对可操控资产计提减值的审视【外文翻译】

1、本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译外文出处 accounting horizons sep92，vol6，issue3，p30-41 外文作者 linda j.zucca and david r.campbell 原文：a closer look at discretionary writedowns of impaired assetthe current enviromentan asset is said to be impaired when its book value exceeds some measure of its fair value. when a firm recog

2、nizes this impairment and subsequently records the effect by decreasing the book value of the asset and debiting an income statement account, the firm has recorded a writedown. gaap clearly allows these writedowns in several situations. first, certain current assets, such as marketable securities an

3、d inventories, are examined periodically and adjusted to the lower of cost or market. similarly, long term equity investments are adjusted periodically to the lower of cost or market although the income statement is not affected by the writedown. finally, any long term assets for which disposal is c

4、ontemplated (including assets being sold as part of a discontinued operation) are adjusted to their net realizable value (exit market value less costs of selling and readying for sale). these final typies of writedowns are adequately addressed by apb 30, and there appears to be no confusion on the a

5、pplication of the rules to these situations, nor any reason to reassess apb 30 at this time. most of the writedowns which a firm might normally record would fall into one of these three categories. the writedowns which the fasb would specifically target with their potential regulation would be those

6、 which do not.timing and motivationat the current time, partial writedowns of impaired long-lived assets are recognized at the discretion of management (and with the subsequent support of their auditors). thus, it is important to investigate when management decides that the impairment should he reco

7、rded and what might motivate them to make such a dedsion. it is very difficult to assess the factors which might motivate a manager to record any discretionary event because of the managers inahility or reticence to describe the dedsion process. often the researcher must draw conclusions from the av

8、ailable data to provide apparent motivating factors in the dedsion to record transactions. in this paper, earnings management will be examined as a possible explanation for the timingof and motivation for discretionary writedowns.by observing reported earnings surrounding the period in which the wri

9、tedown was announced, two possihle patterns of earnings management can be identified: income smoothing and l)ig baths. income smoothing describes sm earnings pattern in which management aspires to maintain a steady and predictable rate of earnings growth. management may try to record discretionary g

10、ains, losses, or accruals in the period which will best help them to attain their goal of steady growth. this goal may he perceived as desirable because of a management incentive plan structured to reward smooth earnings patterns, or the hope that the market will equate smooth earnings with lower ri

11、sk and subsequent higher stock prices. thus, in the case of writedowns, a firm with an impaired asset may attempt to record the loss in a period of higher than normal earnings, or it may time the loss to coincide with a non-discretionary gain (for example, winning a substantial settlement in a lawsu

12、it).a second form of earnings management has been referred to as the big bath. under this scenario, the firm appears to save up discretionary losses or accruals and then record several in the same period or in a period in which the firm has already experienced below normal earnings. management might

13、 undertake a big bath to signal investors that bad times are behind them and hetter times will follow. in the case of discretionary asset writedowns, this reasoning is particularly appropriate since a writedown results in decreased depredation expense in the future. the hig bath has been mentioned o

14、ften as a probable motivation for recording asset writedowns. to determine whether earnings management was a possible motivation in the timing of writedowns in this study, a measure of expected eamings was compared to reported earnings for each firm in the period in which the writedown was recorded.

15、 income smoothing is characterized by periods in which prewritedown earnings were higher than expected. by recording the writedown, reported earnings were closer to (but not less than) the level expected. a big bath is characterized by periods in which pre-writedown earnings were already below expec

16、ted earnings. thus, the firm recorded the writedown in a period in which other losses or accruals were already recorded or in a period of below normal operations.financial consequences of discretionary writedownsthe financial consequences of recording discretionary writedowns of impaired assets can

17、be assessed by observing certain finandal indicators at the time of and after the writedown. three specific indicators have been chosen in this study: (1) the reaction of the stock market, (2) the frequency of subsequent merger or acquisition activity, and (3) the subsequent financial health of the

18、firms as measured by certain key ratios. each of these three indicators will be discussed separately.stock market reaction. the average stock returns of the writedown firms (adjusted for cash and stock dividends as well as firm-spedfic risk) were compared with the market return for a period of sixty

19、 days before to sixty days after the announcement of the writedown. on the average, there were no significant unusual or excess returns earned by the writedown firms over this period of time.in addition, they performed similarly to a control group of firms matched on the basis of industry and asset

20、size over the same period of time.these results do not refute the anecdotal evidence that firms announcing discretionary price increases. rather, they indicate that for every firm that achieves these positive results, there is a firm for which the market acts negatively.thus, a firm which records a

21、writedown is just as likely to experience a negative market reaction as it is a positive market reaction.subsequent merger or acquisition activity. some people in the business and academic communities believe that a writedown may be an indicator of some sort of major capital structure change such as

22、 an acquisition of,acquisition by, or a merger with another similarly sized organization. to investigate this contention, each writedown firm was observed rom the writedown date through the end of 1987 for evidence of merger or acquisition activity, and the results were compared with those of firms

23、in similar industries and of similar asset size. the results are presented in table 2.the results indicate that a greater number of the writedown firms engage in subsequent mergers or acquisitions than do firms in similar industries and of similar size which do not record writedowns. however, a chis

24、quared test found that the frequency of subsequent merger or acquisition activity is not significantly higher (at a 0.05 level of significance) for the writedown firms. this means that the apparent differences could be due to chance. there is no statistical evidence to support the contention that fi

25、rms recording discretionary writedowns of impaired assets are more likely to engage in subsequent merger or acquisition activity.subsequent financial health. to evaluate the comparative financial health of the writedown and control firms in the periods surrounding the writedown, four financial varia

26、bles, (1) cash dividend growth, (2) earnings/price ratio, (3) debt to equity ratio, and (4) quarterly return on assets, were measured at six points in time over the period of three years before to three years a|ter the writedown. the period in which the writedown was recorded is not included because

27、 of its obvious impact on the financial variables and to provide a clearer view of the long term trend of each variable. in addition, because of the diverse range of relative size of the writedowns, the writedown firms were split into two groups based on the size of the writedown as a percentage of

28、total assets of the firm. splitting the writedown group in this manner will allow for the observation of the impact of the writedown size on the firms subsequent financial health. these two groups will be referred to as large and smallwritedowns.the results of these calculations and variables are pr

29、esented in figure 4. the significance of the difference in the means of the three groups (large writedowns, small writedowns, and control) at each point in time and for each variable is evaluated using a oneway analysis of variance design.summary and conclusionsthere are several conclusions that can

30、 be drawn firom the results of these empirical tests of discretionary writedowns of impaired assets. first, the number of events located dxiring the test period of 1981 to 1983 is low. this observation may indicate two different situations. first, asset impairments not already covered by gaap could

31、be infrequent. second, and probably more realistic, the number of partial impairments may be significant, but, given the paucity of specific regulatory guidance or requirement, the writedowns are not being recorded. this second situation has particular implications for the standard setting community

32、 since it makes it difficult to estimate the impact of potential regulation. the firms recording writedowns tend to be in capital-intensive industries and tend to be traded on the new york stock exchange. the writedowns also vary in absolute and relative size, again perhaps reflecting the defidendes

33、 in guidance on what comprises impairment.second, the writedowns occur primarily in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, probably because of the more extensive review due to the budgeting and audit processes occurring in that period. management tends to view the writedowns as unusual events and hi

34、ghlights them as separate line items after income from operations. however, even in a period preceding the secs prohibition of extraordinary income statement treatment, none of the firms disclosed the writedown after continuing operations.third, the majority of the firms wrote down their assets in a

35、 period of already below normal earings (a big bath), but 25 percent offset the writedown with other gains or unusually high earnings (income smoothing).these results provide support for the contention that writedowns are being used to manage earnings. finally, the writedowns are not a precursor of

36、improved financial health for the firm. no significant evidence of positive stock market reaction to the writedown announcementcould be foiind. there is no significant increase in merger or acquisition activity for writedown firms as compared to a control group of firms. in general, control firms ou

37、tperformed writedown firms on the basis of key financial characteristics. in addition, the larger the writedown as a percentage of assets, the larger the decline in financial health.for those firms which did decide to record partial writedowns despite the lack of specific regulatory requirements, th

38、is study indicates a less than positive picture. recording the writedown as a fourth quarter adjustment without warning evidence of earnings management,and finally declining financial health which intensifies as the relative size of the writedown increases are all contradictory to the impression oft

39、en given by the financial press, and perhaps management itself, that the writedown is a positive event which will result in increased stock prices and a healthier firm. for the standard setters, it provides a dilemma since it is impossible to determine how many firms actually have impaired assets bu

40、t have so far elected not to record the writedown. the fasb must decide, first of all, the magnitude of the potential problem and then when to require partial writedowns of impaired long-lived assets. once these decisions have been made, then the substantive issues of measurement and disclosure can

41、be addressed.source: zucca,linda j,david r.campbell.a closer look at discretionary writedowns of impaired assetsj.accounting horizons,1992(3):3041.译文：对可操控资产计提减值的审视当前环境当一项资产的账面价值超过其公允价值的时候。这项资产被认为是“减值的”。一个公司确认资产价值的减损，随后记录由减少资产的账面价值和借记损益表账户而带来的影响时，这个公司就记录了“资产减值”。一般的公认会计准则清楚地认同这几种情况下的减记。首先，一定的流动资产，如有价证

42、券、存货，都被定期进行检查，调整为较低的成本或者市价。同样，长期股权投资的价值也定期地调整，以成本与市价孰低计量，尽管利润表没有受到影响。最后，任何拟出售的长期资产(包括资产作为停止经营而被出售的一个组成部分)也被调整为可变现净值。一个公司进行的资产减记大部分都属于以上这三种类别。时机和动机目前，部分受损的寿命较长的资产价值的减记被认为是在管理层决策（和他们的审计人员的支持）的结果。因此，研究管理层作出决策记录资产减值的时间和动机是十分重要的。由于管理层的无能和对于决策过程的沉默，我们很难评估是什么促使管理层记录资产减值。通常研究者可以从得到的数据中得出结论来提供明显的驱动因素。在本文中，盈余

43、管理将被认为企业决策资产减值的一种可能的解释。通过观察，存在两种盈余管理的可能模式：1.收益平滑。2.大清洗。收益平滑是这样一种盈利模式：管理层渴望保持一种稳定的可预测的盈利增长速率。管理层可能尝试记录一些可以支配的收益和亏损，在此期间，尽量帮助他们实现增长稳定的目标。这个目标被视为是可取的，因为管理模式的激励结构，以平滑盈余奖励计划，或者这样一种希望：市场把收益平滑视为一种降低风险和随之带来的较高收益的股票的一种手段。因此，在资产价值减记的情况下，一个有减值资产公司可能会试图记录在一个时期高于正常收入的损失，也可能控制损失的时间，以配合可支配收益（例如，赢得了大量的诉讼及和解）。盈余管理的第

44、二种形式被称为“大清洗。”在这种情况下，公司出现大量计提资产减值的，公司在改期的收益低于正常收益，管理层更有可能进行“大清洗”，目的在于提示投资者说：“困难时期”的背后他们美好的时间将随之而来。在可以控制的资产计提减值准备的情况下，这个理由是合适的，因为资产价值的减计在以后期间可以降低折旧费用。“大清洗”被认为是一种进行资产价值减计的可能动机。确定盈余管理是否在本研究中是适时减计资产价值的可能动机：收益平滑被认为是在计提资产减值之前的收入要高于计提之后的收入。通过计提资产减值，报告收益比较接近（但不低于）预期的水平。而“大清洗”的特点是计提资产减值之前的收入低于预期的业绩，因此，公司记录了一些

45、其他损失，在该会计期间内，收益远远低于预期。计提资产减值的经济后果通过观察计提资产减值中或之后的经济指标来评估价值毁损资产的计提资产减值记录的结果。此次研究有三个指标：股票市场对此的反映，并购的频率，以及通过主要比率来衡量公司财政的健康度。其中每一个指标都得分开讨论。股票市场对此的反映。在披露计提资产减值之后的减记公司平均股价的回升（调整后的现金股利、股票股利和公司特定的风险）带来的市场回报与减计之前60天的平均股价相比较。平均而言，在这段时间内，减记公司并没有其他主要的或是多余的报酬。他们就像公司的控制组一样在同一时间控制着工业和资产的规模。这些结果并不违背公司的价格自由上涨的实例的证据。相反，这表明市场一定会对一些公司产生消极影响。 因此，公司的减记记录就像是经历一个与消极的市场一样的积极市场反应。随后的并购活动。一些经商的和学术领域的人士认为减记意味着主要资