1-委托代理理论

1、?Agency TheoryRequired reading:Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14: 57- 74. What is an agency problem?Think about the relationship between a stockholder and a manager, what would happen between them?OwnerManagerAgency TheoryAssumptions: 1.

2、 about people: self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion2.about organization: goals conflict among members;3. about information: information asymmetryPrincipal-AgentProblems:1.conflict goals: expensive for the principle to verify what the agent is actually doing;2.different attitudes towards

3、 risk/goals: principle and agent prefer different actions. Questionswhat kind of contract is more efficient to relieve the agent problem?more specifically, is the behavior-oriented contact(e.g. salaries, hierarchical governance) more efficient than an outcome-oriented contact (e.g. commissions, stoc

4、k options, transfer of property right, market governance)?The positivistidentifying situations in which the principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the governance mechanisms that limit the agents self-serving behavior. Positivist The positivistProposition 1: When

5、 the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. Proposition 2: When the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. The Principal-agent

6、The focus of the principal-agent literature is on determining the optimal contract, behavior versus outcome, between the principal and the agent.involves careful specification of assumptions, which are followed by logical deduction and mathematical proof. The Principal-agent Proposition 3: Informati

7、on systems are positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts. Proposition 4: Outcome uncertainty is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts. Proposition 5: The risk aversion of the agent is po

8、sitively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based con-tracts. Proposition 6: The risk aversion of the principal is negatively related to behavior-based con-tracts and positively related to outcome-based contracts. Proposition 7: The goal conflict between principal

9、and agent is negatively related to behavior-based contracts and positively related to out-come-based contracts. Proposition 8: Task programmability is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts. Proposition 9: Outcome measurability is negatively

10、related to behavior-based contracts and positively related to outcome-based contracts. Proposition 10: The length of the agency relationship is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts. Recommend Reading:Jensen, M. &W. Meckling (1976). Theory o

11、f the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305-360.Discussion:The agency-principle relationship in your daily lifeCase discussionEnron scandalThe Enron scandal, revealed in October 2001, eventually led to the bankruptcy of the Enron Corpor

12、ation, an American energy company based in Houston, Texas, and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen, which was one of the five largest audit and accountancy partnerships in the world. In addition to being the largest bankruptcy reorganization in American history at that time, Enron was attributed as t

13、he biggest audit failure.Enron was formed in 1985. Several years later, when Jeffrey Skilling was hired, he developed a staff of executives that, through the use of accounting loopholes, special purpose entities, and poor financial reporting, were able to hide billions in debt from failed deals and

14、projects. Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow and other executives not only misled Enrons board of directors and audit committee on high-risk accounting practices, but also pressured Andersen to ignore the issues.Shareholders lost nearly $11 billion when Enrons stock price, which hit a high of US$

15、90 per share in mid-2000, plummeted to less than $1 by the end of November 2001. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation, and rival Houston competitor Dynegy offered to purchase the company at a fire sale price. Enrons auditor, Arthur Andersen, was found guilty in a

16、United States District Court, but by the time the ruling was overturned at the U.S. Supreme Court, the firm had lost the majority of its customers and had shut down. Where are the agency problem? financial reportingExecutivesShareholdersAndersen. Chief Financial Officer委托代理和公司治理中美股权结构比较第一大股东持股比例约为5%

17、，几乎看不到持股超过10%的大股东沪市A股十大权重股公司的股权结构 董事会经营者大股东小股东小股东董事会经营者大股东情况之一：国有企业，国家是大股东，导致内部人控制。比如：陈久霖搞垮中航油事件股权集中化 由于股权结构集中度决定着公司控制权的分布，进而决定了所有者与经营者之间的委托代理关系的性质，因而股权结构是决定现代公司治理结构的基础。 股权集中化存在不可忽视的风险，具体有三种手法： 手法1以庞大的集团先注册登记一个公司，由集团注入资产推动股份公司上市融资，集团顺利当地成为上市公司第一大股东，然后上市公司通过配股、分红等各种方式将资源回送给集团，而上市公司最后经常只剩下一个债务负担相当沉重的

18、“壳”，这个债务“壳”由中小股东一起来负担。 手法2大股东勒令上市公司为其提供债务担保或质押，结果大股东将担保或质押来的资源挥霍殆尽，作为担保或质押方的上市公司最终成为大股东的债务偿还人。 手法3通过大量的关联方交易或重组，将集团的劣质资产，或者价值很低的资产通过所谓的评估跃身一变成为优绩资产，转让给上市公司，以抵冲集团对上市公司的欠款或直接套回上市公司的资金。比如：三九医药大股东及关联方占用公司25亿。 另一方面，除了考虑大股东“利益输送”风险之外，还需警惕“热心主张”的风险，大股东很可能按照自己认为的符合全体股东利益的决策轻松通过某项议案。大股东情况之二：大股东和小股东之间的利益冲突。股权分散化一个是股东大会空壳化风险。在高度分散化的股权结构之下，在股东大会上要形成多数意见以通过一项决议相对而言变得更为困难，同时“股东无法有效表达利益诉求”，进而可能导致“投资者抽象化，转向从二级市场获利，无人关心公司的实际业绩和长期发展”。另一个是“免费搭车”问题。“零散力薄的小股东一般缺乏积极监督公司管理层的动因，同时也很难形成有效的对抗力量”。委托代理与公司治理（财务管理）公司治理的内容治理结构（Governance Structure）股权结构、董事会、监事会经营班子等的设置治理机制（Governance Mechanism)用人机制、监督机制和激励机制用人机制董事长人