连锁店的定价策略[文献翻译]

1、原文：Chain-Store Pricing for Strategic AccommodationThe chain store has been one of the principal factors in the movement towards the simplification of distributive functions. As such, it has caused pronounced concern among manufactures, jobbers, and retailers. It has been the subject of litigation, o

2、f recrimination, and of endless discussion. The manufacturer has hesitated to make full use of the chain store system as an outlet, because of his desire not to offend the members of his regular distributive systems. The jobber has made open war upon the chain because it has frankly attempted to sup

3、plant him, and to independent retailer has often failed to recognize the decisive line of division between price merchandising and service merchandising.Every concern which ultimately markets its products to the consumer is vitally affected by the status of chain retailing; more particularly with th

4、e position which it will occupy in the future. The following pages contain a brief resume of the present chain store situation in the fields of retailing where it has become well established.Trends of developmentThe most rapid growth of the chain store has taken place in the grocery, drug, dry goods

5、, tobacco, and confectionery lines. It is essential to understand the reasons for this:1. The public demand in these lines is well defined; is not subject to great fluctuation in times of business depression; and in each case there is a “repeat market.”2. The articles handled fall mainly in the clas

6、s of necessities, or semi-necessities. That is, they are regarded as essential by a proportion of the market large enough to insure a steady demand.3. Because of the standard character of the stocks, and the broad demand, a high rate of turnover may be maintained, which allows the chain to make a sm

7、all but steady margin of profit at frequent intervals.4. Buying or purchasing is standardized and centralized at headquarters.5. Since articles are of small unit value, and not bulky or heavy, the chain store is able to operate on a cash and carry basis-a factor of great importance in chain store gr

8、owth.6. Merchandising is largely a matter of display and price advertising.7. Standardization of methods has made it possible to centralize management at headquarters and control member stores under managers who, while they may have a pecuniary interest in sales made by their stores, have nothing to

9、 say about the conducting of them.Our analytic focus in this paper is the geographic scope of pricing. Specifically, is it better for a chain-store retailer to set prices according to local market conditions(reflecting differences in cost, demand and competition) or set common prices that apply acro

10、ss all its stores, i.e. adopt a uniform pricing policy? Are likely firm decisions on this in line with consumer preferences? In contrast to the entry deterrence issue considered by Selten (1978), Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson(1982), we look to see whether pricing policy, other than

11、 deterring entry, might instead be employed strategically to accommodate entry when it is inevitable. The geographic scope for pricing is a very real issue for multiple retailers. It is evident that in practice some chain-store groups adopt uniform pricing while others do not. In some sectors, all m

12、ultiple retailers price identically across their stores, e.g. UK electrical goods retailers (MMC, 1997a,b). While in other sectors, local pricing is practised to the extent that product prices might vary considerably from one store to another, e.g. the FTC found that for office supply superstores av

13、erage prices varied by as much 16% depending on the extent of local competition in the US. Moreover, this pricing policy distinction applies not just to different sectors but can apply within the same sector, e.g. amongst UK supermarkets where, of the leading fifteen groups, eight priced uniformly w

14、hile seven priced according to local conditions (Competition Commission, 2000). Yet, in these days of computer-based pricing systems, it can hardly be said that ticketing costs are high, or that local demand and cost conditions cannot be effectively gauged. Hence, choosing a uniform price must be se

15、en as a conscious act. Of course, uniform pricing might not be practicable when retailing costs are substantially different from one area to another. Nevertheless, for many multiple retailers both local and uniform pricing might be feasible but a choice has to be made on which to adopt. This leads t

16、o two questions, first why it might ever be preferable for the incumbent to impose a constraint on its own behaviour, and second the circumstances under which the constraint is desirable. Our key insight on the first question is as follows: A firm will find itself more under competition in some mark

17、ets than others. By practicing uniform pricing, it softens competition between itself and rival players. This entails setting a higher price in those markets subject to (more) competition, at the expense of lower prices in markets where it is not subject (or is less subject) to competition, compared

18、 with a practice of market-specific pricing. The higher price in turn makes the action one which rivals find attractive, so it does not require agreement. Thus if the markets under competition are important enough to the firm, its net gain is positive. Hence our papers prime focus is on the paramete

19、rs associated with the nature and intensity of competition that might influence this choice. There is some commonality in this issue with related questions on third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly (e.g. Holmes, 1989). More specifically, the issues raised here tie in with why oligopolistic f

20、irms would wish to limit or even entirely avoid price discrimination, e.g. Winter (1997) and Corts (1998), or adopt practices which provide the same outcome, notably contemporaneous MFC clauses, e.g. DeGraba (1987) and Besanko and Lyon (1993). There are obvious links between our paper and Corts (199

21、8) which also considers the question of uniform versus discriminatory pricing under duopoly (within a rather different framework). However, in Corts model, it turns out that it is usually not in a firms unilateral interest to practise uniform pricing. Therefore, where uniform pricing is profitable,

22、strategic commitments not to price discriminate are normally involved and hence discussion focuses on the form these might take. By contrast, within our framework, and for a specified range of parameters, we find that it is in the firms own interest not to discriminate and that uniform pricing arise

23、s as an equilibrium strategy. This is important, and provides a new insight, because it means that uniform pricing need not be accompanied by evidence of strategic commitment to that policy in order for it to be worthwhile and practised. 1. IntroductionOur result that firms can commonly be better of

24、f under a uniform pricing regime casts an interesting light on some other previous models. The result is not new - it was first encountered in Holmes (1989) “weak market-strong market” model of price discrimination in oligopoly. However, in their investigation of a model similar to Holmes, Armstrong

25、 and Vickers (2001) find that if a market is sufficiently competitive, profits always increase with discrimination. This leads them to conclude that “Holmes result that profits may fall with discrimination requires markets to be reasonably uncompetitive.” (p. 597). Our model shows this is not comple

26、tely true. In our framework, which in effect has a weak and a strong market, profits may fall with discrimination whatever the degree of competition. That is, however uncompetitive the market, uniform pricing can be profitable. What is required for this is each individual monopoly market, in our con

27、text, to be sufficiently large.To consider how different competitive conditions affect the scope-of-pricing decision, the model developed here has an incumbent monopoly chain-store operating across a finite number of local markets, analogous to Seltens well-known chain-store paradox analysis. Howeve

28、r, in contrast to Seltens framework, these local markets are assumed to differ in respect of the scale of consumer demand and this in turn affects entry conditions. There are two market types. In each of the larger, “affluent” markets, entry barriers are insufficient to prevent entry by a new, indep

29、endent rival. Yet, in smaller, less affluent markets the chain-store is taken to have a protected monopoly position(arising from natural or institutional barriers). In this setting, we show that a chain-store would not necessarily prefer to use local pricing as a profit-enhancing price discriminatio

30、n tool. Competitive conditions exist in the form of a region trading off the degree of substitutability between entrant and incumbents products and the degree to which duopoly markets are larger than monopoly markets. Under these conditions, the chain-store would prefer to commit to a policy of unif

31、orm pricing since this allows for softer competition in contested local markets and hence raises its aggregate profits. While the prospect of strategic accommodation through dampening price competition influences the preference between local or national pricing, a chain-stores choice is not inevitab

32、ly at variance with that preferred by society. In particular, a stores willingness to commit to national pricing can in certain circumstances not only enhance its profits but also raise social welfare if not consumer surplus. Yet market conditions commonly exist under which welfare would be adversel

33、y affected by the chain-store following its preferred choice. Although our model is undoubtedly specific, the results are considerably more general. Our general results are (1) that under a range of conditions including very competitive markets, uniform pricing is privately optimal both for incumben

34、t and entrant without co-ordination and (2) that enforcing uniform pricing where firms would prefer local pricing by no means necessarily advances social welfare. The significance of the first is that existing papers have concentrated heavily on co-ordinated action on uniform pricing. By contrast, p

35、olicy has often focused on whether firms practice uniform pricing, viewing this with approval, something in conflict with our second point. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the analytical framework whereby an incumbent chain-store retailer faces certain entry i

36、n a (fixed) number of its local monopoly markets. As with the original Selten story, entry into such “contested” markets is, in each case, by an independent, non-affiliated local retailer. Section 3 then examines and compares the outcomes where the chain-store uses local pricing against where it ado

37、pts a uniform (national) pricing approach. Section 4 addresses consumer welfare considerations. Section 5 concludes the paper.2. The FrameworkFollowing Selten and others, we consider the situation of a chain-store retailer holding a monopoly position in a finite number of independent, local markets.

38、 In each market there is one potential entrant; should that firm enter, post-entry competition would be characterised by the Bertrand-Nash outcome in a duopoly pricing game. Complete information applies and it is assumed that the incumbent has no cost or demand advantage over the entrant, or vice ve

39、rsa. In this situation entry is inevitable in each local market when entry costs are low (at least when there is some minimal differentiation between the firms allowing for positive returns for the entrant) and when there are no institutional impediments such as planning restrictions that prevent ne

40、w stores being opened. However, if entry costs are substantial or there are no available sites then the local market is blockaded and entry does not occur. Our key departure from the previous literature is that we allow entry not be viable in all local markets. That is for the N markets originally h

41、eld by the chain-store we assume that M (<N) are blockaded or otherwise provide insufficient demand for two firms, but that the remainder C (= N M) can become “contested” by virtue of becoming local duopolies. The relevance of this assumption will become apparent from the analysis. We have a two-

42、stage game, depicted in Figure 1. In the first stage, each entrant simultaneously decides whether or not to enter; we illustrate with only two markets and potential entrants. Then in the second stage, the incumbent decides pricing policy whether to practice local (L) or uniform (U) pricing. There is

43、 no commitment stage. The equilibrium concept is subgame perfection. Hence, in determining its move, the entrant (e.g. E1) knows the payoffs facing the incumbent (I), as its aggregated profits (PI); knows that the incumbent will choose the path that is the more profitable. However, because an entran

44、t does not know how many other entrants will enter for certain (given simultaneous entry moves), it will not necessarily know whether the incumbent will practise local or uniform pricing.Source: Paul W. Dobson and Michael Waterson, April 2003“Chain-Store Pricing for Strategic Accommodation” The univ

45、ersity of warwick Department of Economica in its series The Wateick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 677, PP.1-4.译文：连锁店的定价策略市场环境的变动对连锁店的分布而言是主要因素之一。这样，很明显的它也引起制造商、零售商 、连锁店的关注。因而已成为争论的主体，或受到指责,成为没完没了的讨论主体。制造商会对充分利用连锁店系统作为出口的政策有些犹豫，因为他的这一欲望会违反成员间的定期的规律性分配。由于连锁店想要取代零售店，因而他们之间的战争已经开始

46、，并且对独立的零售商来讲很难从价格商品销售和服务的销售活动中认识到自己的不足之处。每个关心最终市场的产品给消费者都会受到连锁店状态重大的影响；特别是未来将会占有的分布情况。本文以下的内容包括一个简短的摘要以说明目前连锁店在连锁业领域的发展情况以及它将会有什么样好的建设。发展趋势连锁店的快速增长发生在杂货店、药物、干货、烟草和糖果行。经过了解至关重要的原因如下：1.在这些行业中有很好的公共需求；不受经济不景气的时候业务的抑制；每次有大波动的情况下，会有一个“重复”的市场。2.文章讨论的主题主要是立足于必需品和半必需品这类产品。这就是说，它们被认为是基本的市场中所占比例足够大以确保稳定的需求。3.

47、由于存货的标准特征，为储备和广泛的需求保持了很高的流动比率，从而允许连锁店是一个小规模但具有稳定的盈利的单位。4. 购买或购买标准化,集中在总部。5.尽管本文是从小单位价值而不是大的方面来描述，但连锁店能够起到操纵市场现金，对连锁店的成长起到了重要的基础作用。6. 购货很大程度上是一种展示和价格广告。7.标准化的方法有可能集中在总部的管理和控制下的商店经理人手中，然而毫无疑问的他们或许会在商店销售中会受到罚款。1.介绍本章分析的重点是地域定价范围。具体地说,是零售商连锁店如何更好地根据当地市场条件制定价格(反映不同的成本、需求和竞争)或在所有申请的店面里建立同样的价格,即采用一个统一的定价政策

48、。公司做这个决定是否会符合消费者的喜好?和泽尔滕 (1978)、尔格罗姆和罗伯茨 （1982 年） 和科瑞普和威尔逊(1982) 提出的各种威慑问题相比，我们想看看在否定价格政策上的其他威慑条目, 可能会在相反的时候使用,以适应战略上不可避免的要求。对多数零售商而言地域范围的价格是很实际的问题。实际上这是很明显的,是某连锁企业组队采用统一的定价,但另外一些却不会这么做。在某些领域,所有的多个零售商的价格一致,例如在英国零售商的商店，然而在其他的行业,当地的基本定价从一家商店到另一家在产品价格上可能相差很大,公平贸易委员会发现,对于办公用品的超市平均价格的修改,有多达16%取决于在美国本地竞争的

49、程度各不相同。此外,这种价格政策不仅适用于区别不同部门申请而且也适用于在相同的部门, 例如在英国超级市场的位置，十五个主导牌子的商品的八个价格统一而其他的七个的定价则根据当地条件（竞争委员会 2000年)。然而, 基于计算机的定价系统的今天，可以几乎说成是票务成本很高，或本地需求和成本条件不能有效地衡量。因此，选择一个统一的价格必须看作是一种有意识的行为。当然,当零售成本从一个地方到另一个地方还是完全不同的时候，统一的定价这一行为是不可行的。不过,对于很多零售商来说自行定价和统一定价或许可以行得通,不过要在其采用上做出的一种选择。这会导致出现两个问题, 首先为什么它可能永远受现任征收而抑制自己

50、的行为,其次在某些情况下约束是可取的。我们对第一个问题的关键性认知如下：一个公司将会发现自己在市场竞争中会比其他的公司有优势。通过实践统一定价, 会使其与竞争对手之间的竞争关系变得缓和。这就意味着在那些竞争激烈的市场中更要树立比较高的价格,与那些特定市场的定价的做法相比，使较低的价格不受市场竞争的影响。反过来看更高的价格会使其竞争对手更具有吸引力,所以它不需要协议。因此判断是否足够重要的是该公司在市场竞争条件下,其公司净收益是正的。所以本文的主要重点是竞争的性质与竞争的激烈性，以及可能会影响这种选择的有关参数。在寡头垄断就这一问题上三度价格歧视会有一些共性(例如霍姆斯，1989年)。更具体地说

51、，为什么寡头公司在这里提出配合问题，想限制甚至完全避免价格上的歧视，例如温特 (1997)和 柯尔 （1998 年）， 为采取的做法提供了相同的结果，尤其是同期的 MFC 条款，如迪格林顾尔拜（1987 年） 和 班思科和里昂 (1993 年)。很明显的，本文和 霍尔茨（1998 年） 也认为统一的问题与价格歧视在寡头垄断之间的存在联系。然而，在霍尔茨的模型中，原来它通常不是一个公司的单方面利益实行统一定价。因此，实行统一的定价是盈利的,承诺不价格歧的战略通常视为涉及这些可采取的形式。相比之下,在我们的框架中,指定了参数的整定范围,我们就会发现它是在公司的自身的利益下不歧视和统一定价而产生一个平衡的策略。提供了新的研究思路是重要的,因为这个政策意味着统一定价不用伴随战略承诺的证据,以便它值得去实行。我们的结果显示与先前的模型相比，一般企业在统一定价政策下可以做的更好。这个结果并不是最新的，第一次是在福尔摩斯的(1989)“软弱市场、较强市场价格歧视”模式的寡头垄断的市场中被提及。然而,在他们的调查一个类似于福尔摩斯的模型中,阿姆斯特朗和维(2001)发现,如果市场是充分竞争的、价格歧视的利润始终是增加的。这导致