外语翻译EVA–经济增加值：从间接证据中筛选出直接解释

1、本科毕业论文外文翻译外文译文题目仲文）：EA -经济增加值从间接证据中筛选出直接解释学院：管理学院专业：会计学学号：学生姓名：指导教师：日期：2012年9月1号EVA -Economic Value Added :Sifting the Direct from the CircumstantialJoseph SammutSource: ttp:/EVA -经济增加值 从间接证据中筛选出直接解释约瑟夫萨穆特来源：1. 介绍如果存在一个脐带链接三大支柱业务，管理，会计，经济，毫无疑问，一个可信的竞争 者应该是EVA(经济增加值)。其原因在于它富于变化的根源。对于一个明确规定的财务 目标，研究人们

2、的行为和如何直接操纵这种行为。在这个方向，EVA理论走了很长的路。它突出本身是一个非常规和非法定科学，在 这两个人类行为和利润测量这样声称是最优的两个链接之间在寻找未来完美的商业项 目。这种断言有很多的支持者和反对者，伴随着潜在的疑点，它可以是介于目光短浅或一个空想和是最可能的情况两者之间。沿着这些方向是一些未被发现的东西。这篇简短论文可以详细分析经济增加值(EVA )的涵义即既是金融性能测量工具也是 一个密探,矛头直指接下来的管理革命后的全球化时代，即绩效工资的引入。本文将解决 关键的问题也是EVA联结科学管理、会计和经济学通过将直接转化为的间接证据努力深 入这个问题。最后本文将成为一个通过

3、提交作者的看法提出的关键点。32. EVA的涵义最简单的形式,EVA被定义为业务操作中的货币残留的扣除资本成本。它的正式术 语相当于税后净营业利润（NOPAT）更少的股本成本。即通过考虑到的资本成本，将账目 收益灵巧的转换为经济收益。表面上看起来这个概念是革命性的和新潮的。然而，其创意不过仅限于包装，这个想法至少可以追溯到一百年，到一个特定的名字一一阿尔弗雷德马歇尔。新的推动者, Stern Steward,只是继承了这个概念、依赖更愿意接受的和复杂的市场，并且很明智地 链接到报酬革命，从而利用并发几率形成未来新公司的模型。EVA勺主要推力与其说是表现措施和绩效工资之间的联系，不如说是老板员工

4、个人 利益的统一。这样做,EVA试图摆脱传统的股东/员工关系的对抗的立场，利用一个非常 简单但高度情绪化的口号 绩I。冒险进入一个创新的商业文化，通过建立和实现这一传统路线已经是显而易见的，只是没有在EVA的名片。历史和 会计准则被认为是EVA的推广者，不只是一个有效的工具来衡量和促进商业效益而且是 更出奇的方式来粉饰财务结果。EVA因此不仅与传统会计冲突而且挑战它的道德高地。最近的背景下，会计低迷和 金融崩溃，它可以而且应该侵入现代商业研究，从而在股东/管理关系中建立本身作为一 种新的支柱。这个新职业科学上进，此外,声称是最接近的链接可能的市场价值。在这个行业 ，拥 有一个杰出的捍卫者本身和

5、突出的后卫在形式的巴鲁克列弗，哈佛商学院教授已经明确了脆弱性会计数据和资本市场之间的值。列弗使EVA理论有了质的飞跃，因批评公认会计准则的质量，暗示包含股本成本应作为基本业绩测量有更好的适应市场价值。Kramer和Pushner已经测试了这个假说,EVA是高度相关的市场价值补充。他们发 现,在他们所有的测试案例的 MVA勺水平与NOPA和EVA积极相关。OByrne和Steward 研究很大范围年限内的市场价值变化。他们的研究结果指向在解释市场反应方面 EVA勺 明确的优势，而继续得出结论因为 EVA与市场价值系统相关，这最终被证明是一个比其 他绩效方式更好的预测市场价值的措施。这种集成的业务

6、模型提出两个高度情感诉求的经济观念。没有利润，除非你赚到资本成本I和凡是可以被度量的事物就可以被管理 。它把本身与传统的指控联系在一起 并建立金融措施，排除股东的投资，并因此完全忽视资本成本。考虑到这些会计异常与 传统的奖金的直接关系，一个可能的功能失调的行为在经理和高管蓄势待发。它可能是 在传统的会计死灰复燃时爆发。EVA勺涵义与一个特定的词-语言I直接相关。这个媒介不仅因其知名优越的品质著 称,而且可能更为著名的是成为更为普遍首选的公分母的两边的方程塑造股东价值的标 准。3. 从间接证据中筛选出直接解释对于这件事感兴趣的程度是影响它传播的关键因素 ，也是测量方面和大致表现对确 实的经济附加

7、值（EVA影响的之间的区别。看起来,至少研究混淆这两个属性就好像他 们是暹罗不可分割的形式。这种学术的混乱已经推动了受到外来状态影响的力量，但 就物质和价值而言，这个问题仍然在实验室状态。Riceman,Cahan和梅西监控的一个公司,雇佣了一个混合的管理团队。有些是EVA相关奖金方案及一些传统的奖金计划。虽然他们承认以管理层为基础的 EVA要比以同事 为基础的EAV表现的更好，但是他们的优势源自于EVA并不是一个优越的性能测量工具, 而在于其是一种一致性的奖励过程。有趣的是，他们发现分歧在EVA的理解和效应与在 同一公司不同区域有所不同。在市场价值方面，Visaltanachoti,罗和易发

8、现，传统的会计绩效之间的关系,明确的息税前利润，投资行业的回报高于 EVA也就是说，对于部门市场回报方面，业绩比 EVA对于部门市场回报方面更重要。Visaltanachoti et al甚至试图定义和明确这个优势。他们指出EVA的劣势在于对未来现金流动和其添加的并发症的调整的代理。弗格森,Rentzler和Yu调查是否采用EVA会导致更好的股票表现和默认情况下的 更大的盈利能力。他们还没有找到足够的证据来证明这些。然而，发现有一些证据表 明,EVA采用者比非EVA同行提高了盈利能力。在这个阶段它会在学术上应该很有趣， 弗格森进行测试，以验证是否这个模式是稳固的的或随意的。如果没有这样的证据,

9、EVA仍然是很有作用的。EVA被学术界进一步批判的原因是是 Biddel,Boswen和华莱士发现的只有边际附加 信息内容超出传统的收益llo约翰逊和Soenen降级是为其解决EVA忽视一个公司的增 长潜力的问题。这两套怀疑论者是建议以一个静态的反对一个动态测量方向查看，以最作为短期业绩衡量，因此考虑到其使用范围和有效性 EVA明显有缺陷。Eva 一直被学术批评是关于其潜在的弱点在股东回报率之间的关系和该公司的EVA的不均衡。特伦斯,Boscaljon官员,Batala和拉奥发现最小的证据是公司采用 EVA与传 统的非EVA采用者的市场回报之间的差异。因此，任何形式的EVA怀疑论者绝对必须基于

10、其性能度量函数及其适应性的直接联 系作为适当的性能识别方案。用一个灵敏度分析来证明，即两个不仅直接相关，而且本质上通过一个名为性能的共同纽带相互依赖。如果它的致命弱点在于所谓脆弱性之间的连接测量和性能的话，那么EVA的Heraclean力量在于其声称同化的两极。据说 EVA已经发现了诠释方式，以这个公式来 体现集成性能测量与实际性能。对共同利益的担忧是最影响该公司的利益相关者的。他 们可能会抨击EVA的学术先端，坚持认为最有价值的管理已经不会支持会计收益，因为 他们将改变对不可预测性的非经营性目的。 这种全权委托会计不仅转移目标职位，当 业绩奖励发挥作用时，更危险地提供完美的方法。因此未来的模

11、型是将EVA和绩效工资措施进行融合。EVA会成为相互沟通的机会的 性能目标和策略，产生一个稳健的的智能集成测量和奖励系统。它是沿着这条线索，发现EVA最狂热的推动者。毫无疑问，未来的商业模式是部分受到可变工资推动支持的形式。这一创新的方式 会调整工资和薪金与公司的市场相联系的表现。Zall列出三个假设渗透这个公式。首先,金钱激励人们努力工作。其次,增加动力提高性能。第三,公平测量性能的是可能的。 EVA声称会提供最完美的鸡尾酒即内部和周围的这些相关参数。根本问题在于分析方法的效率和公平补偿人对这些生产力按照他们的相对输入。 Bellavary 和艾伦认为公司意识到，为了成功他们必须鼓励他们的员

12、工建立合伙关系。 他们认为支付I是一个组织和员工之间的强而有力的沟通者。只有自然看待 支付M乍 为在一个组织和一个需要认真的定义作为最有效的语言。支付绝对是一个强大的动力，但它可能不是最强大的。弗雷德赫兹伯格坚称这是工作本身是首要因素在于员工。 即使在有意识的条款方面，该链接看起来也不紧凑。在2006年，一个相关代表调查凯利 服务职业介绍所表明，只有四分之一的员工没有在任何性能相关的支付说他们应当表现 得更好。薪酬是首要动力，但很显然,只对少数人群。凯利还发现，平均比例的员工与性能相关的比例在欧盟为 21%是最高的,可以理解 的是,金融服务是28%最低的在教育5%这是由于相对轻松地照亮与金融服

13、务行业可 以测量其结果对相对歧义和难以测量教育机构的性能。性能相关的支付（prp）成为受欢迎的年代末年代和年代早期,尤其是在美国。到1991 年,51%的美国公司操作的某种形式的 prp。在英国,prp还在1998年的40%这不仅证 实了其更高的声望和使用在美国但默认情况下也 ，潜在的风险和间接影响的预期那里。这只是一个时间问题，公司高管,股票期权和股票上运行性能计划，开始寻找自己的 方式进入系统。其余的是现代金融的历史。然而 ，只能最终得到因为报告标准促进形式 为代价的，因为这些物质或受托监护人聪明过了头。因此以这个历史的角度来看,EVA的动量。竞选中个人主义和其自然孪生与违反新 闻道德行为

14、对强势复兴的逐渐减弱的管理工具提供了完美的背景。作为长和只要让会计专业不要与其行为沉重地走在一起，通过实施严厉措施,EVA的支持者将继续利用了致命 的性能之间的联系和法定利润回报报告以现在的形式和条件。64. 作者在关键点上的最终意见它确实是讽刺，虽然不是不自然的或不切实际的，EVA的宿敌模式对会计标准应该是 直接向性能的-先锋报告轴。毫无疑问，大多数会计行为不当源自某处的脆弱和剥削其 报告机制。它有滥用的倾向，反过来,创建了一个非常活跃的和阴暗的市场。性能相关的工资和奖励从未打算禁用报告要求和标准。事实上，他们是截然不同的 两个理论和实践。前者是一个激励因素，后者，一个计算器。事实上，计算器

15、,在某些情况下 被操纵并不意味着所有这些计算器是被动的。它也不意味着任何性能相关方案提供了这 样的可能性会被计算。EVA的强调这种“性能一一报告“异常回避评估它在它的总体 ，从而限制自己质疑 二元性的第二部分。这个弱点似乎源于一个事实，理论家们已经接受了“性能”和“性 能相关的支付”在即将到来的商业革命作为其中的一种催化剂。EVA的支持者,获得了一个方面，因此集中他们的努力在其他方向。的确，态度支付标准正在改变。对齐的企业、劳动力和市场目标是更全面的系统的 输入和奖励制定进度的走向。然而，基本标准客观公正的测量性能尚未解决。无论是否 有个人主义的影响。因此据说前一种已经被保护是一个严重的夸张。

16、EVA提出改变报告技巧。不管它是一个根本性的改变但并不取决于业主资本也被 考虑进去,但它的能力无法检测和也阻止不了不道德的行为。原因很明显,EVA的捍卫者还没有发出任何形式的担保或赔偿。这并不意味着EVA是会计的领域一个不必要的入侵者，。没有相互排他性的融资。 补充可能是最好的金融工具。评估情况提供了足够的洞察力的多边达到一个更高的程度 的结论。鉴于这个现实,EVA应当有一个非常强大的流行和激烈的支持。EVA不应被视为一个竞争者或替代财务报告的事物。它的优势在于其性能部分的 二元性。因此，它是一个结合业主和雇员的利益支柱。它的狡猾的特质提供最终的安慰。71. In troducti onIf

17、ever there should have bee n an umbilical cord betwee n the three pillars of bus in ess, that is, man ageme nt, acco untancy and econo mics, without doubt a credible conten der should have been EVA (Economic Value Added). Its apogee lies in its Machiavellian roots. The investigation of how people be

18、have and the outright manipulation of this behaviour for a clearly set finan cial objective.EVA travels a long way in this direct ion .It protrudes itself to be a non-conven ti onal and non-statutory scienee in both human behaviour and profit measurement and in so doing claims to be the optimal link

19、age between the two in the quest for the futuristic perfect bus in ess project. This asserti on comes along with a full assembly of both defe nders and sceptics and with the un derly ing suspici on that it can be either a myopia or an utopia or as is the most possible case sce nario somewhere in bet

20、wee n. Alo ng which coord in ate is somethi ng yet to be discovered.This brief Paper shall an alyse in some detail the attributes of Econo mic Value Added (EVA) both as a finan cial performa nee measureme nt tool as well as an age nt provocateur to spearhead the n ext man ageme nt revoluti on in the

21、 post globalisati on era, that is, performa nee related pay. The Paper shall addresskey issues with which EVA in terlocks the scie ncesof management, accountancy and economics and shall strive to penetrate into the issue by separati ng the circumsta ntial from the direct evide nee. Eve ntually this

22、Paper shall come to a close through the submissi on of the author s views on the critical poi nts raised.82. Attributes of EVAIn its simplest form, EVA is defi ned as the mon etary residue from bus in ess operati ons after allowi ng for the cost of capital. Its formal tech ni cal equivale nt is Net

23、Operat ing Profit After Tax (NOPAT) less Equity Cost. A neat conv ersi on of acco unting profit into econo mic profit through the factori ng-i n of the cost of capital.At face value the con cept looks both revoluti onary and n ew. Its orig in ality however is limited to the wrapp ing as the idea dat

24、es back at least a hun dred years and to a specific n ame -Alfred Marshall. The new promoters, Stern Steward, have simply re-i nven ted the con cept, banking on a more receptive and sophisticated market and smartly linking it to a remuneration revolution, thus leveraging the odds concurrently as the

25、 new futuristic firm model takes shape.EVA s main thrust is not so much its linkage between performanee measurement and performanee related pay but can best be captured in the alignment of both owners and employees i nterests along a com mon freque ncy. In sioing, EVA attempts to depart from the con

26、fron tati onal sta ndpo ints that have traditi on ally characterised shareholders/employees relati on ships and ven ture into an inno vative bus in ess culture by capitaliz ing on a very simple but highly emotional catchword -?performanee.Achiev ing this through already established and conven ti ona

27、l routes is pla in and simply not on EVA s cards. Historical and statutory accounting is considered by EV's promoters as not only an in effective tool to gauge and promote bus in ess performa nee but more sen sati on ally as means to airbrush and whitewash finan cial results.EVA thus not only co

28、n flicts with traditi onal acco unting but challe nges its moral high ground. Aga inst the backdrop of rece nt acco un ti ng malaise and finan cial meltdow n, it can and should make in roads in to moder n bus in ess studies and thus establish itself as a new pillar in shareholder/ma nageme nt relati

29、 on ship.This new pro-scientific aspirant, furthermore, claims to be the closest link possible to market values. In this sector it exults itself in hav ing an eminent and prominent defe nder in the form of Baruch Lev. The Harvard Busin ess School professor had already made his positi on clear as reg

30、ards the fragility betwee n acco unting data and capital market made EVA ' seap forward in quality by criticising GAAP's treatment of equity and thus hinting towards the in clusi on of equity cost as fun dame ntal for performa nee measureme nt and better alig nment to market values.Kramer an

31、d Pushner have tested the hypothesis that EVA is highly correlated with Market Value Added. They found that in all their tested cases the level of MV A positively relates to both NOPAT and EVA. O ' Byrneand Steward studied market value variations inmultiple year formats. Their findings point tow

32、ards a clear superiority of EVA explaining market reacti ons and go on to con clude that because EVk is systematically lin ked to market value, it proves to be a better predictor of market value tha n other performa nee measures.what gets mThis in tegrated bus in ess model kno cks on the doors of tw

33、o highly emoti onal econo mic no ti ons. There is no profit uni ess you earn the cost of capitalII and man aged II .It allies itself with the accusati on that traditi onal and established finan cial measures excludeshareholders inv estma ntsthus completely ignore the cost of capital. Con sideri ng t

34、hese acco un ti ng ano malies direct relati on ship with traditi onal incen tive compe nsati on, a possible dysfu nctional behaviour among man agers and executives does not rema in long on paper. It is probably in this regi on that traditi onal acco un ti ng has recovered its worst corpses II .EVA a

35、ttributes are directly correlated to one specific word: ?language The medium that is not only recog ni sable by its superior measuri ng qualities but probably more stron gly by being the preferred com mon denomin ator of those on both sides of the equati on shap ing shareholder value.103. Circumsta

36、ntial and Direct Evide neeProblematic in the appreciati on of this questi on, and probably also a key to its diffusi on, is the separatio n betwee n the measureme nt aspect and the alleged performa nee impact effect of EVA. It seems, at least optically, that studies confound the two attributes as if

37、 they are of Siamese in separable form. This academic con fusi on has propelled the subject to exotic status but insofar as substanee and value are concerned, the issue is still in laboratory con diti on.Ricema n, Caha n and Massey mon itored a firm that employs a mixed man ageme nt team. Some are o

38、n EVA related bonus schemes and others on traditi onal bonus pla ns. Whilst they ack no wledge that EVA based man agers perform better that their colleagues, yet their superiority does not ema nate from EVA being a superior performa nee measureme nt tool but in its consistency as a reward process. I

39、nterestingly, they found out divergences in EVA un dersta nding and effect related to differe nt areas within the same firm.On the market value front, Visalta nachoti, Luo and Yi found that the associatio n betwee n traditi onal acco un ti ng performa nee measures, specifically EBIT, and sector retu

40、r ns is higher than that with EVA. That is to say Earnings is superior to EV A in explaining sector market retur ns. Visalta nachoti et al eve n attempted to defi ne and locate this superiority. They point towards EVA inferiority in proxying for future cash flows and its added complication of book-k

41、eep ing adjustme nts.Fergus on, Ren tzler and Yu in vestigated whether adopt ing EVA leads to better stock performanee and by default greater profitability. They did not find sufficient evidenee to prove this albeit hav ing found out that there is some evide nee suggest ing that EVA adopters experie

42、 nee in creased profitability in relati on to their non-EVA peers after adoptio n. At this stage it would have bee n academically in teresti ng should Fergus on et al carried out tests to verify whether this pattern is entrenched or casual. In the absenceof such evidenee, EVA remai ns an elixir.Furt

43、her criticism is levied on the information qualities of EVA. Biddel, Boswen and Wallace found only marginal additional information content beyond traditional earnings II . Joh nson and Soenen dow ngrade EA for its n eglect in address ing the growth pote ntial of a firm. Both sets of sceptics suggest

44、 a static aga inst a dyn amic measureme nt tool look ing at the most as a short term performa nee measure, thus eon sideri ng its range of use and effective ness as sig nifica ntly han dicapped.EVA has bee n academically criticised for the un derly ing weak ness in the relati on ship betwee n shareh

45、older returns and the firm 'EVA qua ntum. Terra nee, Jalbert, Boscalj on, Batala and Rao found minimal evide nee of discrepa ncies betwee n the market returns of firmsadopt ing EVA with traditi onal non-EVA adopters.Thus any form of defenee against the circumstantial discourse of the EVA sceptic

46、s definitely has to be based on the direct correlation between its performanee measurement function and its adaptability as ?the appropriate performanee recognition scheme. A sen sitivity an alysis has to prove that the two are not only directly related but more esse ntially mutually depe ndent thro

47、ugh a com mon bond n amed performa nee II .If its Achilles Heel lies in the perceived vulnerability of the linkage between measurement and performanee, EV s Heraclean strength lies in the lauage that purports to assimilate the two poles. EA asserts to have discovered the Ian guage and thus the formu

48、la to in tegrate performa nee measureme ntwith actual performa nee. This com mon denomin ator allays the in terests of the firm 'most in flue ntial stakeholders and by default, its market valuation. Ochsner probably hit EVA ' sacademic apex by insisting that most valuable man agers have grow

49、 n to distrust acco unting earnings because they cha nge un predictably for non-operational purposes. This carte aeanxdiieing does not only shift the goal postsbut far more dan gerously provide the perfect poti on whe n performa nee rewardi ng comes into play.Marrying EVA to pay-for-performanee meas

50、ures is thus the sine qua non of this futuristic model. EVA becomes an opport un ity to com muni cate performa nee goals and strategies and by eonsequeneea robust eontribution to the intelligent integration between measureme nt and reward. It is along these lines that EVfound its most arde nt promot

51、ers.No doubt the futuristic bus in ess model is partially shaped by the thrust in favour of variable pay. This innovative way of aligning wages and salaries with companies market performanee is, naturally, music to EVA promoters ' eaZll listed three assumptions that permeate this formula. First

52、that money motivates people to work harder. Secondly that in creased motivati on in crease performa nee and thirdly that fair measureme nt of performa nee is possible. EVA purports to provide the perfect ?cocktail within and around these parameters.The fun dame ntal questi on lies in the an alys ing

53、 of productivity and the methods of fairly compe nsati ng people in accorda nee to their relative in put towards these productivity gains. Bellavary and Allen theorise that companies realise that in order to succeed they have to encourage a partnership with their employees. They argue that pay Is a

54、strong com muni cator betwee n an orga ni sati on and its employees. It is only n atural to look at as the most effective Ianguage within an organisation and the one in serious need of defi nin g.Pay is defi nitely a strong motivator but it may not be the stron gest. Fred Herzberg in sists that it i

55、s the job itself which is the prime motivator amon gst employees. Relegat ingpay in the employee hierarchy n eeds |is n aturally in compatible with EVA salleged supremacy as a measuring-rewarding-performing mechanism. The linkage seems to melt un der stress testi ng.Eve n in perceptive terms, the li

56、n kage does no t look compact .In a fairly represe ntative survey con ducted by Kelly Services Employme nt Age ncy in 2006, it resulted that only a quarter of employees not un der any performa nee related pay say that they shall perform better. Pay is the prime motivator but, evide ntly, only for th

57、e mi nority.Kelly found out also that the average perce ntage of employees with performa nee related packages in the EU is 21 per cent. The highest, un dersta ndably, is in the finan cial services at 28 per cent whilst the lowest in educati on at 5 per cent. This is illu min at ing give n the relati

58、ve ease with which the finan cial services in dustry can measure its results aga inst the relative ambiguity and difficulty in measuri ng educati on in stituti ons performa nee.Performa nee Related Pay (prp) became popular in the late Eighties and early Nin eties especially in the US. By 1991, 51 per cent of US compa nies operated some form of prp. In the UK, prp was still at 40 per cent in 1998. This not only con firms its higher popularity and usage in the US but by default also, the pote ntial ri