利用关联方交易支撑【外文翻译】

1、外文翻译原文Propping through related party transactionsMaterial.Source:Review.of.Accounting.Studies Author: Ming.Jian ,T.J.WongBased on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 1998 through 2002, this paper documents that listed firms prop up earnings by using abnormal related sales to their controlling owne

2、rs. Such related sales propping is more prevalent among state-owned firms and in regions with weaker economic institutions. We also find that these abnormal related sales are not entirely accrual-based but can be cash-based as well, and they serve as a substitute rather than complement to accruals m

3、anagement for meeting earnings targets. Since these abnormal related sales can be cash-based,there is significant cash transfer via related lending from listed firms back to controlling owners after the propping. However, no cash transfer via related lending is found to be associated with accruals e

4、arnings management.Using a sample of listed firms in China, we study how institutions and firm organizational structures in a transitional economy shape the ways firms use related party transactions to manage earnings. This paper is motivated by recent research on economic institutions and accountin

5、g properties. In contrast to prior studies that attempt to draw broad inferences from data across many countries, this paper utilizes the intricate institutional structures of a particular country and the variation of the institutions across provinces within the country. In addition, by analyzing re

6、lated party transactions as a form of earnings management, this paper complements prior research such as Leuz et al., who focus primarily on the relationship between accruals and earnings management.China offers a natural setting for a study of the questions for three reasons. First, as in many othe

7、r emerging markets, the capital, product, and labor markets in China are underdeveloped. As a result, firms in these markets organize into groups to form internal markets to lower transaction costs (Khanna and Palepu 2000). Further, the restructuring process before the initial public offering of lis

8、ted state-owned enterprises (hereafter SOEs) creates corporate groups with frequent related party transactions between the listed subsidiaries and the parent companies, which serve as the controlling owners.Second, the bright-line rules for share issuance and delisting in China allow us to identify

9、clear evidence of earnings managementincentives. Chinese securities regulators have set two earnings targets that regulate firm listings. In particular, a firm must report at least 10% return on equity (ROE) to maintain its listing status and 10% (6% after 2001) ROE to issue new shares. These target

10、s create incentives for controlling owners to assist listed firms in managing ROEs. We expect that more income-inflating transactions are associated with reported ROEs that are only slightly above the earnings targets.Third, the weak legal and market institutions in China implies a higher frequency

11、of propping (Cheung et al.2006) and increases the power of our tests. The significant variation in the degree of market development and government intervention in business activities across China' shirty provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (excluding Hong Kong and Macau SAR) allows

12、us to examine the cross-sectional effects of legal and market institutions on propping.We hypothesize that controlling owners inflate Chinese listed firms' reveiand earnings through related sales to qualify for rights issues or to avoid delisting.4 Chinese firms have ample opportunities to use r

13、elated sales for earnings managementbecauserelated party transactions are very common. One reason for their prevalence is that SOEs rely heavily on internal markets for materials, products, labor, and capital. Before China' asconomic reforms, these markets were non-existent as the central govern

14、ment directed all aspects of SOEs operations.Another reason is that close to 80% of the listed firms in China were previously production units that had been carved out from their parent SOEs, which serve as the controlling owners after the listing (Aharony et al. 2000). After the carve-out and IPO,

15、the listed subsidiaries continue to engage in frequent related party transactions with their parent SOEs.Following Khanna and Yafeh (2005), we use related sales to proxy for propping because they are one of the most frequent types of related party transactions in our sample. The high frequency of th

16、ese transactions allows sellers to inflate earnings simply by shifting next period' s related sales to the current period.Compared with real activities manipulation such as aggressive price discounts toincrease sales or deferral of R&D projects discussed in Roychowdhury (2006), accelerating

17、related sales are likely to be less costly to the manipulating firm. We hypothesize that the level of related sales is abnormally high when firms try to meet earnings targets.We note that firms could use other types of related party transactions such as asset injections as an alternative way to achi

18、eve propping, but such transactions are much more infrequent and thus more easily detected. According to the CSRCs 1999 regulations for rights offerings, infrequent items such as gains and losses from investments and sales of fixed assets are no longer allowed to be included in the calculation of RO

19、E, which suggests that government regulators regard nonrecurring items as potential earnings management tools. In the diagnostic checks reported in Sect. 4, we examine other operating items, such as related purchases, and non-operating items, such as asset or cash injections. The results do not supp

20、ort the notion that firms use these items for propping around the time of share issuances and delistings.Chinese listed companies have been required to disclose related party transactions since 1997. This disclosure was incomplete and irregular in the first year (Yuan 1998), but more systematic ther

21、eafter. Most companies report in a special footnote to their financial statements the identity of their related parties, the relation with these related parties (for example, percentage of shares held), and the types and amounts of related party transactions. Due to the complexity of some Chinese co

22、rporate groups, footnote disclosures of these connected dealings can be very complicated. For instance, Shanghai Dragon Corporation reported more than 140 transactions with more than 100 related parties in 2002 alone.Based on the financial statement footnotes on related party transactions, we manual

23、ly collect and classify each transaction by the nature of the transaction and the related party involved. Generally, the major related parties are the shareholders (or companies in the shareholder group), the subsidiaries and the associated companies of the listed companies. Some other related parti

24、es include the subsidiary misority shareholdersand the listed companies 'ex-shareholders.We classify related party transactions into 17 different types of transactions. The firm-year frequency and the average value for each transaction are as follows: sales (47.29%, RMB 303 million), purchases o

25、f goods and products (44.50%, RMB 5.5 billion), accounts receivable and payable (37.07%, RMB 1 billion), loans to and from related parties and other receivables and payables (51.32%, RMB 1.8 billion), service revenues (12.53%, RMB 78 million) and expenses (22.08%, RMB 66 million), interest income (1

26、4.57%, RMB 11 million) and expenses (3.6%, RMB 18 million), asset purchases(10.44%, RMB 136 million) and sales (5.69%, RMB 75 million), stock purchases (7.95%, RMB 6.8 billion) and sales (5.56%, RMB 51 million), rent revenues (11.90%, RMB 10 million) and expenses (28.63%, RMB 35 million), joint inve

27、stments (2.73%, RMB 83 million), and loan guarantees to related parties (24.87%, RMB 1.4 billion) and from related parties (23.49%, RMB 3.6 billion). The average total assets of these firms are RMB 1.96 billion.Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics on related sales with various types of rela

28、ted parties in the three general categories of firm ownership. Specifically, 57 and 48% of the central and local government firms, respectively, have related sales, while only 37% of the nonstate firms report such dealings. The majority of these intra-group trades involve the largest shareholder, wi

29、th 48% of central government firms and 40% of local government firms. Related sales with the second-largest shareholder are much less frequent, ranging from 2% for local government firms to 5% for central government firms.This study uses a sample of firms listed in China from 1998 through 2002 to pr

30、ovide evidence of propping through related party transactions. China offers a natural setting for studying the shifting of resources between controlling owners and listed firms due to its underdeveloped capital, product, and labor markets; bright-line rules for share issuance and delisting; and weak

31、 legal and market institutions.Our evidence shows that controlling owners of Chinese listed firms engage in propping through related sales. The increase in related sales is associated with higher operating profits, and related sales are used to damp negative industry earnings shocks when listed firm

32、s have incentives to manage earnings. By using such inter-company trades to meet securities regulators earnings targets, the controlling owners help the listed firms maintain their listing status or qualify for rights issues.Propping through related sales can be effected through cash-based, rather t

33、han entirely accrual-based, transactions. Related sales and discretionary accruals are found to be substitutes for earnings management. When firms generally have sales transactions with their related parties or they have positive abnormal related sales, they have a weaker tendency to use discretiona

34、ry accruals to meet earnings targets. However, we find that firms have a stronger tendency to use discretionary accruals to inflate earnings when they do not have related sales or when they have notengaged in related sales management. Also, cash-basedpropping through related sales is associated with

35、 the transfer of cash back to the controlling owner through related lending. Since discretionary accruals management does not involve cash transfers, such earnings management activity is not linked with subsequentcash transfers.译文利用关联方交易支撑资料来源：会计研究述评作者：Ming.Jian ,T.J.Wong以1998至2002的中国上市公司为研究样板，本文研究了

36、上市公司利用关 联交易操纵利润问题。这种不正常的关联交易在国有企业和一些经济体制薄弱 的地区非常常见。我们也发现这些不正常的关联交易并不完全基于获利多少， 还可以根据现金的流动，并且他们起了一个替补作用，而非为了达到盈利目标。 由于这些异常相关的销售可以是以现金为基础，通过有关的借贷款有大量现金 从上市公司调回后，用以支撑控制业主。然而，通过相关借贷没有发现现金调 动同增值收入管理联系在一起。利用中国的上市公司为样本，我们研究机构和企业组织结构如何在在转型 经济中利用公司关联交易来操纵盈余管理。本文是出于对经济机构和会计性能 的研究而进展的。与试图吸引来自全世界各地的许多国家广泛的推论和以前的

37、 研究数据不同，本文利用了某一特定国家的体制结构和在该国境内跨省变化的 复杂机构。止匕外，通过分析主要作为盈余管理形式的关联交易，如Leuz等人先前的研究，发现他们侧重于研究应计项目与盈余管理之间的关系。研究该问题，中国提供了一个很好的天然环境。首先，正如许多其他新兴 市场一样，在中国，资本，产品，以及劳动力市场并不发达。因此，在这些市 场内的企业们会自发地组织起来，形成内部市场，降低交易成本。止匕外，在首 次公开招股的上市国有企业（以下简称国有企业），以所有者身份，在公开发行 之前，与其子公司和母公司频繁地创建企业集团间的关联方交易。其次，对股票发行与中国退市的具体规则允许我们寻找盈余管理的

38、激励机制 的证据。中国证券监管机构已经设立了要规范上市的两个公司的盈利目标。特 别是，公司必须报告至少10%的权益回报（净资产收益率）用来维持其上市地 位以及10% （2001年后6%）的净资产收益率才能发行新股。这些目标创造的 盈余，使得所有者支持上市公司净资产收益率的管理激励机制。我们期望更多 的收入和报告的净资产收益率与高于盈利目标只有轻微有关。我们推测，所有者通过夸大中国上市公司的销售收入和盈利水平来通过有关 资格权利问题，避免被停止上市。中国企业有充分的机会利用关联交易，因为 关联方交易是一种很常见的现象。其原因之一是国有企业普遍依赖于材料，产 品，劳动力和资本的市场现象严重。在中国

39、的改革开放以前，作为中央政府， 它指导国有企业的所有方面的运作， 这些市场现象并不存在。另一个原因就是， 近80%的中国上市公司是被从他们的父母， 即以前的国有企业中分离，变成了 上市公司的所有者并控制其附属公司。剥离出来并首次公开上市后，上市附属 公司继续经常从事与父母国有企业有关的关联方交易。以Khanna和Yafeh为例，我们使用相关的关联交易代理为支撑， 因为他们 是我们的样本中关联方交易最频繁的类型之一。这些高频率的交易，可以简单 方便的通过把今后一个时期的相关销售收益移动到当期收益。与操纵手法比较 真实的活动相比，如利用积极的价格折扣，来增加销售或延迟Roychowdhury讨论研

40、发项目，加快关联交易的进行可以使操纵公司的成本更低。我们猜测， 当企业想尽量达到盈利目标时，关联交易的水平会异常的高。我们注意到，企业可以使用其他类型的关联交易，如以另一种替代方式来 实现资产注入，以达到支撑关联方的目的，但这样的交易非常频繁，因此更容 易被发现。根据CSRCs1999年的配股规定，一些罕见项目，如投资收益和出售 固定资产不再被允许计入净资产收益率，这表明政府监管机构将视潜在收益的 非经常性项目作为管理工具。在诊断检查报告的第二节，我们研究其他的操作 系统，如相关的采购项目以及非经营性项目，如资产或现金的注入。研究表明 结果不支持企业在周围的股份发行和被除名的时间里，利用这些项目来支撑这 一概念。中国上市公司自1997年开始被要求披露关联方交易。这种披露在第一年， 即1998年是不完整也不规则的，但此后便变得更加系统。多数公司在报告中标 有一个特殊的脚注，表明其财务报表中的有关各方的身份，以及与这些关联方 的关系（例如，持有股份的百分比）、种类和关联方交易的金额。由于一些中国 企业集团的复杂性，这些关联交易附注披露可以非常复杂。例如，上海龙公司