【Dell的FMEA教材失效模式影响分析】

欢迎阅读本文档，希望本文档能对您有所帮助!欢迎阅读本文档，希望本文档能对您有所帮助!欢迎阅读本文档，希望本文档能对您有所帮助!欢迎阅读本文档，希望本文档能对您有所帮助!欢迎阅读本文档，希望本文档能对您有所帮助!欢迎阅读本文档，希望本文档能对您有所帮助!FailureModeEffectsAnalysis失效模式影响分析Objectives课程目标Bytheendofthetraining,youwillbeableto:在本堂课程结束时,您将能够:Compareandcontrastthedifferenttypesoffailuremodeeffectsanalysis(FMEA).比较与对照不同类别的失效模式影响分析(FMEA).CharacterizethedifferencesinquestionsaskedincompletingeachtypeofFMEA.区分在完成不同类别的FMEA过程中所提出问题的特性.DefinedesignFMEAandprocessFMEA.定义设计FMEA与流程FMEA.DescribehowtoapplyFMEAtoaprocessmap.了解如何将FMEA运用于流程图.ListthestepsandcomponentsusedinbuildinganFMEA.将建立FMEA的步骤与要件列出.Demonstratehowtoassesslevelofrisk.展示如何评估风险等级.Prioritizeriskassessmenttodrivecorrectiveactions.排定风险评估优先级以推动矫正措施.

FEMAandWhatisit?什么是失效模式影响分析FMEACouldthesehavebeenavoided?TheBhopaltragedyTheValujetaircrashThecontaminationofmeatatHudsonFoodsTheY2Kproblem下列事件原本是否可以避免呢?印度波布尔化工厂毒气外泄惨剧美国Valujet航空公司坠机意外美国Hudson食品公司肉品污染事件千禧虫问题WhatisFMEA?什么是失效模式影响分析DisciplinedapproachtostudyingfailuresinProductSystemProcessServicePluscausesandeffects有系统的研究下列各种失效产品系统流程服务原因与结果Methodthatquantifieslevelofrisk用量化评估风险等级的一种方法.RequirementofQS9000QS9000品管系统要求条件之一.Tooltouseonneworexistingproducts,processes,services,etc.用于新的或现有的产品,流程,服务,等等的工具.

WhenFMEA’sShouldBeConducted何时该做FMEALifeCycleCost生命週期成本LifeCycleCost生命週期成本StagesinProduct/ServiceLifeCycle產品/服務生命週期之各個階段StagesinProduct/ServiceLifeCycle產品/服務生命週期之各個階段

FMEAExerciseFMEA练习FMEAExercise1FMEA练习一Considerthepagerasacommunicationdevice.Answerthefollowingquestions:将呼叫器当做一个通讯工具.回答下列问题:Identifythemostseriousfailurethatcanoccurwithapager.列出呼叫器可能发生最严重的失效状况(故障)._______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________Whatcouldbethe“worstcase”effectofthisfailure?这个失效状况所能导致的最糟结果是什么?___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________Identify5causesthatleadtosuchfailure,andrankinorderofpriorityforcorrectiveaction.列出五个导致这个失效状况的原因,并将它们矫正措施的优先等级列出.Cause原因Rank等级

FMEAExercise1,ContinuedFMEA练习一,续前页 Pointstoconsider:Whatwasthebasisforallottingtheranksyoudid?Howsuredidyoufeelaboutwhatyouweredoing?Doyouthinkyourrankingwillagreewithmostotherpeopleintheclass?Why?Wouldateameffortbebetterorworse?考虑以下各点:您分配优先等级的参考依据是什么?您对您的结论有多大的信心?您认为这个班里大部份的学员会同意您的评比等级吗?为什么?小组合作的结果会更好或更差?

FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页ProbabilityofOccurrence–Cause发生机率–原因Veryrare,maybeoncein10yrs.,or<1ppb 1非常罕见,每＋年才可能发生一次,或小于十亿分之一Rare,maybeoncein5yrs.,orX00ppb 2罕见,每五年才可能发生一次,或大约为十亿分之数百Couldoccursomewhatfrequently,morethanonce/2yrs.,or<100ppm 3发生频率略高于每两年一次,或小于百万分之一百Couldoccur1to3times/yrorbetween100and1000ppm 4每年发生一至三次,或介于百万分之一百至百万分之一干Definitelymorethanoneoccurrenceperquarter,orabove1000ppm 5发生频率多于每季一次,或高于百万分之一千Severity–Effect严重性–影响Minorinconvenienceinpersonal/worklife 1对个人生活与工作稍有不便Noticeableimpacttoworkschedule/personalplans 2对个人与工作计划稍有影响Affectsrelationshipswithboss/familymembers 3对上司/家人之间的关系有影响Lossofrevenue,relationships,andorreputation 4对收入,关系,或名誉有损失Couldresultininjury,/othersafetyissues 5导致受伤或其它安全事故Detection–FailureMode(orCause)侦测能力–失效模式(或原因)Failureoritscauseisreadilyorselfevident 1失效本身或其原因显而易见或自行彰显Manualinspectionortestcaneasilydetectfailure/cause 2人工检验或测试可以轻易侦测到失效或其原因Failureishardtodetect,specialinstrumentsortrainingreq. 3失效不易侦测,必须要有特殊仪器或训练Failuredetectionwilldestroytheunit 4失效侦测过程会损毁产品Failurecanslipbyunnoticed 5无法侦测到失效CompletethefollowingFMEARatingWorksheetfortheprobleminExercise1.将练习一的问题排定FEMA优先等级并填入下表.Productorfeature产品或特性Failuremode失效模式Effect影响SCause原因OCurrentcontrols现行管制DRPN风险系数Rank等级

FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页CommontypesofFMEAFMEA的一般类型Design/Product–Focusonproduct,system,sub-system,orcomponentpart设计/产品–重点在产品,系统,次系统,或零附件.Process–Focusprocess.Outputusuallyaproduct流程–重点在流程本身.其输出通常为产品.Service–Focusonprocess,butoutputisservice服务–重点在流程.但其输出为服务.Design/ProductFMEA设计/产品FMEABenefits:IncreasesrobustnessofdesignsIdentifiesfailuremodesEnablesprioritysettingforcorrectiveactionSupportsfailurediscussionbetweendifferentgroupsProvidesaframeworkforcontinuousimprovementofdesignsIdentifiesoftenmissedfailuremodeswhenusedatsystemslevelCustomers:Enduser,manufacturing,assembly,serviceand…好处:更完善的产品设计找出失效模式得以设定矫正措施的优先级支持不同工作小组之间的失效案例讨论提供设计持续改善的工作架构找出在系统阶层经常遗漏的失效模式客户:最终用户,制造,组装,服务,与…ProcessFMEA流程FMEABenefits:IncreasesrobustnessofprocessIdentifieshighriskprocessstepsIdentifiesprocessvariablescontrolsSupportsfailurediscussionbetweendifferentgroupsDocumentsresultsofprocessProvidesframeworkforcontinuousimprovementofprocesses……Customers:Enduser,downstreammanufacturing/assemblyprocesses,serviceoperationsand…好处:更完善的流程设定找出高风险的流程步骤找出流程变量的控制办法支持不同工作小组之间的失效案例讨论经由纸上作业制订流程提供流程持续改善的工作架构……客户:最终用户,下游制造,组装流程,服务作业,与…

FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页ServiceFMEA服务FMEABenefits:ReducesprobabilityofservicenotmeetingexpectationsIdentifiesfailuremodesEnablesprioritizationforcorrectiveactionPinpointshighriskstepsinserviceprocessIdentifieshighestvaluecontrolstepsCustomers:Enduser,downstreamprocessowners,and….好处:降低服务不良的机率找出失效模式得以设定矫正措施的优先级精确指出在服务流程中的高风险步骤找出最高价值的管制步骤客户:最终用户,下游流程负责人,与…DefinethescopefortheFMEA定义FMEA的范围Step1Definetheboundarieswithinwhichtheproduct,process,orservicewillbestudied,identifyingtheoperatingassumptions,currentconditions,andConstraints’ifany.步骤一定义要所要研究的产品,流程,或服务的研究界限,确定作业假设条件,目前状况,以及可能的限制.

TheInfluenceofLevel不同阶层的影响RadiatorPump,VBeltRadiatorPump,VBeltDiaphragm,BiMetalSpringDiaphragm,BiMetalSpringSafety,LubricationEngine,Braking,ExhaustSafety,LubricationEngine,Braking,ExhaustTrans.,CoolingThermostatThermostatExampleofaProductLevel阶层Focus重点FailureMode失效模式Cause原因Effect影响System系统Car轿车Overheating引擎过热Coolingsystemfailure冷却系统失效Strandedontheroad在途中抛锚Sub-system次系统Coolingsystem冷却系统Inadequatecoolantflow冷却剂循环不当Thermostatstuckclosed澎胀阀死锁Caroverheating轿车引擎过热Sub-assembly次组合Thermostat澎胀阀Stuckclosed死锁Bi-metalspringbroken铋金属弹簧断裂Inadequatecoolantflow冷却剂循环不当Component零件Bi-metalspring铋金属弹簧Broken断裂Fatigue金属疲劳Thermostatstuckclosed澎胀阀死锁

FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页ExampleofaProcess流程举例CompanyCompanyPlant4Plant3Plant2Plant1Plant4Plant3Plant2Plant1PCBLinePowersuppliesFHPMotorsPCBLinePowersuppliesFHPMotorsOp250Op20Op10Op250Op20Op10FMEAcanbeconductedatanyoftheselevels;italldependsonyourobjective依据您的目的,FMEA可应用于以上任何一个阶层.Op250Op240210Op10Op120Op250Op250Op240210Op10Op120Op250OpA20OpA10OpA20OpA10Level阶层Focus重点FailureMode失效模式Cause原因Effect影响System系统Factory(Plant2)工厂(二厂)Latedeliverstocustomer交货延迟LowFPYonLine2第二线直通率过低Lostbusiness损失订单Sub-system次系统Line2(powerSupplies)第二线(电源供应器)LowFPY直通率过低Highreworkat/aftertesting测试后重工率太高Latedeliveries交货延迟Operation作业站TestingOp210第210测试站Highrework重工率太高Testingresultsinconsistent测试结果不稳定LowFPY直通率过低Important:Youmustbeabletoseeacascadingoffailuremodes,causes,andeffects.重要提示:您必需要能看出失效模式,原因,和影响的系列关联.

FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页DefinethescopefortheFMEA,cont.定义FMEA的范围,续前页Step2Identifyteammembers,customer,andknowledgeexpert/sInvolvethecustomerintheprocess.步骤二确定小组成员,客户,与专家.邀请客户参与作业Step3DeveloprolesandresponsibilitiesforteammembersLeveragethestrengthsofeachteammember步骤三指派小组成员职掌充分运用各小组成员之长处Step4Studytheproduct/Process/ServiceAllteammembersworktofamiliarizethemselveswiththeproduct,process,orservice步骤四研究产品/流程/服务各小组成员致力于熟习产品,流程,或服务Step5DevelopratingscalesforSeverity,Occurrence,andDetection步骤五建立严重性,发生机率,与侦测能力的评比等级Quantifyingfailuremodes,effectsandcauses量化失效模式,影响,与原因 Causes FailureModes* Effects 原因 失效模式 影響 Occurrence Detection Severity 發生機率 偵測能力 嚴重性Howsevere?有多嚴重?Whohasthemostinfo?Howsevere?有多嚴重?Whohasthemostinfo?誰有較多的資訊?Howeasytodetectwithcurrentcontrols?現有的偵測能力有多好?Whohasthemostinfo?誰有較多的資訊?Ifpreventedwilleffectsbeeliminated?預防措施是否可以消除影響?Howfrequent?多頻繁?Whohasthemostinfo?誰有較多的資訊?Ifeliminated,willfailurebeavoided?如果消除了發生機率,失效是否可以避免?

FailureModeEffectsAnalysisstyleref"MapTitle",RatingScalesFMEA分析,评比等级来源于中国最大的资料库下载Ratingscales评比等级ExamplefromDesignFMEA设计FMEA举例Severity严重性Occurrence发生机率Detection侦测能力Effect影响Cause原因Failuremodeorcause失效模式或原因1 - Noeffect 无影响2 - Minoreffect-fit/cosmetics 轻微影响–配合/外观3 - Majoreffect-fit/cosmetics 严重影响–配合/外观4 - MinorreductioninFunction 功能稍受影响5 - Customerdissatisfied 客户不满意6 - Majorreductioninfunction 功能大受影响7 - Totallydysfunctional 功能完全不正常8 - Presentsminorhazard 形成轻微危险9 - Presentsinjuryhazard 造成受伤危险10 - Fatalifused 造成致命危险1 - Remotechance, <1ppm 微乎其微2 - Verylow 1-5 非常低3 - Verylow 5-10 非常低4 - Moderate 10-100 中等程度5 - Moderate 100-1K 中等程度6 - High 1K-10K 高度7 - High 10K-100K 高度8 - VeryHigh 100K-1M 非常高9 - VeryHigh 1M-10M 非常高10 - Almostcertain 几乎是必然会发生1 - Certaintobedetected 一定能侦测出2 - Veryhighchanceofdetection 非常高的机会能侦测出3 - highchanceofdetection 很高的机会能侦测出4 - Moderatelyhighchanceofdetection 中高程度的机会能侦测出5 - Moderatechanceofdetection 中等程度的机会能侦测出6 - Lowchanceofdetection 低程度的机会能侦测出7 - Verylowchanceofdetection 非常低程度的机会能侦测出8 - Remotechanceofdetection 微乎其微的机会能侦测出9 - Veryremotechanceofdetection 非常微乎其微的机会能侦测出10 - Slipsbyundetected 无法侦测

Ratingscales评比等级FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開5 DevelopratingscalesforSeverity,Occurrence,andDetection ExamplefromProcessFMEA:Severity-effect1Severity-effect1–Noeffectonoperators,users,orcurrentanddownstreamprocesses2–Minorreworkatcurrentstep/nodysfunctionintroducedinproduct3–Reworkatcurrent/subsequentstepscausingsomedelayedschedules,orproductisrenderedpartiallydysfunctional4–Heavyreworkatsubsequentoperation,majordelaysinschedules,orproductfunctionisseverelyimpacted5–RiskofinjuryorfatalOccurrence-cause1–Veryrareoccurrence,X00ppboroncein3to5years2–Rareoccurrence,XtoX000ppm,2to5occurrencesin3years3–Frequentoccurrence,X000toX0,000ppm,1to3occurrencesin1year4–Highfrequencyofoccurrence,X0,000toXMppm,over4occurrencesperyear5–AlmostcertainDetection–failuremode(orcauseinsomecases)1–Certaintobedetected,beforeanymeasurabledamageisdone2–Automatedinspection/detectionorstrongprocesscontrolsexistatcurrentsteporwithinthesystemboundaries3–Samplingplansusedforinspectionpurposes4–100%manualinspectionmethodsusedwithinsystemboundaries5–Defectunlikelytobedetected,willslipbyunnoticed建立嚴重性,發生機率,與偵測能力的評比等級流程FMEA舉例:嚴重性– 影響對作業員,使用者,或目前及下游作業無影響.對該作業步驟輕微重工,產品功能不受影響.對該作業/後續作業步驟重工而造成進度稍為落後,或產品功能部份受影響.對後續作業步驟施以重大重工,造成進度嚴重落後,或產品功能嚴重受影響.有受傷或致命危險.發生機率–原因發生機率非常罕見.十億分之數百,或三至五年發生一次.發生機率罕見.百萬分之一至百萬分之數千,或三年發生二至五次.發生機率時常.百萬分之數千至百萬分之數萬,或一年發生一至三次.發生機率頻繁.百萬分之數萬至百萬分之數百萬,或一年發生多於四次幾乎是必然會發生.偵測能力–失效模式(在某些案例中這個項目是原因)在損失造成前一定可以偵測到.自動檢驗/測試,或對該流程或系統有週密的流程管制.依抽樣計劃檢驗.系統範圍內施行百分之百人工檢驗.無法偵測.FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页RatingScaleWorksheet评比等级工作表Severity严重性Occurrence发生机率Detection侦测能力Effect影响Cause原因FailureModeorCause失效模式或原因

FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页DefinethescopefortheFMEA,cont.定义FMEA的范围,续前页Step6Brainstormfailuremodes,knownandpotentialIdentifyasmanyfailuremodesaspossible.步骤六运用脑力激荡方法找出已知和可能的失效模式尽可能的找出各种失效模式SeparatingFailureModes,EffectsandCauses區分失效模式,影響,與原因SeparatingFailureModes,EffectsandCauses區分失效模式,影響,與原因Multiplicitywillexistforcauses,failuremodes,andeffects重複性存在於各個原因,失效模式,與影響之間FailureModes : Willsharecauses,andeffects失效模式 : 不同的失效模式會有共同的原因與影響Causes : Thereasonsforfailure,canbeoneormanyforagivenfailuremode原因 : 某個失效的(多個)原因,可能是另一個失效模式中一或多個的原因.Effects : Theresultsofthefailure,canbeoneormanyforagivenfailuremode影響 : 某個失效的(多個)結果,可能是另一個失效模式中一或多個的結果.FailureMode3FailureMode1Effect3Effect2Effect1Cause4Cause3Cause2Cause1FailureMode2Multiplicitywillexistforcauses,failuremodes,andeffects重複性存在於各個原因,失效模式,與影響之間FailureModes : Willsharecauses,andeffects失效模式 : 不同的失效模式會有共同的原因與影響Causes : Thereasonsforfailure,canbeoneormanyforagivenfailuremode原因 : 某個失效的(多個)原因,可能是另一個失效模式中一或多個的原因.Effects : Theresultsofthefailure,canbeoneormanyforagivenfailuremode影響 : 某個失效的(多個)結果,可能是另一個失效模式中一或多個的結果.FailureMode3FailureMode1Effect3Effect2Effect1Cause4Cause3Cause2Cause1FailureMode2

styleref"MapTitle"FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页DefinethescopefortheFMEA,cont.定义FMEA的范围,续前页Step7Listtheeffects,causes,andcurrentcontrolsforeachfailuremodeIncludeinputfromcustomerandknowledgeexperts步骤七列出每一个失效模式可能产生的所有影响,原因,与目前的管制办法将客户与专家的意见包含在内FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開Listtheeffects,causes,andcurrentcontrolsforeachfailuremodeListtheeffects,causes,andcurrentcontrolsforeachfailuremode列出每一個失效模式的所有影響,原因,與目前的管制辦法 Example: 舉例

FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页DefinethescopefortheFMEA,cont.定义FMEA的范围,续前页Step8AssignratingsforSeverity,Occurrence,andDetectionWorktoreachteamconsensus步骤八列出严重性,发生机率,和侦测能力的评比等级致力于达成小组共识FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開8 AssignratingsforSeverity,Occurrence,andDetection8 AssignratingsforSeverity,Occurrence,andDetection列出嚴重性,發生機率,和偵測能力的等級Example: 舉例FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页数目DefinethescopefortheFMEA,cont.定义FMEA的范围,续前页Step9CalculateRPN(RiskPriorityNumber)步骤九计算RPN(风险等级数)9 CalculateRPN(RiskPriorityNumber)SimplyassigningratingsforSeverity,Occurrence,andDetectiondoesn’thelp9 CalculateRPN(RiskPriorityNumber)SimplyassigningratingsforSeverity,Occurrence,andDetectiondoesn’thelpquantifytheriskintoasinglemeasurablevalue.Multiplyingtheratingscoresthusfillsthisgap.NotethatinthisapproachwehavemaintainedequalweightforeachofthethreeS,O,andD.計算RPN(RiskPriorityNumber)單單是列出嚴重性,發生機率,和偵測能力的等級無助於將風險量化成為一個可評估數值,將這些評比等級分數相乘可以達到這個目的.請注意在這個方法中三個S,O,和D的加權值是一樣的. Example: 舉例 FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页DefinethescopefortheFMEA,cont.定义FMEA的范围,续前页Step10DecideonathresholdRPN,withoutignoringhighseverityfailuremodes步骤十在不勿视高严重性失效模式项目前提之下决定RPN门坎DecideonathresholdRPN,withoutignoringhighseverityfailuremodes在不勿視高嚴重性失效模式項目前提之下決定RPN門檻DecideonathresholdRPN,withoutignoringhighseverityfailuremodes在不勿視高嚴重性失效模式項目前提之下決定RPN門檻 ExampleusingParetoChart:運用柏拉圖的舉例:FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開CumulativeRPNCurve累計RPN曲線CumulativeRPNCurve累計RPN曲線80%ofCumulativeRPN80%累計RPNCumulativeRPN累計RPN80%ofCumulativeRPN80%累計RPNCumulativeRPN累計RPNCauses原因Causes原因

FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页DecideonathresholdRPN,withoutignoringhighseverityfailuremodesDecideonathresholdRPN,withoutignoringhighseverityfailuremodes在不勿視高嚴重性失效模式項目前提之下決定RPN門檻 ExampleusingRPN>=200foreachfailuremode:以RPN>=200作為失效模式門檻的舉例FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開

FailureModeEffectsAnalysis,ContinuedFMEA分析,续前页来源于中国最大的资料库下载DefinethescopefortheFMEA,cont.定义FMEA的范围,续前页Step11PrioritizebasedonRPNandseverity,orasrequiredbycustomer步骤十一依据风险等级数和严重性,或客户要求排定优先次序11 PrioritizebasedonRPNandseverity,orasrequiredbycustomerArriveattheorderinwhichyouwillstartaddressingthefailuremodesandcausesforcorrectiveaction.AlthoughRPNandseveritybasedprioritizationseemsthemostlogical,yourdecisiontoproceedmustbemadewithcustomerinput.Thisstepiseasilyaccomplishedbysortingthedata,indescendingorder.Youcandothiswithineachfailuremodetomaintaindataintegrity.Documentationonworksheetisimportanttoensurethewholeteamisinsync.11 PrioritizebasedonRPNandseverity,orasrequiredbycustomerArriveattheorderinwhichyouwillstartaddressingthefailuremodesandcausesforcorrectiveaction.AlthoughRPNandseveritybasedprioritizationseemsthemostlogical,yourdecisiontoproceedmustbemadewithcustomerinput.Thisstepiseasilyaccomplishedbysortingthedata,indescendingorder.Youcandothiswithineachfailuremodetomaintaindataintegrity.Documentationonworksheetisimportanttoensurethewholeteamisinsync.依據風險等級數和嚴重性,或客戶要求排定優先次序這個優先次序是您將用以處理與矯正失效模式及原因.雖然依據RPN與嚴重性所訂出的優先次序看來是最合理的,但您最後的決定必須要納入客戶的意見.這個步驟可以很容易的藉由將數據以由大到小的順序排列出來而完成.您可以將這個步驟分別運用於每一個失效模式之中以保持資料的完整性.將作業過程與結果記錄於工作表上以確保整個小組的步調一致是很重要的.FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開FMEA分析,续前页DefinethescopefortheFMEA,cont.定义FMEA的范围,续前页Step12Identifycorrectiveaction步骤十二决定矫正措施12 IdentifyCorrectiveActionInthisstepyouidentifythecorrectiveactionsneededtoeliminate/control12 IdentifyCorrectiveActionInthisstepyouidentifythecorrectiveactionsneededtoeliminate/controlthecauses,andreducetheriskleveltoorbelowtheagreeduponthreshold.Therewillbetimeswhenyoucannotworkontherootcause;insuchcasesthebestcourseofactionwillbeviaadditionofcontrols/adequatewarningdevices/mechanismsofimpendingfailure.Re-evaluatetheratingsforS,O,andD,followedbyRPNcalculation.Discussionwiththecustomerisimportantagainsincethecorrectiveactionswillimpactthem.Knowledgeexpertsmayalsoprovidevaluableinputastowhatkindsofcorrectiveactionwillbebestsuitedforthegivencause/failuremode.Finally,fromallpossiblecorrectiveactions,theteammaychooseonebasedoncost/benefitanalysis,speedofimplementation,andthenewlevelofrisk.決定矯正措施本步驟針對符合先前所訂定門檻條件之項目製定矯正措施以消除或控制失效原因,並降低風險程度.有時您會無法找出失效的根本原因,在這個時候最好的辦法就是對即將發生的失效追加管制方法,設立適當的警告設置/機制.重新評估S,O,和D,並重新計算RPN.再次的強調,與客戶充份的溝通討論是重要的,因為矯正措施與他們有密切的關係.專家可以對各個原因/失效模式提供寶貴的正確矯正措施意見.最後,小組可以由各種可行的矯正措施中依成本/效益分析,導入速度,與導入後的新風險程度選出一個最適當的矯正措施.FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開FMEA分析,续前页DefinethescopefortheFMEA,cont.定义FMEA的范围,续前页Step12Identifycorrectiveaction步骤十二决定矫正措施12 IdentifyCorrectiveAction決定矯正措施12 IdentifyCorrectiveAction決定矯正措施Questions:Whydidthecauseofworntireshaveanactionitem,althoughtheRPNwas160?TraininginadvanceddrivingtechniquesreducestheRPNfrom350to200,shouldtheteamstophere?Whyisitthattheseverityratingdoesnotreducealthoughtraininginadvanceddrivingtechniquesisprovided?Doyouthinktheteam’sworkisdone?問題:為什麼輪胎磨損這個原因的RPN只有160(不到200)也需要有矯正措施?事前施以駕駛技巧訓練可以將RPN由350降低至200.這是否就足夠了呢?為什麼事前施以駕駛技巧訓練無法降低嚴重性的等級?您認為您這個小組的工作是否完成了?FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開FMEA分析,续前页12 IdentifyCorrectiveAction決定矯正措施12 IdentifyCorrectiveAction決定矯正措施Example-allcauseswithRPN>=200areaddressed舉例–所有RPN等於或大於200的項目都被包含在內FMEA分析,续前页DefinethescopefortheFMEA,cont.定义FMEA的范围,续前页Step13Implementandverifyeffectivenessofcorrectiveaction步骤十三导入并确认矫正措施的成效FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開FMEA;StepbyStepFMEA;逐步展開13 ImplementandverifytheeffectivenessofcorrectiveactionCorrectiveactionsidentifiedoughttobeimplementedlikeprojects-withadefinitestartandend.Inmanycasesaprojectteamsmaybeformedtocarryout13 ImplementandverifytheeffectivenessofcorrectiveactionCorrectiveactionsidentifiedoughttobeimplementedlikeprojects-withadefinitestartandend.Inmanycasesaprojectteamsmaybeformedtocarryouttheimplementation.TheseprojectteamsmayhavemembersfromoutsidetheFMEAteam,howeveratleastonemembershouldbedrawnfromtheFMEAteam. Acheckontheeffectivenessofthecorrectiveactionisimportant,intheabsenceofwhichyouwillnothaveaclosedloopfeedbackonwhatreallytranspired.ThischeckshouldbeconductedbytheFMEAteamafterthecorrectiveactionshavebeeninplaceforsometime.Thisissobecausethecorrectiveaction,likeachange,maynotlast.Ittakesdiligentefforttoensurethechangewillhavepermanence.Ifthecorrectiveactionisnoteffectiveenough,youmayneedtoimplementsomemorecontrols/takemoreactions.導入並確認矯正措施的成效矯正措施的導入實施應比照專案作法–明確的定義出起始與結束點.在很多例子中會組成專案小組以執行矯正措施.專案小組成員可能包含FMEA小組以外的人員,但最少應有一個FMEA小組人員參與專案小組.檢查矯正措施的成效是很重要的,如果不這樣的話您就沒有辦法得到完整的回饋從而得知實際狀況為何.成效檢查應由