萨尔瓦多国际经济学件PPT学习教案

1、会计学1 萨尔瓦多国际经济学件萨尔瓦多国际经济学件 第1页/共52页 第2页/共52页 第3页/共52页 第4页/共52页 FIGURE 9-1 Partial Equilibrium Effects of an Import Quota. 第5页/共52页 第6页/共52页 第7页/共52页 第8页/共52页 第9页/共52页 第10页/共52页 第11页/共52页 第12页/共52页 第13页/共52页 第14页/共52页 第15页/共52页 FIGURE 9-2 Partial Equilibrium Effect of an Export Subsidy. 第16页/共52页 第17页

2、/共52页 第18页/共52页 第19页/共52页 第20页/共52页 第21页/共52页 第22页/共52页 nConcerns nDifficult to pick winners and devise appropriate policies to nurture them. nEfforts largely neutralized when leading nations undertake strategic trade policies at the same time. nRetaliation in other markets may eliminate any gains.

3、第23页/共52页 n1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act nRaised average import duties to 59% by 1932. nSpurred international retaliation 第24页/共52页 n1934 Trade Agreements Act nAuthorized the president to negotiate mutual tariff reductions by as much as 5%. nReductions were based on the principle of most favored nati

4、on. nThe most favored nation principle extends to all trading partners any reciprocal tariff reduction negotiated with any trading partner. nFor example, a negotiated reduction with Canada would extend to Mexico if it had most favored nation status. 第25页/共52页 n1947 The General Agreement on Tariffs a

5、nd Trade (GATT) nDesigned to promote expanded international trade through multilateral negotiations. nGATT rested on three basic principles: 1.Nondiscrimination 2.Elimination of nontariff barriers 3.Consultation among nations in solving trade disputes 第26页/共52页 n1950s Movements away from free trade

6、1.Peril-point provisions prevented the president from negotiating tariff reductions that would seriously damage a domestic industry. 2.Escape clause allowed any domestic industry claiming injury from imports to petition for tariff reduction. 3.National security clause prevented tariff reductions whe

7、n they would hurt industries important for national defense. 第27页/共52页 n1962 Trade Expansion Act nAuthorized the president to negotiate across the board tariff reductions of up to 50%. nIntroduced Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to workers displaced by international trade. nAllowed the passage of

8、the Kennedy Round negotiation of the GATT. 第28页/共52页 n1974 Trade Reform Act nAuthorized the president to negotiate tariff reductions of up to 60% and the elimination of tariffs below 5%. nContributed to passage of the Tokyo Round negotiations of the GATT. 第29页/共52页 n1984 The Trade and Tariff Act nAu

9、thorized the president to negotiate international agreements for the protection of intellectual property rights. nExtended the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a system by which developing nation exports are granted preferential access to US markets. nProvided authority for negotiations lead

10、ing to free trade with Israel. 第30页/共52页 n1988 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act nRequired the U.S. Special Trade Representative to set a rigorous schedule for negotiating reductions in trade barriers with countries maintaining high barriers to U.S. exports. 第31页/共52页 FIGURE 9-3 U.S. Average Tariff Rates on Dutiable Imports, 1900-2000. 第32页/共52页 第33页/共52页 第34页/共52页 第35页/共52页 第36页/共52页 第37页/共52页 第38页/共52页 第39页/共52页 第40页/共52页 第41页/共52页 第42页/共52页 第43页/共52页 第44页/共52页 第45页/共52页 第46页/共52页 第47页/共52页 第48页/共52页 FIGURE 9-4 Maximization of the Inte