raisingtheshareofrenewableenergyto20%oftotalEUgrossfinalenergyconsumptionby2020.Inadditiontosubsidiesforrenewableenergygeneration,theEUproposestostepupR&Dspendingonrenewableenergytechnologies.●Increasingtheuseofrenewablesintransportfuelsto10%ineachmemberstate.●ReducingEUenergyconsumptionby20%by2020,comparedtobaselinedevelopments.MeasuresincludeintroducingEU-widevehicleefficiencystandardsfornewpassengercars,abuildingefficiencycode,andupdated,comprehensiveperformancestandardsforelectricalappliances.●Developingafullyintegratedsinglemarketforelectricityandgas,throughtheeffectiveunbundlingoftransmissionsystemoperators,strengtheningandenhancingco-operationalmostenergyregulators,increasinginvestmentininfrastructuretofacilitatecross-bordertradeinelectricityandgas,andrapidgrowthinrenewableenergy.●EstablishingalegalframeworkoncarboncaptureandstorageCCSandusingadedicatedpartoftheproceedsfromtheETStofinanceanumberofCCSdemonstrationplantsandinnovativerenewables.●EnhancingenergysecuritythroughthedevelopmentofaEuropeanenergygridanddiversifyingtheenergymix.PricingcarbonandthemovetoasinglemarketforelectricityandgaswillbecriticalforachievingthesegoalsOverall,thisleadstoanenergyintensityimprovementofapproximately30%between2005and2020.ResultsofOECDmodellingsuggestthatifEuropeactsinconcertwithothercountriestostabilisetheatmosphericconcentrationofGHGat550ppm,GDPin2050wouldbejustover2%belowitsbaselinelevelBurniauxetal.,2008.ThecostsfortheEUareconsiderablysmallerthanthoseformanyothercountries,largelybecausecountriesinEuropearelessfossilfuelintensiveFigure4.9.However,thisassumesthatthereisaglobalcarbontaxandthatthereisnoburdensharingbetweentheEUanddevelopingcountries.The550ppmstabilisationtargetusedinthemodellingisalsohigherthanthe450ppmbeingpursuedbytheEUininternationalnegotiations.EmissionsTradingSchemesThemostimportantinstrumentfordeliveringthegoalofreducinggreenhousegasemissionsistheEuropeanEmissionsTradingSchemeEUETS.TherationaleforthepolicyissimpleDuval,2008.Infossilfuelintensivesectorsoftheeconomy,aby-productisthemissionofgreenhousegaseswhichalsohasasocialcost.Theenergypricewillnotincludethesocialcostsofclimatechangeandemissionswillbelargerthanissociallyoptimal.Themainmarketmechanismsforinternalisingthesocialcostofcarbonemissionsare“capandtrade”emissionstradingschemesandcarbontaxes.Under“capandtrade”totalemissionsarecappedineachperiodandallowancestoemitallocatedtofirmseitherfreeorthroughanauction.Firmscanthentradetheirallowancesdependingonwhetheritisprofitabletoemitmoreorlessthantheirallocation.Becausethequantityofallowancesinthemarketisfixed,thepriceofallowances,andhencethepriceofcarbon,adjustsaccordingtodemandandsupplyintheallowancemarket.Incontrast,underacarbontax,thepriceofcarbonissetbythegovernment,withthequantityofemissionsdeterminedbyhouseholdsandfirmsreactingtothechangeinrelativepricesTheEuropeanUnionchoseacap-and-tradeETSbecauseitwillcrediblydeliveritsemissions-reductiontargetsforcoveredsectors;itcouldbelinkedwithemergingnationalschemesincountriesliketheUnitedStates,AustraliaandNewZealand,providedthattheschemesarecompatiblewiththeEUETS;itismorelikelytosustainthepoliticalcoalitionrequiredforthelong-termcredibilityofclimatemitigationpolicy;anditenablesfirmstomanagecarbonriskthroughthesecondarymarketforemissionallowances.WhensettingupanETS,anumberofimportantdesignissuesneedtobeconsidered,including:●Thesectoralcoverageofthescheme.TheefficiencyandfairnessofanETSwillbeenhancediftheschemeincludesasmanysectorsasispractical.Broadcoverageensuresthatlow-costabatementopportunitieswillbeimplementedanddistributesthesocialburdenmoreequitablyDuval,2008;Garnaut,2008.Governmentsalsoneedtodecidewhereinthesupplychainthepointofobligationforsurrenderingallowancesshouldbe.Theimplementationofschemescanbedifferentfordifferentsectors,andforsomesectorsitmaybeeasiertoimplementschemesatupstreampointse.g.oilimportingcompaniesratherthanindividualemissionssourcesduetolowercomplianceandadministrativecosts,whileforotherse.g.energyutilitiesimplementingschemesdownstream,i.e.atthepointsourceofemissions,ismorepracticableandlikelytoensurenecessarycompliance.●Amechanismforallocatingemissionallowances.Allowancestoemitgreenhousegasescanbeallocatedtofirmsthroughauctioningand/orfreeallocationbasedonlikelylossesinassetvalue,historicemissionsgrandfatheringandindustrybenchmarks.Whenallocatingallowances,governmentsneedtoconsiderequityandtheneedtoencourageabatementandpromotemarketefficiency.Emissionstradingperensuresstaticefficiencybecauseitgeneratesauniformpricesignalthatallocatesmitigationeffortsacrossfirmsdependingontheirownmarginalabatementcosts.Inadditiontothat,auctioningimisesdynamicefficiencythroughincentivisinglong-termtechnologicalchange.Moreover,auctionsdeliverrevenuetogovernmentsthatallowsothertaxestobereducedandgreatersupportforresearchanddevelopmentoflow-emissiontechnologies.Auctionscanalsopromoteequitybytransferringincomefromfirmsthatcanpassonthecostofallowancestothosethataremostaffectedbycarbonpricing.OneargumentforthefreeallocationofallowancestofirmsisthatitisatransparentwayofcompensatingfirmsforthelossofvalueoftheirexistingassetsthatstillpreservesthepricesignalfromtheETS.However,Stern2007arguesthatfreeallocationespeciallyifbasedongrandfatheringcanrewardtheworstpolluters,delayinvestmentinlow-emissiontechnologiesandcandetercompetitionifnewentrantsinapollutingindustrydonotreceiveanyfreeallowances.Freeallocationmayalsogeneratewindfallprofitsforfirmsthatareover-allocatedallowancesandareabletopasstheopportunitycostofholdingallowancestohouseholdsandfirmsdownstream.Freeallocationismorelikelytobeappropriateforfirmsoperatinginenergy-intensive,trade-exposedindustriesthatcannotpassonthecostofallowancesasawayofcombatingcarbonleakagetocountriesthathavenotimposedapriceoncarbonReinaud,2008.However,assistanceshouldonlybegiventofirmsthataregenuinelyatriskofrelocatingoffshoreorlosingmarketshare;assistanceshouldbestrictlytransitional,andallocatedonthebasisofindustrybestpractice.●Measurestoincreasetheflexibilityofthescheme.Theshort-runcostsanduncertaintyfromcomplyingwithanETScanbealleviatedbyallowingtheuseofcarbonoffsetsthatcomeatacheaperpricethanallowancesforcompliancepurposes.OffsetscanbecreatedoutsideorwithinacountrywithanETSbyinvestinginprojectsthatreducegreenhousegasesalreadyintheatmospherecarbonsinksorbycapturingandstoringgasesatthepointofemissionscarbonsequestration.Investorsinoffsetscanbecreditedwithallowancesthatcanbesoldtoemitterswithallowanceshortfalls.Flexibilitycanalsobeenhancedbyallowingallowancesthatarenotusedwithinanallocationperiodtobebankedandusedtoacquitemissionsinfutureperiods.Borrowingallowsemitterstouseallowancesallocatedtothemforuseinfutureperiodstomeetcurrentperiodemissions.Byallowingemissionstobetransferredbetweenperiods,borrowingandbankingmayimplythattheprofileofemissionreductionsmayvaryfromthetrajectorychosenbythegovernment.Thisshouldnotaffecttheintegrityoftheschemeaslongasthelong-termemissionreductiontargetisachieved.However,becauseemittershaveanincentivetobankallowancesforfutureuseandpaytheemissionpenaltywhentheyexpectthefuturepriceofallowancestoincreaseabovethelevelofthepenalty,itisnecessarytolimittheamountof