消费信贷的决定因素研究：基于文献的回顾【外文翻译】

PAGE2外文翻译TheDeterminantsofConsumerCredit:AReviewoftheLiteratureMaterialSource:ConsumerCreditinEuropeAuthor:DanielaVandone1IntroductionTheliteratureofconsumercreditissizeable.Suchabodyofworkreflectsnotonlythecompositenatureofunsecureddebt,butalsothefactthatdifferentmethodologicalapproachesexistdependingontheresearchquestionsunderanalysisandtheobjectivessought.Fourmainapproachescanbeseen:amanagementapproach,whichfocusesonthecharacteristicsofthecreditindustry,itsworkingsandthepoliciesadoptedbysupply-sideplayers;alegalapproach,whichinvestigatestheimpacttheregulatoryframeworkhasoncompetitionandconsumerprotection;asocio-psychologicalapproach,whichanalyseshowindividualsareaffectedbyconsumptionbehaviourandindebtednesschoices;aneconomicapproach,whichforthemostpartconcentratesonthedeterminantsofthedemandforandsupplyofconsumercreditandonananalysisofthecharacteristicsofindividualsandhouseholdsindebt.Inthischapterwewilldiscusstheeconomicapproachwiththeaimofprovidinganoutlineoftheindividualandinstitutionalfactorsthatareconsideredintheliteratureasdeterminantsofconsumercredit.Theeconomicmodelsreferredtoarebasedontheeconomicrationalityofindividuals,whoseektoincreaselivingstandardsbysmoothingconsumptionoverdifferentperiodsoftheirlivesthroughsavingandborrowingdecisions.Accordingtothesemodels,consumercreditdemandandsupplyisdeterminedbyindividualfactors.2TheLife-CycleandPermanentIncomeTheoriesThetheoreticaleconomicframeworkforconsumption,savingandindebtednessdecisionsisdevelopedwithintheLife-Cycletheory,developedbyModiglianiandBrumbergin1954,andthePermanentIncomeHypothesis,proposedbyFriedmanin1957Althoughthetwotheoriesusedifferenteconomicmodels,bothenvisagesimilarconsumptionbehaviourpatterns.Forthepurposesofthiswork,therefore,thenamesofbothwillbeconsideredasequivalents..Thecentralideaoftheseintertemporalconsumptionchoicemodelsisthathouseholdsmaketheirconsumptionchoices(andconsequentlythoserelatingtosavingandindebtedness)onthebasisoftheirwealth,currentdisposableincomeAlthoughthetwotheoriesusedifferenteconomicmodels,bothenvisagesimilarconsumptionbehaviourpatterns.Forthepurposesofthiswork,therefore,thenamesofbothwillbeconsideredasequivalents.Theunderlyingassumptionofthesemodelsisthatincomeisgenerallylowinanindividual’searlyworkinglifeandtendstorisetowardsretirement.Individualsatthestartoftheirworkinglife,expectinghigherfutureincomereceipts,financethepurchaseofassetsinordertoraiseconsumptionoverthelevelofferedbycurrentincome.Nearingtheendoftheirworkinglives,inversely,individualsraisesavingslevelsinpreparationforretirementwhenspendingwillbegreaterthanearnings.Withinthisframework,savingandindebtednessguaranteeheightenedeconomicwelfarebysmoothingoutconsumptionovertime.Inthe"standardtheory",namedassuchbyModiglianihimself,theeconomicmodelpositsthatchoicesregardinghouseholds’consumptionlevelsoverdifferentperiodsoftheirlifearesubjecttoanintertemporalbudgetconstraint.Considerablefurtherempiricalanalysesofthetheoryhavestressedtheneedforthestandardmodeltotakeintoaccounttwoadditionalaspects：——Householdsdemandfordebtissubjecttofactorsotherthanincomeandwealth;——householdsmaybe"liquidityconstrained".Encompassingtheseaspectseffectivelyimpliesthemodelshouldaddressvariablesthatinfluenceboththedemandandsupplysidesofthecreditmarket(Table1.1).Table1.1ConsumercreditdemandandsupplyfactorsCREDITDEMANDINDIVIDUALFACTORSCREDITSUPPLYSocio-demographicAgeEducationSizeandcompositionoffamilyEconomicIncomeWealthUncertaintyINSTITUTIONALFACTORSEfficiencyofjusticesystemInformation-sharingInformalcreditmarkets2.1CreditDemandFactorsWithregardstoindividualfactors,empiricalanalysishasextendedthestandardmodelbyexaminingtowhatextentsocio-demographicvariables,suchastheageoftheheadofthehousehold,thesizeandmakeupofthefamily,andlevelsofeducation,influenceindividuals’spending,savingandborrowingchoices.Theterm"household"refersintheliteraturebothtoanindividualandafamilywithpersonalloancommitments.Forthisreasonwhenreferenceismadeinthisworkto"householdunsecureddebt"theterms‘‘individual"and‘‘family"areconsideredassynonyms.Consistentwiththelife-cycle,youngpeople,characterisedbyexpectationsofrisingincomereceipts,haveastrongdemandforcreditwhich,overtime,dropsbecauseincomeissufficienttocoverspendingandwithageindividualsbecomemoreadversetoindebtedness.Indebtednessishigherorthecapacitytosaveisloweralsointhecaseoflargefamilieswithchildrenatpre-schoolorschoolagewheninthislife-cyclephasespendingistypicallyhigh.Thisbeingsaid,however,thepresenceofchildrenmayalsobeanincentiveforgreatersavinginordertosatisfyinter-generationalassettransfer.Educationalsohasapositiveeffectonthedemandforcreditbothbecauseitreflectsaprobableriseinfutureincomeandgreaterjobsecurityandreducesthecostsofenteringthecreditmarketthankstoanenhancedcapacitytomakeinformeddecisionsregardingindebtedness.Inadditiontotheeconomicvariablesalreadyincludedintheoriginalframework,i.e.individuals’incomeandwealth,empiricalanalysishasextendedthemodeltoincludealsouncertaintyabouttheamountandvariabilityoffutureincome.Suchuncertaintydeterminestheneedtoretainliquidityasaprecautionagainstincomefallsorunexpectedincreasesinliabilities,withasubsequentincreaseinsavingandareductioninthedemandforcredit.Turningtoinstitutionalfactors,theliteratureidentifiesthreeinparticular:theextentofinformation-sharingamongstfinancialinstitutionsregardingthelevelofborrowers’creditrisk,theefficiencyofthejusticesystemintakingstepsagainstinsolventindividuals,andthesizeoftheinformalcreditmarket.Institutionalfactorsinfluencethedemandforcreditbycreatingtheconditionsforthemarkettosanctionopportunisticbehaviour.Thedecisiontorepayaloandependsinfactnotonlyonthecapacity,butalsoonthewillingnessofanindividualtorespectthecontractualobligationsundersigned.Putanotherway,ahouseholdmaydecidetotakeoutaloannotasawayofanticipatingspendingbasedonexpectationsofincreasedfutureincomereceipts,butbecausehe/sheknowsthattheloanwillnotberepaid;aphenomenonaptlytermedas"strategicinsolvency"(Groppetal.1997).information-sharingmechanismsamongstlendersreduceahousehold’sincentivetoover-borrowbydemandingcredittomorethanoneinstitutionatthesametimeaseachlenderwillbeinapositiontoknowtheapplicant’stotalsystem-wideexposure.Withregardstotheefficiencyofthejusticesystem,theprobabilityoflatepaymentsorinsolvencyincreaseswhencreditrecoveryproceduresarecostlyandlengthy.Turningtothethirdinstitutionalfactor–theroleofinformalcreditmarkets–individualswhohaveaccesstoloansfromrelativesandfriendswillregardthepossibleexclusionfromformalcreditcircuitsaslessproblematicalthankstothefactthatwheninneedtheycanalwaysturntoinformalcreditsolutions.2.2CreditSupplyFactorsThestandardmodelassumesthattherearenoconstraintsonthepartofthehouseholdtoobtaincredit.Theamountoftheloan,however,iseithersubjecttoaceilingorthelevelofinterestratesappliedbylendersmayreduceorcancelthedemandforcredit,soforcinghouseholdstolimittheirspendingtotheresourcesavailable.Creditconstraintsarewidelyviewedintheliteratureasderivingfromtheexistenceofasymmetricinformationbetweenborrowersandlenders;suchinformationalimperfectionsforcelenderstotakestepstoavoidapprovingloansthatwillsubsequentlynotberepaid.Inturn,creditavailabilitybyfinancialintermediariesdependsonanindividual’ssocio-demographicandeconomiccharacteristicsaswellashis/herinstitutionalsetting.Astoindividualfactors,highincomeandwealthlevelscombinedwithconditionsofstableemploymentincreasethesupplyofcreditofferedbylenders.Withregardstotheimpactofinstitutionalfactorsonthesupplyside,twoofthethreefactorspreviouslymentionedintheanalysisofthedemandsideareparticularlysignificant:theefficiencyofthejusticesystemandtheexistenceofinformation-sharingmechanisms.Anefficientjusticesystemallowslenderstorecovernon-performingloansrapidlyatcontainedcosts.Thisisclearlythecasewithsecureddebtexposures:delaysanddifficultiesinobtainingtherepossessionofmortgagedpropertyactasdisincentivesforlenderstoextendtheirmortgageloanportfolio.Thesameinstitutionalfactormayalsohaveanimpactonthesupplyofunsecuredcredit:inthiscase,thedisciplinaryeffectoninsolventindividualsisrepresentedbyinformationconcerningthemandcollectedbycreditbureausthatmaydamagetheirprospectsofaccessingthecreditmarketagaininthefuture.Insuchascenario,theavailabilityofcreditisaffectedbytheexistenceamongstlendersofinformation-sharingmechanismswhichareusedinbuildingupcustomercredit-riskprofilesandwhichthereforereduceasymmetricinformation.3EmpiricalFindingsEmpiricalanalysesaimedatstudyingthedeterminantsofhouseholdcreditmarketsandtheircoherencewithLife-CycleandPermanentIncomemodelsfocusonthefollowingareas,accordingtotheresearchquestionstheyinvestigate:——Participationinthecreditmarket——Levelofborrowing——Cross-countrycharacteristics——Riskofover-indebtedness——CreditconstraintsWorkacrosstheseareasexaminesbothindividualandinstitutionalvariables.Analysishastypicallyconcentratedonthedemandside,thoughabranchofstudyhasusedeconomicmodelstoinvestigatethedeterminantsofthesupplyofconsumercredit(Table1.2).Table1.2TheliteratureofhouseholdcreditTopicareaAuthorsYearParticipationintheCrook2006creditmarketGrant,Padula2006,2007Casolaro,Gambacorta,Guiso2006Jappelli,Pagano2006Duygan,Grant2008LevelofborrowingMagri2002,2007Fabbri,Padula2004DelRio,Young2005Cross-countryBianco,Jappelli,Pagano2002characteristicsCrook2006Crook,Hochguertel2007Riskofover-Bridges,Disney2004indebtednessDelRio,Young2005Rinaldi,Sanchez-Arellano2006CreditconstraintsCox,Jappelli1993Ferri,Simon2000Magri2002,2007Fabbri,Padula2004Crook2006Bicakova20073.1ParticipationintheCreditMarketEmpiricalanalysesinthisareaindicatethedeterminantsofhouseholds’participationinthecreditmarket.Amongstsocio-economicfactorsexaminedwithintheindividualcategory,theageprofileasadeterminantofhavingunsecureddebtisconsistentwiththelifecyclemodelofconsumption:youngpeoplearemorelikelytoborrowthanmembersofolderagegroups(Crook2006;FabbriandPadula2004),withthepercentageofindividualswithunsecureddebtpeakingforindividualsagedbetween30and40yearsofage(DelRioandYoung2005a;Magri2007).Withregardstohouseholdsize,FabbriandPadula(2004)findthatthereisapositiverelationbetweenlevelsofindebtednessandthenumberofhouseholdmembers.Similarly,DelRioandYoung(2005)andCrook(2006)showthatmarriedindividualsaremorelikelytohaveunsecureddebtthanthenon-married.Havinghighereducationalqualificationsisassociatedwithahigherprobabilityofhavingunsecureddebt.Levelsofeducationingeneralcanreasonablybeseentohaveapositiveimpactonindividuals’financialknowledge:thehigherthislevelofknowledgeis,theeasieritistoaccessandevaluatefinancialproductsandservices.Turningtoeconomicfactors,theincomevariableisofsignificantimportance.Demandforcreditispositivelyinfluencedbyexpectationsofincreasedfuturereceipts,aspositedbythelife-cycletheory:iftherewerenoexpectationsofincreasedincomeinthefuture,therewouldbenoneedtoadvancespendingviadebt(FerriandSimon2000;Crook2005;CoxandJappelli1993).Findingsdifferwithregardstolowincomeasafactorforindebtedness:DelRioandYoung(2005a)showthatthereislessprobabilityofthepoorerpaidhavingdebtduetothefactthatlowearningsaretypicallyassociatedwithhighlyunstableemploymentconditionsthattendtoreduceboththedemandforandthesupplyofcredit.Thepercentageofhouseholdsthathavedebtishigherforthosewithlimitednetwealth.Infact,resultsintheliteratureshowthathouseholdswithhighnetwealthareabletosatisfytheirconsumptionneedsautonomouslywithoutrecoursetodebt.However,householdswithintermediatewealthlevelsaremorelikelytoparticipateintheconsumercreditmarketduetoincreasedspendingpatternsthatcharacteriseimprovementsinlifestyle.DelRioandYoung(2005a)focustheiranalysisonhouseholdswithaportfoliooffinancialassetsandfindthathouseholdsthatdonotownsuchaportfoliohaveagreaterprobabilityofhavingunsecureddebtthanthosewhodo.Movingtoinstitutionalfactors,analysishasfocusedontheprobabilityoflenders’havingtheirloansrepaid.Studiesshowhowtheprobabilityofdefaultisnegativelycorrelatedwiththelevelofefficiencyofthejusticesystemandtheexistenceofeffectiveinformation-sharingmechanisms,whilstpositivelycorrelatedwiththeexistenceofinformalcreditmarkets.3.2LevelofBorrowingAsfarasthissecondresearcharea,i.e.theamountofdebtheldbyhouseholds,amongindividualfactorsagedoesnotappeartoinfluencethelevelofborrowing,whilstthelevelofeducationalqualificationsispositivelycorrelated.Asregardseconomicvariables,FabbriandPadula(2004)showthatincomeandwealthlevelshaveapositiveeffectontheamountofunsecureddebtanindividualislikelytohave.Withreferencetolabourmarketstatus,Magri(2007)findsthattheamountofconsumercreditishigherfortheself-employedandsuggeststhisisbecauseindividualsinthiscategoryuseunsecureddebtalsoasameansoffundingtheirworkactivities.Theimpactofinstitutionalvariablesdoesnotdifferfromthoseillustratedinthefirsttopicarea(Sect.1.3.1):theexistenceofinefficientsystemsofjustice,ineffectiveinformation-sharingmechanismsandextensiveinformalcreditmarketsnotonlyincreasestheprobabilityofparticipationinthecreditmarket,butalsotheamountofdebtheldbyhouseholds.3.3Cross-CountryAnalysesThethirdresearchareaconsistsofspatialanalysesofthedeterminantsofunsecureddebtwiththeaimofinvestigatingtheexistenceofanyfactorsthatarespecifictoacountryorgeographicalarea.Crook(2006)pointsoutthatasregardsage,althoughtheprobabilityofhavingdebtinallcountriesisgreaterforyoungpeople,themaximumpercentageisreachedintheUnitedKingdomandGermany(thoseaged30–40)andlater(thoseaged40–50)intheUnitedStates,JapanandtheNetherlands.Thepercentageofhouseholdshavingunsecureddebtispositivelycorrelatedwithincome.EvidencesupportingthispositionisparticularlystrongintheUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates,wheretheshareofmiddle-to-highincomeearnerswithdebtisveryhigh,whilstonlyatmarginallevelsinItaly.Withreferencetoemploymentstatus,thoughtheretiredhaveagenerallylowprobabilityofhavingdebt,theshareofthosewithdebtishigherintheUnitedKingdomandGermany.Thereislessprobabilityoftheself-employedhavingdebtinItalyandtheNetherlands,whereastheunemployedhavegreaterproblemsinaccessingcreditinSpainandtheUnitedStates(CrookandHochguertel2007).Cross-countryanalysesrevealtheeffectofinstitutionalfactors.Studiesshowthatthoughthesetofindividualvariablesinfluencingdemandforcreditarecommonacrosscountries,significantdifferencesemergeregardinghowindividualsrespondtonegativeshocks:thesameevent,forinstancejobloss,ismetbydefaultincertaininstitutionalenvironments,typicallythosecharacterisedbyinefficientjusticesystems,andrepaymentinothers.Suchdifferencescannotbeexplainedsolelyonthebasisofindividuals’deviantbehaviourwithregardtodebt,butalsoonthebasisofdifferencesintheefficiencyandeffectivenessofinstitutionalfactors(Biancoetal.2002;Crook2006).3.4Over-IndebtednessThisfieldofresearchattemptstoidentifyinstitutionalfactorsthatmaydeterminesituationsoffinancialfragilityorover-indebtednesswhichincreasetheprobabilitythatindividualswillnotbeabletorepaytheirdebts.Suchsituationsoffinancialtensionordifficultyaredescribedintheliteratureasadverseeventsthatcantransformaperformingloanintoonetheborrowerfindsdifficulttorepay.Suchnegativeshockstohouseholdfinancesincludejobloss,illnessordivorce.Themostsignificantstatisticalvariableforidentifyingcriticalrepaymentdifficultiesisthelevelofdebttoincome.DelRioandYoung(2005b)showthatthereisapositiverelationbetweenthelevelofdebttoincomeandtheprobabilityofrepaymentdifficulties.Similarly,RinaldiandSanchez-Arellano(2006)reportthatariseinthedebtincomeratioisassociatedwithanincreaseinpaymentarrears.Thesameauthorshoweveralsopointoutthatifariseinthedebt/incomeratioisaccompaniedbyanincreaseinavailableincome,thenegativeeffectsofincreasedindebtednessarecancelledout.BridgesandDisney(2004)identifylowincomesasthemaincauseforover-indebtednessandinsolvency.Themodelsreferredtogenerallyincludedummyvariablesinordertocaptureunexpectedeventsthatmayhaveanegativeeconomicimpact.Theeffectssucheventscanhaveonaborrower’sfinancialpositionvarynoticeablyfromcountrytocountryanddependoninstitutionalfactorswhich,asalreadyseen,caninfluenceahousehold’swillingnesstorepayaloan.3.5CreditConstraintsThelastresearchareaanalysestheexistenceofcreditconstraintsasameansofidentifyingboththesocio-economicprofileofindividualsmostatriskofhavingtheirapplicationforaloanturneddownandtheeffectinstitutionalfactorshaveonlenders’creditsupply.Asregardsindividualfactors,empiricalevidenceconcursthatthesupplyofcreditriseswithincreasesinageandeducationalqualifications;italsotendstoriseformarriedcouplesandlargefamilies(Crook2006;CoxandJappelli1993).Thesizeofthetownorcityofresidence,whichisasignificantdeterminantofdemandforcredit,doesnothaveasignificantimpactonthesupplyside(Magri2007).Withreferencetoeconomicvariables,asonemayexpect,theprobabilityofhavingaloanapplicationrejectedisnegativelycorrelatedwithincomeandwealthlevels.Loanapplicationsfromtheself-employedhaveagreaterprobabilityofrejectionthanthosepresentedbytheemployed(FabbriandPadula2004;FerriandSimon2000).Empiricalanalysesintotheeffectinstitutionalvariableshaveonthecreditsupplysideconcentrateprincipallyonthespecificfeaturesofthejusticesystemandtheexistenceofinformation-sharingmechanismsinaparticularcountryorgeographicarea.Casolaroetal.(2006)analysetheavailabilityofcreditinItalyandshowthatsupplyisinfluencedbyasetofformalandinformalmechanismsthatdeterminesrepayment.Asregardsformalmechanisms,inlinewithFabbriandPadula’sfindings(FabbriandPadula2004),Magri(2007)andBiancoetal.(2002)reportthatthemoreefficientajusticesystemis(efficiencyherebeingmeasuredintermsoftheyearsnecessarytocloseproceedings),thelowerthecostsforcreditrecoveryareandsubsequentlythelowertheprobabilityofcreditrationing.Theavailabilityofcreditalsodependsontheexistenceofinformalcreditmechanisms,normallydeterminedonthebasisofacommunityorgeographicalarea’ssocialcapital.Thisresourceismeasuredgenerallybythenumberofblooddonationspercapita,theleveloftrustindividualshaveinfellowcommunitymembers,andparticipationinpoliticalelections(Guisoetal.2004).Itisproposedthathigherlevelsofsocialcapitalcorrespondtoacivicsenseandanetworkofsocialrelationsthatdrivepeopletorespecttheirindividualcommitments.Bicakova(2007)analysestheexistenceofasymmetricinformation(moralhazardandadverseselection)anditseffectsontheconsumercreditmarket.Shestartsbyshowingthatdefaultratesdifferaccordingtotheproductforwhichtheloanistakenout(loansforthepurchaseofmotorbikes,second-handcars,mobilephoneshavehigherinsolvencyratesoverthosefornewcarsandelectricalappliances)andsheanalyseswhetherthisisduetothe‘‘selectioneffect’’orthe‘‘goodeffect’’.4SummaryoftheDeterminantsoftheDemandforandSupplyofConsumerCreditTheeconomicmodelsofthePermanentIncomeandLife-Cycletheoriescontinuetobeusedasaframeworkforanalysisofhouseholds’consumption,savingandindebtednessdecisions.However,workinbehaviouraleconomicshasmadeanimportantcontributionindrawingattentiontotheroleplayednotonlybysocio-demographicandeconomicvariables,butalsopsychologicalfactorsasdeterminantsofthedemandforunsecureddebt.Ithasalsobeenshownhowpsychologicalfactorshaveanimpactontheeffectivenessofpoliciesadoptedtopreventexanteandmanageexpostfinancialdifficultiesarisingfromover-indebtedness.Table1.3providesasummaryofthefactorsinfluencingthedemandforandsupplyofconsumercredit.Ascanbeseen,thesigns(+)and(－)arenotalwayshomogeneousandhavevaryingdegreesofintensity.Table1.3SummaryofthedeterminantsofconsumercreditPossiblerelationwithPossiblerelationwithcreditdemandcreditsupplyINDIVIDUALFACTORSSocio-demographic（+）ForyounghouseholdswithAge（+）Lessevidentbell-curvefutureincomeexpectations（+）GreatneedforconsumptionSizeandcompositionof（+）Forlargefamiliesfamily（+）HigherlevelsoffinancialLevelofeducational（+）Higherlevelsoffinancialknowledgeandbetterqualificationsknowledgeandmoreunderstandingoffinancialresponsibleborrowingproducts（+）ReduceroleofinformalSizeoftown/cityofNosignificantcreditmarketandgreaterresidenceavailabilityoflendersEconomic（+）Formiddle-highincomeIncome（+）Higherprobabilityofbracketsrepayment（+）ForintermediatewealthWealth（+）Higherprobabilityoflevelsrepayment（－）DuetotheneedtoholdUncertainfutureincome（－）LessprobabilityofsavingsincaseofrepaymentunexpectedeventsPsychological（+）Over-estimatemoneyOverconfidencebias（－）Factordifficulttoidentifymanagementability（+）Under-estimateriskofAvailabilityheuristic（－）Factordifficulttoidentifyover-indebtedness（+）Under-estimateoffutureHyperbolicdiscount（－）FactordifficulttoidentifysustainabilityofpersonaldebtINSTITUTIONALFACTORS（－）IncentiveforstrategicEfficiencyofjustice（+）Reducedrecoverytimesinsolvencysystemandcosts（－）IncentiveforstrategicInformation-sharing（+）Reducedinformationinsolvencysystemsasymmetries（+）IncentiveforstrategicInformalcreditmarket（－）Incentiveforstrategicinsolvencyinsolvency消费信贷的决定因素研究：基于文献的回顾资料来源:欧洲消费信贷作者：万多内丹妮拉1概要关于消费信贷研究的文献是相当多的，如此大量的成果不仅仅反应出非担保债务的种类之繁多，也说明了由于调查分析以及调查目的的不同，对于消费信贷的研究就产生了不同的角度。这里有四种主要的角度：从管理学的角度，这是一种重点关注信贷产业特性的方法，采用这种方法的多为信贷的供应方；从法律的角度，主要从法律框架上研究对产业竞争和消费者保护的影响；从社会心理学角度，它分析个体是如何受到消费行为和债务选择的影响的；从经济学角度，主要研究关于消费信贷供给与需求的决定因素，并分析个人或家庭的债务特征。这里我们主要讨论经济学角度的研究，目的是为了提供一份个人的提纲以及那些在研究文献中提及的消费信贷决定因素。这种经济模型基于个人的经济理性，即人们希望在不同的生命周期中通过储蓄和负债的决策实现相对平滑的消费来提高他们的生活水平。从这些模型来看，消费信贷的供给和需求取决于个体因素。2生命周期理论与持久收入假说消费、储蓄以及债务决策的经济学理论框架是在由Modigliani和Brumberg（1954）提出的生命周期理论与Freidman（1957）虽然这两个理论使用的是不同的经济模型，但它们都基于共同的消费行为模型。由于其研究目的是相同的，这里将其定义为同等模型。虽然这两个理论使用的是不同的经济模型，但它们都基于共同的消费行为模型。由于其研究目的是相同的，这里将其定义为同等模型。上述模型建立的基本假定是在个人工作生涯的早期收入普遍较低并随着临近退休而逐渐增加。人们会在工作生涯的早期，预期更高的未来收入，为了提高消费水平融入资金购买资产进行超前消费，相反的，在工作生涯的后期，人们则更倾向于提高储蓄的水平为将来退休做准备。在这种框架下，储蓄和债务通过使消费变得平滑保证了其经济福利的提高。在Modigliani所说的“标准理论”中，经济模型假定在关于家庭消费水平在不同时期的选择受跨时期的预算约束。以此理论更进一步的实证分析还强调了这一标准模型还需考虑另外两个方面：——家庭对债务的需求还受收入和家庭现有财富的支配——家庭还可能受到“流动性约束”这实际上意味着模型应从信贷市场需求和供给两个方面确定变量对它的影响（表1.1）。表1.1消费信贷需求与供给因素信贷需求个体因素信贷供给社会人口统计年龄受教育程度家庭结构经济收入家庭财富不确定性因素制度因素法律制度信息共享非正规信贷市场2.1信贷需求因素在个体因素方面，实证分析通过对人口统计学变量的审计扩展了标准理论，例如户主的年龄、家庭结构、受教育程度，都影响了个体对消费、储蓄以及债务的选择文献中对个人和家庭个人贷款都涉及到对术语文献中对个人和家庭个人贷款都涉及到对术语“家庭”的运用，所以当参考中带有“家庭无担保债务”时，这里“个人”和“家庭”被认为是同一概念。在生命周期中，年轻人预期未来收入是增加的，他们对信贷的需求是巨大的，随着时间的推移，当收入逐渐能够覆盖支出的时候，这种需求就会慢慢减少。大部分家庭在子女教育阶段的花费也是非常高的，他们往往具有较高的负债水平或是低弱得储蓄能力。然而子女的存在也是大量储蓄的动机，人们为了资产向下一代的转移而提高他们的储蓄比例。受教育程度对信贷需求也有着积极的影响，因为它反映了个人未来收入提高的预期和工作保障，同时，它也降低了进入信贷市场以及做出债务决策的成本。除了包含于原框架之内的经济因素外，实证分析指出该模型还应该包括不确定因素，即将来收入的可变性。这种不确定性使人们必须保持必要的流动性防止未来收入的下降或是非预期的债务支出，从而导致储蓄的增加和对信贷需求的减少。在制度因素方面，文献定义出三个主要因素：金融机构中关于借款人信用风险的信息共享程度、法律制度在应对个人破产所采取措施的效用以及非正式信贷市场的程度。制度因素通过为市场创造条件制约机会主义行为来影响信贷需求。偿还债务不仅仅取决于偿债能力，还取决于个人遵从合约条款履行义务的意愿。换句话说，家庭的借款可能不是基于预期收入增加所进行的预先消费，而是他/她认为这笔债务是不需要偿还的，这一现象被称为“战略性破产”（Gropp等人1997）。贷款人间的信息共享机制使贷款人能够系统的了解降申请人的情况从而降低了家庭超额负债的可能性。对于效率的司法系统，逾期付款或是破产的概率增加则其信用的恢复是一个漫长而昂贵的过程。转到第三制度性因素——非正式信贷市场的作用，若个人能在亲戚和朋友间得到信贷资产，就会排除寻求正规金融机构的动机。2.2信贷供给因素标准模型假设家庭在获得信贷方面没有约束。然而，实际贷款的数额受到了贷款上限或者是利率水平的管制，由此贷款人可能减少或者取消家庭对信贷的需求，从而强迫他们限制消费以获取可得资金。文献中广泛认为信贷约束的存在来源于借贷双方的信息不对称；这种信息瑕疵促使贷款人采取措施避免批准将来可能没有回报的贷款。反过来，金融机构的信贷资金可获得性取决于个体的社会经济特点以及他所在的制度环境。在个体因素中，高的收入和财富水平以及稳定的工作状态都增加了贷款人愿意提供的信贷供给。关于供给方面制度性影响因素中，在需求因素分析中预先提到的那俩个因素也有其重要的意义：法律制度建设的效率和机构间共享信息平台的存在。有效地司法系统使贷款人能够迅速收回不良贷款的成本。如在抵押担保债务中，延迟或是不能够赎回抵押财产将会限制贷款人抵押担保贷款的提供或推广程度。同样，制度性因素也可能影响无担保贷款的供给。在这里，信用咨询机构所收集到得破产者的信息很可能损害其未来再次进入信贷市场的前景。在这种情况下，贷款的可获得性就受到了贷款人间机构信息共享平台的影响，这一平台被用于建设顾客信用风险评级，以此减少信息不对称所产生的风险。3实证研究结果实证分析旨在研究消费信贷市场的决定因素以及它们与生命周期和永久收入理论的相关性，从调查研究的问题来看，主要集中在以下几个模型领域：——信贷市场结构——借款水平——社会特征——过度负债的风险——信贷约束对这些模型领域的调查包括了个体因素和制度因素变量。分析一般都集中在需求方面，虽然研究的一个分支使用的是经济模型来调查消费信贷供给的决定因素（表1.2）。表1.2关于消费信贷的文献研究对象作者年份市场结构Crook2006Grant,Padula2006,2007Casolaro,Gambacorta,Guiso2006Jappelli,Pagano2006Duygan,Grant2008借款水平Magri2002,2007Fabbri,Padula2004DelRio,Young2005社会特性Bianco,Jappelli,Pagano2002Crook2006Crook,Hochguertel2007过度负债的风险Bridges,Disney2004DelRio,Young2005Rinaldi,Sanchez-Arellano2006信贷约束Cox,Jappelli1993Ferri,Simon2000Magri2002,2007Fabbri,Padula2004Crook2006Bicakova20073.1信贷市场结构这方面的实证分析表明了在信贷市场中家庭参与的决定因素。在个体范畴的社会经济因素检验中，检查判定年龄剖面作为拥有无担保债务的决定因素